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In the age when ”Big Data” is becoming almost a household word, such abundance of
information in different forms and representations can be of a great help for one’s decision-
making let it be a trader betting on a stock, or a policy-maker assessing the potential impact
of proposed regulation. Whereas traditional economic research is primarily based on the use
of numerical data continuous or discrete, there is a great deal of useful information that
can be extracted from text data. Such information can power novel identification strategies
or help perceive solutions from a different angle, but observed volumes of such data as well
as its textual format require additional preprocessing techniques. Recent expansions in the
Data Science methods allow to successfully use this alternative source of information and
complement traditional economic modelling with a new insight.
Abundant ”Big Data” information fuels search for yet new market predictors. Some
areas of research, asset pricing for instance, produced hundreds of such factors over the past
few decades. However, many of these factors are weak and often lose their predicting power
altogether after the date of publication. Moreover, traditional least squares approach would
break down when stuffed by the hundreds of these factors, some of which are, in addition,
quite highly correlated. To tame the ”zoo” of the factors in a given problem, one would
want to consider alternative methods suggested in the data science literature, which allow
for regularization as well as potential non-linearities in the unobserved model structure.
v
Regularization can also be useful in building a counterfactual – a technique so often used
in a policy evaluation questions. In assessment of certain legislations effect on the individual
or a firm, a construction of hypothetical world in which this regulation never took place is
often done through weighted averaging of the units (other individuals, or firms) which were
not subject to the regulation. Calculation of weights is an optimization process stability of
which requires a set of certain constraints. Some of these constraints contradict natural way
of things in certain policy evaluation problems. Thus, to relax these constraints, especially
in the case where the number of unaffected units is large, one could apply regularization
methods and derive the weights that are suitable to the true nature of the problem.
In my dissertation, I assess the potential of usage of the machine learning methods in
finance and policy evaluation. The results show that these methods prove to be useful
additions to the traditional econometric approach.
This dissertation consists of two chapters.
Chapter 1 In this study, I assess presence of herding and contrarian behavior in the stock
market proxied by StockTweets authors. The personal signal of the traders about changes in
the stock price is approximated by the news headlines from Reuters. I find that the market
populated by the small (retail) traders which are eager to exchange their thoughts on the
micro-blog is likely to exhibit presence of herding and contrarian behavior. Moreover, these
social behavior estimates can be used as an insight about the stock price volatility, especially
in the case of tech firms, which product/service is harder to evaluate.
Chapter 2 The Volcker Rule (also known as Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act) was put
into law in 2010 to regulate prop trading activities of Wall Street banks. To assess the effect
of the Rule on Banks’ revenues and riskiness of their activity I apply a synthetic control
method in a form of the elastic net regression. The identification strategy is based on 10-K
vi
filings text data. I find that the total gross notional amounts of derivative contracts held
for the purpose other than trading would have been lower in the post-Volcker era, had there
been no Volcker Rule signed into law, possibly suggesting an increase in the market-making
or hedging activity of the banks. The bigger banks also show a decrease in riskiness of their
activity and trading assets, although this result is statistically significant only for the few last
observed months in the testing window. No significant impact of the Rule on profitability
or assets available for sale has been found.
Contents
Contents vii
List of Tables ix
List of Figures xiii
1 Herding in Social Media 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Herding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Structural model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.5.1 Tweet classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.5.2 News polarity filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5.3 Spatial (network) regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5.4 Herding and stock price volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.6 Estimation and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.6.1 Classification performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.6.2 News impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.6.3 Herding and Contrarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
vii
CONTENTS viii
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2 Banks under the Volcker Rule: Elastic Net Approach 78
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.3 Model and inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.4 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.6 Estimation and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Bibliography 120
List of Tables
1.1 Firms. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.2 Tweets. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.3 Classification performance comparison. Area under the curve . . . . . . . . . 32
1.4 Classification performance comparison. Accuracy, Precision and Recall . . . 33
1.5 Post-classification Bull and Bear sentiment. Whole sample . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.6 ”Bull”/”Bear” tagging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.7 News coverage and news polarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.8 Relationship between News and Sentiment Class. Weekend Included . . . . . 36
1.9 Relationship between News and Sentiment Probability. Weekend included . . 37
1.10 Relationship between News and Sentiment Class. Weekend not Included . . 37
1.11 Relationship between News and Sentiment Probability. Weekend not included 38
1.12 Reply delay. Days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.13 Rho. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.14 Realized volatility (10 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Log-
odds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.15 Realized volatility (10 days) vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Log-odds 40
1.16 Realized volatility (10 days) vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Probability 40
1.17 Realized volatility (10 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Prob-
ability) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
ix
LIST OF TABLES x
1.18 Realized volatility (14 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Log-
odds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.19 .Realized volatility (14 days) vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Log-odds) 42
1.20 Realized volatility (14 days) vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Probability 42
1.21 Realized volatility (14 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Prob-
ability) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.22 Realized volatility (30 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Log-
odds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.23 Realized volatility (30 days) vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Log-odds) 44
1.24 Realized volatility (30 days) vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Probability) 44
1.25 Realized volatility (30 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Prob-
ability) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.26 Intraday realized volatility vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Log-
odds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.27 Intraday realized volatility vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Log-odds) 46
1.28 Intraday realized volatility vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Probability) 46
1.29 Realized volatility (30 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Prob-
ability) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.30 R-squared and partial R-squared in the regression on lagged Volatility and
Herding Rho (directional W matrix) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.31 R-squared and partial R-squared in the regression on lagged Volatility and
Herding Rho (non-directional W matrix) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.32 R-squared and partial R-squared in the regression on lagged Volatility and
Herding Rho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.33 ADF test statistics. News Polarity and Rho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
LIST OF TABLES xi
1.34 R-squared and partial R-squared in the regression of differenced volatility on
lagged differenced volatility and Herding Rho (non-directional W matrix) . . 50
1.35 R-squared and partial R-squared in the regression of differenced volatility on
lagged differenced volatility and Herding Rho (directional W matrix) . . . . 51
2.1 Variable Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.2 Summary statistics. Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.3 Summary statistics. Variables of Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.4 Summary statistics. Covariates. Control banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.5 Summary statistics. Covariates. Control banks. Continued . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.6 Summary statistics. Covariates. Small banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2.7 Summary statistics. Covariates. Big banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2.8 Weights. Big representative bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.9 Weights. Big representative bank. Continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
2.10 Weights. Small representative bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.11 Weights. Small representative bank. Continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
2.12 stimates of gaps for a representative treated unit. Big Banks. Calculated as
observed minus predicted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.13 Estimates of gaps for a representative treated unit. Small Banks. Calculated
as observed minus predicted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.14 Estimates of gaps in Trading Assets as the percentage of Total Assets. Big
Banks. Calculated as observed minus predicted. Bank by bank calculation . 108
2.15 Estimates of gaps in Trading Assets as the percentage of Total Assets. Small
Banks. Calculated as observed minus predicted. Bank by bank calculation . 108
LIST OF TABLES xii
2.16 Estimates of gaps in IB advisory, brockerage, and underwriting fees and com-
mission as a percentage of interest and non-interest income. Big Banks. Cal-
culated as observed minus predicted. Bank by bank calculation . . . . . . . 109
2.17 Estimates of gaps in IB advisory, brockerage, and underwriting fees and com-
mission as a percentage of interest and non-interest income. Small Banks.
Calculated as observed minus predicted. Bank by bank calculation . . . . . . 110
2.18 Estimates of gaps in derivatives held for trading. Big Banks. Calculated as
observed minus predicted. Bank by bank calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.19 Estimates of gaps in derivatives held for trading. Small Banks. Calculated as
observed minus predicted. Bank by bank calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.20 Estimates of gaps in derivatives held for the purpose other than trading. Big
Banks. Calculated as observed minus predicted. Bank by bank calculation . 112
2.21 Estimates of gaps in derivatives held for the purpose other than trading. Small
Banks. Calculated as observed minus predicted. Bank by bank calculation . 112
2.22 Estimates of gaps in Z-score. Big Banks. Calculated as observed minus pre-
dicted. Bank by bank calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2.23 Estimates of gaps in Zscore. Small Banks. Calculated as observed minus
predicted. Bank by bank calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
2.24 Estimates of gaps in AFS securities as a percentage of Total Assets. Big
Banks. Calculated as observed minus predicted. Bank by bank calculation . 115
2.25 Estimates of gaps in AFS securities as a percentage of Total Assets. Small
Banks. Calculated as observed minus predicted. Bank by bank calculation . 116
List of Figures
1.1 Stocks’ Amihud measure of illiquidity and social media coverage . . . . . . . 52
1.2 Stocks with sufficient continuous tweet data and their log-Amihud illiquidity 53
1.3 Histograms of disturbances as defined by Equation (8) . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.4 Histograms of disturbances as defined by Equation (8). Continued . . . . . . 55
1.5 Histograms of disturbances as defined by Equation (8). Continued . . . . . . 56
1.6 Histograms of disturbances as defined by Equation (13) . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.7 Histograms of disturbances as defined by Equation (13). Continued . . . . . 58
1.8 Histograms of disturbances as defined by Equation (13). Continued . . . . . 59
1.9 Value of Gamma against its P-value. Gammas as specified in Equation (8) . 60
1.10 Value of Gamma against its P-value. Gammas as specified in Equation (8).
Continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.11 Value of Gamma against its P-value. Gammas as specified in Equation (8).
Continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1.12 Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to matu-
rity and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from
non-directional W’s, right panels represent directional W’s . . . . . . . . . . 63
1.13 Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to matu-
rity and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from
non-directional W’s, right panels represent directional W’s. Continued . . . . 64
xiii
LIST OF FIGURES xiv
1.14 Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to matu-
rity and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from
non-directional W’s, right panels represent directional W’s. Continued . . . . 65
1.15 Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to matu-
rity and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from
non-directional W’s, right panels represent directional W’s. Continued . . . . 66
1.16 Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to matu-
rity and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from
non-directional W’s, right panels represent directional W’s. Continued . . . . 67
1.17 Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to matu-
rity and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from
non-directional W’s, right panels represent directional W’s. Continued . . . . 68
1.18 ACF plots for the News Polarity for each stock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
1.19 ACF plots for the News Polarity for each stock. Continued . . . . . . . . . . 70
1.20 ACF plots for the herding rho for each stock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
1.21 ACF plots for the herding rho for each stock. Continued . . . . . . . . . . . 72
1.22 Plots of herding rho over time for each stock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
1.23 Plots of herding rho over time for each stock. Continued . . . . . . . . . . . 74
1.24 Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to matu-
rity and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from
non-directional W’s, right panels represent directional W’s. Decisions filtered
through seven lags of news. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
1.25 Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to matu-
rity and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from
non-directional W’s, right panels represent directional W’s. Decisions filtered
through seven lags of news. Continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
LIST OF FIGURES xv
1.26 Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to matu-
rity and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from
non-directional W’s, right panels represent directional W’s. Decisions filtered
through seven lags of news. Continued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.1 Covariates. Total Asset weighted average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
2.2 Synthetic control vs true values. Representative big bank . . . . . . . . . . . 118
2.3 Synthetic control vs true values. Representative small bank . . . . . . . . . . 119
Chapter 1
Herding in Social Media
1.1 Introduction
Volatility prediction is a key task in risk management: poor risk assessment might leave
investors overexposed to the market fluctuations and financial institutions insufficiently cap-
italized. The financial meltdown of 2008 indicated a need to reassess risk-modelling practices
as well as volatility forecasting tools, and to assure the validity of the forecast particularly
amid most adverse economic scenarios. Up till now, the primary focus of volatility modeling
was placed on the method rather than data available at hand. In this study, I consider
alternative sources of information (in particular social media text data) that can be useful
in the stock volatility prediction.
A good portion of stock price swings can be explained by herd behavior, a phenomenon
in which traders intentionally ignore their beliefs in order to mimic someone else’s action.
As noted by Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000),
mutual mimicry among investors may temporarily move asset prices away from fundamental
values, which in turn would increase the spread around the mean. Modeling herding, how-
ever, is not an easy task. In previous empirical studies, the presence of herding was analyzed
1
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through the means of statistical clustering, or it was inferred from the sequence and timing
of orders to buy or sell using the generalized Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model.
Recent advances in communication and computer science have made information easily
accessible to all traders. In particular, with the advent of social media, professional investor
thoughts have become available to an average trader: virtual investing communities share in-
vestment recommendations and proprietary analysis; they allow for discussion, collaboration
and monitoring of other participants decision making process (Oh and Sheng (2011)). People
tend to pay more attention to ideas that are reinforced by conversations (Hirshleifer (2001)),
and social media platforms allow such conversations to exist and thrive. Microblogging is
a perfect nurturing place for ideas; sentiment emerges and spreads through the web joining
the continuous flow of information that then feeds into the stock price changes. Building on
this observation, recent studies show that stock microblog sentiment extracted from online
traders conversations has predictive (although marginally small) power in forecasting future
stock price movements (Sun et al. (2016); Oh and Sheng (2011)).
These results led me to consider herding in social media – a place where discussion be-
tween traders could be directly captured and modeled in a network context. This interaction
between agents has not been considered before in empirical herding studies, and it adds to
existing literature of social learning behaviors in financial markets.
Given the network structure of the StockTwits data1, I use news-filtered trade decision
in the regression that takes into account network effect. The regression coefficient captures
the herding effect, which has predictive power in forecasting the stock price volatility.
1The StockTwits data used in this study are kindly provided by the StockTwits Inc. (stocktwits.com)
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1.2 Herding
The stock market is organized as a continuous double auction where agents act sequentially.
Such market structure allows for disproportionate impact of earlier decisions on following
trades and future, sometimes long-term, outcomes. An agent might be observant of oth-
ers’ decisions and ignore his private information in part or in whole to follow the lead of
his predecessors. The trading by an informed agent who follows the trend in past trades
contradictory to his personal information is known as herd behavior. Such behavior is not
irrational from a perspective that the predecessor’s decisions might reflect information that
the agent does not possess (asymmetry of information is imposed). In the grand scheme of
things, however, imitative actions of multiple agents will not mirror their private informa-
tion in full and, hence, be less informative to their successors. Banerjee (1992) finds that
information reduction in the equilibrium could be quite substantial.
Unlike Banerjee (1992), Avery and Zemsky (1998) show that there are limits to price
distortions caused by herding. They note that herding occurs only under a very special
signal structure. In this setting, even extreme cases of herding have little effect on stock
prices. The authors then investigate conditions under which herding can lead to bubbles and
crashes and find such state of the world is very unlikely to happen. They show that herd
behavior does not lead to excess volatility; ex ante expected market volatility is determined
by fundamentals only.
Park and Sabourian (2011) reconsider these results. The authors note that the ”intu-
itively appealing example” in Avery and Zemsky (1998) is only a special case of their own
framework: they show that herding as well as contrarianism (a natural counterpart of herd-
ing) might take place in a much more likely economic setting. Moreover, both types of social
learning behavior could be consistent with large movements in prices. These findings are
based on the hypothesis that a trader herds only if, according to his beliefs, his private signal
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is generated from a fat-tailed distribution where extreme realizations are more likely than
the moderate ones (a so-called U-shaped property of a signal); a trader is expected to act as
a contrarian if the signal induces him to believe that it was generated by a moderate state
realization (a hill-shaped signal).
The findings of the aforementioned and other theoretical studies (Bikhchandani et al.
(1992), Ho Lee (1998), Cipriani and Guarino (2014) have identified mechanisms of social
learning behaviors in an abstract environment. All empirical attempts to test these theories
have faced the same problem: traders private information is unobservable and so it is hard to
know whether the action to buy or sell was based on traders private signal or his predecessors
decision. To shed some light on the problem, empiricists have tried to detect herding through
clustering in trades (Lakonishok et al. (1992), Wermers (1999)), yet they themselves admit
that such coordinated actions of traders might not necessarily be due to herding but be a
reasonable reaction to a public announcement (Cipriani and Guarino (2014)).
Inability to test theory empirically has brought the question into the lab. There is a
plethora of studies assessing herding and contrarianism in experimental setting (Cipriani
and Guarino (2014); Drehmann et al. (2005)). Experimental design, while offering an ad-
vantage of complete control over selection and omitted variable bias (if conducted correctly)
(J. Bloomfield et al. (2007)), has its own limitations: experiments often lack in external va-
lidity. One attempt to overcome the latter is done by Drehmann et al. (2005). Interestingly,
when testing Avery and Zemsky (1998) theory in lab, they find that herd behavior does
not seem to be an important force in financial markets; the agents tend to act differently
from their predecessors, and their contrarian behavior, while not always being profitable,
has stabilizing effect on the market as a whole. Almost a decade later, using field data,
Cipriani and Guarino (2014) attempt to empirically test herding, modeled similar to Avery
and Zemsky (1998). Unlike previous empirical work, the authors allow for possibility of
informed traders to receive noisy signals so that a decision to ignore private information
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may, in fact, be optimal. In such a setting, the sequence in which orders arrive is important.
The authors exploit historical transaction data for a NYSE stock to illustrate the model;
they find that only 2% (4%) of the informed traders herd-buy (herd-sell) which is smaller
than found in previous research using the clustering approach. They note, however, that
because traders do not exploit their private information, price discovery slows down: the
misalignment between market prices and fundamental values is found to be 4%.
An assumption of imperfect private signaling is gaining importance in recent literature
on social learning behavior. As Drehmann et al. (2005) note, in old models with perfectly
informed traders where a market-maker sets the bid-ask spread, no trade would occur; hence,
the noise traders are introduced. It appears, though, that such ad hoc imposition of noise
is not needed — in their experiment authors find that noise emerges automatically due to
the irrationality of some trades: the distribution of irrational trades across agents is not
statistically different from a distribution of trades that would have been obtained if each
trader made rational decision with some probability (in their study, a probability of 0.65).
The authors, however, suggest that the reason for such, to some extent irrational, decision
making is not so much an extraction of relevant information but processing it correctly. In
such a case, I speculate, the agents could herd not only because of asymmetry in observable
information but also due to differing information processing skill sets — a novice is likely to
seek advice from an experienced trader.
1.3 Structural model
To model the trader’s behavior, I consider the following structural set-up. Let K be a
universe of the traders that define market. Each trader, i, i ∈ [1 : K], makes a decision, Git,s
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to buy or sell stock, s, at time t as a result of processing his information set, Ωit,s:
Git,s = Fi(Ωit,s) (1.1)
where the processing function, Fi() is heterogeneous across the traders. The information set,
Ωit,s, can be decomposed into a readily available, public information component about this
stock, Nit,s, and an unobserved, idiosyncratic subset of the information set, eit,s so that
Git,s = Fi(Nit,s, eit,s) (1.2)
For simplicity and interpretability of the approach, let Fi() be a linear function,
Git,s = γ0i,s + γ1i,sNt,s + eit,s (1.3)
allowing (γ0i,s, γ1i,s) to account for the heterogeneous information-processing technology.
Nit,s is publicly available information found in the news and public reports, which could,
potentially, be quantified: the natural language processing literature has grown a decent
text processing tool-kit, allowing for such task to be done. However, eit,s, is a seemingly
missing piece of the puzzle, capturing anything from insider information to signals sent from
other traders.
The daily trades data, a natural proxy for Git,s do not allow for further exploration and
decomposition of the idiosyncratic subset of the information set, eit,s. One would want to
observe the interaction of those who submit the buy/sell order with other traders, e−it,s, as
well as other sources of information, ηit,s, so that following could be modeled:
eit,s = H(e−it,s, ηit,s) (1.4)
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The interaction between traders can be observed directly as they post their tweets on the
micro-blog. Thus, making a strong assumption that the tweets reflect the traders’ actions,
one could obtain a partial proxy for the otherwise unobservable private signal by exploring
a network connection between the trader’s decisions on a given day.
Tweets, however, are collections of words, xit,s; they are not buy or sell orders. Even
so, words have meaning bearing bearish or bullish sentiment. I assume that the aggregate
sentiment expressed by the collection of words is a reflection of the trader’s buy/sell order.
Given this logic, the following words-to-decision matching function, Ψ holds:
Git,s = Ψ(xit,s|Nit,s, eit,s) (1.5)
1.4 Data
To model herding and contrarianism in social media, I use stock microblogging service (Stock-
Twits) text data. StockTwits is a social media platform that aggregates stock-related tweets
of (as of 2016) over 300,000 users, and is viewed by approximately 40 million people worldwide
(Sun et al. (2016)). The content of blog is filtered to weed out finance-unrelated messages
and spam, so an average participant/observer can enjoy a (relatively) high quality, large
scale continuous stream of data.
The coverage of the stock in mass and social media is potentially related to the level of its
liquidity. I consider stocks on the part of spectrum of their illiquidity as measured by Amihud
(2002) to capture differences in the herding levels for frequently traded as well as slightly
less liquid equities. The Amihud measure was calculated for all stocks traded on NYSE,
NASDAQ, or AMEX exchanges during the time window covered in the study (January 2014
- December 2016) using daily absolute returns and daily dollar trading volume as obtained
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from CRSP and averaged over three years.2 To assure a sufficient number of the tweet
observations for each trading day, I consider the 100 most liquid stocks. Figure 1 (a) shows
the distribution of log Amihud measure where left tail represents the most liquid stocks;
panel (b) shows the volume of messages across the stocks collected during January 2014.
Even though there is a negative relationship between the Amihud measure of illiquidity and
social media coverage, the relationship is not perfectly linear: out of 100 of most liquid
stocks, only 22 preserved continuity3 in the discussion about the stock through the time
window of three years. These stocks were chosen for the further analysis. The illiquidity
levels as well as the stocks of the choice are presented in the Figure 2.
For each stock, from the total body of messages that cover three years (2014-2016) of
microblogging history, I extract all tweets based on the presence of the stock of choice cashtag
(”$AAPL” for example) in text as well as all available information about authors of these
tweets.4. Responses to these tweets and retweets are extracted based on the initial message
ID that is also saved in the StockTwits data. Such data structure allows to explore a whole
dialog of StockTwits participants with regards to a specific asset.
In text pre-processing, I follow Sun et al. (2016): the text is cleaned from non-words
terms, such as cashtags, numbers, URLs, and emoticons; punctuation, other symbols and
unnecessary spaces also removed; all text is turned into lowercase. A resulting vector of
2To calculate the Amihud measure of illiquidity, all firms traded over the 2014-2016 time window were
considered. Out of 8509 firms extracted from the CRSP database, only firms that were traded every day
(756 days within 3 year time span) were selected. Firms with changing (multiple per PERMNO) tickers were






Dvoli,t×Pi,t ∀i ∈ [1 : 3741] where D
= number of days in the time window (765), |ri,t| = absolute daily return, Dvoli,t = daily number of shares
traded, and Pi,t = daily price for stock i. The mean Amihud illiquidity over the 5387 stocks is 0.44, which
is in line with the Amihud (2002) seminal study. The Amihud illiquidity measure is reported as multiplied
by 106.
3Since the goal of this study is to calculate a daily social media herding proxy, it requires presence of
such discussion (interaction) each day. Since the time span in this study is three years, it is not easy to find
such firms that are constantly in a ”spotlight”. This is also the explanation for a slight tilt in the choice of
the firms towards the Tech industry.
4The available data about actors includes information about the type of trader, experience, the number
of followers and the number following actors and stocks, etc., however, due to the high degree of non-
responsiveness to the majority of personal data questions, only followers count was used in the analysis.
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messages is then trimmed by few blank messages which are an outcome of cleaning.5 Roughly
20% of the original messages have a bullish or bearish sentiment already noted by the author,
as shown in the Table 2. This part of the tweets sample is used to train the algorithm to
classify all other tweets into an intention to buy or sell.
By definition, an agent herds when he ignores his private signal and follows the lead of his
predecessors. To account for the private signal, I use stock-related public announcements.
Reuters’ ”Company News” subsection in the ”Stocks” section is scraped to cover the analyzed
22 stocks over 2014-2016 years.6 Given a limited-symbol but highly informative nature of
the news headlines, they are used to determine the news polarity, as described in the next
Section. Duplicated news headlines are removed; the polarity is averaged across distinct
news items that came out on a given day.
Once herding existence established, the question becomes whether and how it affects
the stock market. As a first stab at this question, I compare the obtained daily herd-
ing estimate for each stock to the measures of the stock volatility. The realized (histori-
cal) volatility series over 10, 14, and 30 days are obtained from the OptionMetrix dataset.
In addition, implied volatility surface was also extracted for the call option with expira-
tion of 30, 60, 91, 122, 152, 182, 273, 365, 547 and 730 days over a vector of delta,7
δ ∈ {20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80}. To account for the short-term effect of
herding on the stock volatility, I also construct an intra-day volatility measure for the year
of 2014 following the Barndorff-Nielsen (2004) procedure and using TAQ trades data.
5Out of the blank messages only those without the sentiment are trimmed
6For example, the news story about Apple aiming for April to launch TV service with
CBS, Viacom, and Starz would be located at https://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/company-
news/AAPL.O?date=10032017, the story was published on February 13, 2019 for AAPL which is traded on
NASDAQ. These three inputs are used to download story as HTML data
7Delta of an option indicates the response in option premium to a $1.00 change in underlying price.
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1.5 Method
The following subsections describe the steps taken in the analysis of herding in social media
and its effects on the stock market. Section 5.1 describes the algorithm by which tweets of
StockTweets micro-blog are classified. Section 5.2 outlines the method by which the classified
tweets are related tho the public news releases. This leaves the residual component in the
tweets that is subsequently entered into a network model to extract the evidence of herding
and contrarian behavior, as described in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, the herding parameters
are collected and examined as a potential predictor for the stock market volatility.
1.5.1 Tweet classification
Regularized logit — a workhorse of machine learning (in Lee et al. (2006)) — is a simple,
time-efficient yet powerful classification model which, unlike many of the machine learning
methods, allows for interpretation: each covariate can be assessed with respect to how it
affects the classification result. A big advantage of log-linear models in general, as compared
to the discriminative machine learning models, support vector machines (SVMs) for instance,
is that in addition to providing a classification rule, such models also offer an estimate of
probability (Tsuruoka et al. (2009), Zhu and Hastie (2005)) and this probabilistic outcome
can be further used in the text processing pipeline. It is also worth mentioning that, if
executed properly, regularized logit performs on par with SVM (Zhang and Oles (2000)),
which together with aforementioned benefits makes it one of the most applied models in
traditional machine learning.
The training of logistic algorithm involves a maximum likelihood estimation procedure
aiming to obtain the weight for the features that would maximize conditional likelihood
function of the training set. In the natural language processing exercise, each feature xi ∈
{0, 1} is a binary word occurrence indicating whether the word was used in the document
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i (Zhang and Oles (2000)). In this application, each document is represented by the pre-
processed tweet; for the purpose of classification of the remaining 80% of the tweets, the
tweet-feature matrix, x is created with the dimension of n rows for tweets and k columns for
the features as observed in the training set.
Assuming that the trader’s intention to buy or sell, as inferred from the tweet, is denoted
by a variable g = [1, 0], the probabilities through a linear function of predictors are:




Pr(g = 0|x) = 1
1 + e(β0+x′β)
= 1− Pr(g = 1|x) (1.7)
In text analysis, due to sparseness of x and large (often larger than the number of
observations) number of features extracted from the text, regularization is required. To
enhance the prediction accuracy and model parsimony and interpretability, one would like
to retain only the features with the strongest effect. Hense, to classify non-tagged tweets
into intention to buy or sell, I use a logit algorithm with l1-regularization. Given the large
volume of the text data, I follow Tsuruoka et al. (2009) algorithm in the execution of this
classification method.







{I(gi = 1)logp(xi) + I(gi = 0)log(1− p(xi))} − λPα(β) (1.8)
where p(xi) = Pr(gi = 1|xi) is the probability for observation i at a particular value of
parameters (β) and Pα(β) is an l1 penalty:
∑k
j=1 |βj|. λ is a hyper-parameter which controls
the degree of the regularization and which is estimated via a cross-validation procedure.
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where L(i, β) = logp(gi|xi; β). To speed up the computational process, stochastic gradient
descent approach is applied: a small randomly selected subset of the training set is used
to approximate the gradient of the objective function in the Equation (9); the size of this
subset is called a batch size and the batch size of n would represent the gradient descent
approach. By using smaller batch size, one can update the coefficients more frequently and
accelerate the convergence. In particular, the (p+ 1)th update would be:











where p is the iteration number and ηp is the learning rate calculated as ηp = η0α
−p/n where
α is a constant.
As Tsuruoka et al. (2009) note, the computational difficulty of the l1 regularization is
that the last term in the Equation (10) is not differentiable when β is zero, so the proposed
solution is to update weights while dropping the regularization term, and then to adjust β’s
by the difference between the absolute value of the total l1 penalty that each β could have
received and the total penalty that they actually received up to this point.
1.5.2 News polarity filtering
Recent developments in computer science and digitalization of mass media have made infor-
mation more accessible to an average trader. The idea of ”putting the information at one’s
fingertips” was championed by Bill Gates in 1980s, and over the past few decades this, at
the time seemingly futuristic, idea became a reality (McFedries (2009)). The key accelerator
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here was the development of the so-called ”small tech”, in particular, small, thin client de-
vices that would be web-connected and, hence, allow for things to be ”googleable.” Recent
digitalization of the news reflects this trend: according to the Pew Research Center, 93% of
the adults get at least some of their news online and over 90% of this number are getting
their news from their mobile device (Lu (2017)).
Such a vast accessibility of news underlines my assumption that each trader receives a
similar set of information each day. However, this information is not a precise signal to buy
or sell. Rather, each trader processes it in a certain, heterogeneous, way and uses it in full or
in part in his trade decision. Heterogeneity of private information signal processing has been
suggested earlier by Drehmann et al. (2005) especially in case when information is imprecise
or ambiguous.
In this study, I approximate the personal information set of each trader by the individually
processed headlines of stock-related Reuters news. I assume that the public information in
the form of daily news is an input into the personal signal formation process: each trader
possesses a heterogeneous ”technology” of how public information is translated into a private
signal, and this ”technology” can be captured by the parameters of the model that relates
public and private information sets. The private information set is then used to execute a
buy or sell decision (or in the case of StockTweets, post a tweet with a buy- or sell sentiment).
News headlines are word-count-limited, short messages that absorb the main idea from
the news report. All such features of these textual data are useful to have, given limitations
of the news sentiment analysis that is chosen in this study.
One of the biggest challenges of news sentiment analysis is a scarce or altogether absent
training set (John and Vechtomova (2017)). When supervised learning is not feasible, the
most commonly adopted approach in the identification of semantic orientation is to use
polarity lexicons — the so-called bag-of-words approach. I follow the Rinkler (2019) version
of such method employing lexicon specific to the financial texts Loughran and McDonald
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(2011). The news polarity estimation follows Rinkler (2019) methodology, which unfolds in
a following way.
Denote each news headline sj which is broken into a vector of words {w1, w2, ...wnj} of the
length n. Each word is then searched in the dictionary (lexicon) of choice. Words that were
matched to positive (negative) category in the dictionary are assigned a value of +1 (−1)
and are denoted to be polarized words (pwi). Around each polarized word a polar cluster
(ci∀i ∈ [1 : k]) is formed; each polar cluster contains polarized word itself, two immediately
preceding, and two immediately succeeding words - (wk,i, where k ∈ [1 : 4]). The words in
the polar cluster are considered to be valence shifters and include:
• neutral - (w0k,i); have no value in equation but affect the total count of words in the
headline;
• amplifier or deapmlifier - (wak,i or wdk,i) increase (decrease) polarity of a cluster by a
multiple of 1.8.
• negator - (wnk,i); if the cluster contains an odd number of negators the amplifier is
converted to de-amplifier and vice versa. Odd number of negators also flips the sign of
the polarized word.
• adversative conjunction (wck,i) also upweigths (downweigths) the cluster by 0.85 if it
appears before (after) the polarized word. This is based on the belief that adversative
conjunction makes the following close of a higher value while lowering the value of the
previous clause.
The unbounded polarity score, NPj is then calculated as a sum of cluster values scaled by the




. The result of this news sentiment
analysis is an unbounded polarity score for each news headline.
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By definition, herding (contrarianism) represents following the lead of the predecessor
(trading against the predecessor) at the expense of one’s own information. I assume that
each actor’s personal signal is created as a news release processed in a certain way for a given
day. To factor in the trader’s personal information set, which traders face every day, I filter
obtained intention to buy or sell by the stock news polarity score, NPt−1.
8 For each trader




= γ0i,s + γ1i,sNPt−1,s + eit,s (1.11)
where xit,s denotes a set of words in which i
th trader expresses his sentiment to buy or
sell stock s at the time t. The residual, eit,s is the filtered decision to buy or sell which I
will subsequently use in a spatial lag regression. Note that the estimation is carried over
each actor separately, delivering (γ0, γ1) for each i for each stock, which is in line with the
heterogeneous information processing assumption.
In addition to the specification which uses log-odds as dependent variable in concert with
the logistic regression estimated as described in the Equation (8), I consider a model in which
Probability, as a continuous measure, is ”filtered” by the News Polarity so that
Pr(git,s = 1|xit,s) = α0i,s + α1i,sNPt−1,s + eit,s (1.12)
This is done as a robustness check for the potential imprecision in the classification executed
according to the Section 4.1.
8To ensure that the news comes out before the tweet is posted.
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1.5.3 Spatial (network) regression
The news-filtered decision to buy or sell captures a deviation from the actor’s news-based
trading rule. This part of the decision reflects trader idiosyncrasies that, in part, might be due
to either irrational social behavior or unobserved subset of information that is not available
to the public (insider information). In this application, I assume that the insider information
is unavailable to the trader, given the nature of the proxy (StockTwits microblog) which I
use for the market — such information is unlikely to be spread in social media, at least at
the point when the deal is made.
To capture the commonality in the irrational part of the traders’ decisions, I place these
residuals, eit,s in a regression model that takes into account the network effect. Let est be
the vector of residuals eit,s of all recorded twits about stock s on day t. Here, t is defined as
a calendar business day, for which messages related to the particular stock and responses to
these messages are collected. To account for the delay in response to the issue discussed on
day t, any message tweeted on the following day in response to the relevant messages posted
on the day t are also included into day t and excluded from day t+ 1.
est = ρstWstest + εst (1.13)
εst ∼ N(0, σ2stIst) (1.14)
where ρst is scalar parameter on the autoregressive part of spatial regression on day t data.
Wst is the spatial weights matrix for the day t obtained in a following way.
For ease of exposition, I omit the subscripts s and t for now. Let wadji,j be an element of
spatial weights matrix, W , that represents the weight of influence of jth actor on ith actor’s
decision. Calculation of each such element is a modification of the procedure presented in
Getis and Aldstadt (2004) that replaces the distance criterion by interaction and adjusts
calculated weights by the significance of the affecting actor.
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Step 1. Define w∗i,j as
w∗i,j =
1, if trader i interacts with trader j0, otherwise (1.15)
Here interaction is considered as a dialog between ith and jth trader rather than a unique
message sent from one to another. This is done in order to avoid double-counting of traders’
opinions.
Step 2. Normalize the spatial weights by the count of the followers. Customary in









wi,j = 1. In that case, wi,j is equal for each column where it is non-zero in the
ith row, suggesting equal impact of other traders with which ith trader had discussions. I








This procedure yields a non-symmetric direction-preserving weights matrix. In addition, I
also consider a symmetric version of it, which requires a one extra step:






Here, the matrix would capture an interaction rather than a response, and such interaction
would bear a weight of the initiator of the discussion or of the sum of initiator and the
discussant if the interaction was two-sided.
Thus, the spatial weights matrix Wst is built based on the total number of interactions
between the agents (retweet, response to tweet) weighted by significance of the initiating
agents which is proxied by a number of followers that they have. The matrix has a dynamic
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nature: new agents join StockTweets and discover each other over time, and the number of
followers is also time-dependent. To capture this, I calculate the spatial weights matrix for
every day. ρ̂t,s is then obtained for each trading day for each stock; it is an estimate of the
extent to which the agents on average follow their predecessors decisions, at the expense of
processed public announcement. I will further refer to it as ”herding rho”.
Public announcements have a discrete nature and do not necessarily come out every
trading day. In such cases, the private signal of a trader is a function of zero public news (or
a publicly unavailable, insider information) and trades made on this day are most likely a
product of information extracted from the price trend. I expect to observe an economically
and statistically significant ρ̂t,s for the trading periods without news.
It is important to point out that estimates of ρt,s pertain only to herding within the
micro-blog and any further generalizations are potentially hurt by a strong selection bias:
the StockTweets agents represent a self-selected sample of rather small (retail) traders that
post their trading decisions on the blog. Small investors typically trade much smaller volumes
and are subject to higher transaction cost and less preferential treatment than institutional
investors. Some research also shows that this type of trader is more prone to serious in-
vestment mistakes, especially if the trader is poorer and less educated (Campbell (2006)).
Direct assessment of retail traders’ behavior in stock markets faces a data problem: available
surveys (i.e., SCF) do not provide high granularity data on household investments and also
suffer from sampling problems. Under the assumption that micro-blog posts correctly reflect
traders’ decision, StockTweets data allow one to observe in detail trading strategies in a
non-experimental setup. Thus, while acknowledging limitations of these data, I believe that
their potential should also be recognized.
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1.5.4 Herding and stock price volatility
The final exercise of the study is aimed at assessment of the relationship between herding
and the stock price volatility. To examine this relationship, I utilize following model:






where r denotes four specifications from which ρ is obtained
r =

directional W, log-odds as dependent
non-directional W, log-odds as dependent
directional W, probability as dependent
non-directional W, probability as dependent
(1.19)
The construction of directional and non-directional spatial weights matrix, W ,is explained
in a previous subsection.
As a robustness check in the assessment of rho as a volatility predictor, lagged volatility
is added into the right hand side of the Equation (18) so that:





βrl,s|ρrt−l,s|+ βr11,sV olt−1,s + εrt,s (1.20)
1.6 Estimation and results
1.6.1 Classification performance
Table 2 illustrates the proportion of of Bearish sentiment in a tagged subset of tweets. For
the chosen stocks, the figure varies from the low 11% to a high 58% with the average mix
of Bulls and Bears across the stocks being 2:1. This has consequences for the sentiment
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prediction. As Cramer (1999) notes, in a logistic analysis it is always the case that the less-
frequent outcome has lower estimated prediction probabilities while more prevalent one is
always predicted better. Such a dichotomy in the prediction becomes even more pronounced
with a worse fit of the model.
In addition to this, the imbalance in the data also poses a problem for some of the
traditional evaluation metric, such as Prediction Accuracy. Typically, in the classification
exercise, the model performance is evaluated using a confusion matrix, i.e., a cross-tabulation
of true and predicted class values in a testing (held-out) set. The confusion matrix includes
numbers of correctly classified positive and negative (in this case, Bull and Bear) classes,
which are located on the diagonal of the matrix (True Positive (TP), True negative (TN),
and falsely classified positive and negative classes (False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN)),
which are in the off diagonal cells. Prediction Accuracy, then, is a percentage of correctly
classified positive and negative classes in all testing set. In the prediction, however, due to
the imbalance, the positive class will have much higher probability to be classified correctly
resulting in higher accuracy altogether.
Additional metrics, such as Precision, Recall 9, and Area under the ROC curve (AUC),
are useful in properly assessing the model performance. In particular, Precision will help to
detect over-predicting of positives, while from Recall one can infer which portion of true pos-
itives slipped into the negatives class. The ROC, or the Receiver Operating Characteristics,
curve is a plot of all possible pairs of true positive rate (Sensitivity or Recall) versus false
positive rate ((1 − Specificity) 10), for each value of cut-off probability measure p ∈ [0, 1],
which separates observations in a testing set into positive and negative classes; hence, the
ROC curve captures the trade-off between a hit and a miss rates for the positive class at
every possible probability cut-off: the curvier it is the more discriminating power the model
9Precision = TPTP+FP and Recall =
TP
TP+FN
10False positive rate (FPR) = FPTN+FP
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has. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is then a measure of the aggregate classification
performance (Flach and Ferri (2011)).
To deal with the imbalance in the data, it is often suggested to set the probability cut-off
level to the value that maximizes accuracy of classification across both classes. One of the
most frequently used ways to execute such strategy is called the Youden Index (Youden
(1950)). The index can be defined as
J = maxp{Recall(p) + Specificity(p)− 1} (1.21)
where p ∈ [0, 1]. Then J ∈ [0, 1] so that perfectly accurately classified model will receive
an index of 1; 0 denotes the completely opposite case. The optimal value of the probability




where J(p) is defined by the Equation (21) The frequent use of YI criterion for choosing the
optimal threshold value is due to the method’s simplicity and absence of requirements for
additional subjective information as it is the case for the other methods (Fluss et al. (2005)).
The usage of YI probability cut-off is an example of the so-called internal approach to
tackle the imbalance problem: the classification algorithm is modified to suit the data at
hand (Estabrooks et al. (2004)). There is also another approach that is frequently used
in the applied machine learning literature especially when the comparison of the model
performance is the goal of the study: unlike the internal method, it does not use algorithm
transformations that are not necessarily transferable across the different algorithms, but
rather balances the training set by means of re-weighting or re-sampling. There are two
ways to perform re-sampling: 1) oversampling the smaller class to make it reach the size of
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the larger class or 2) under-sampling the larger class to shrink it to the size of the smaller.
In this study, I use internal and external approaches to the imbalanced classes problem:
I calculate Youden’s Index criterion for the probability cutoff in determining which class the
observation in the testing set will be assigned to; I also over-sample the smaller (usually
Bear, as Table 2 would suggest) class to reach the balance in the training set and separate
the classes based on the probability cut-off of 0.5. Both approaches are evaluated based on
the aforementioned diagnostics measures - Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and AUC.
In the cross-validation procedure for the internal approach, the messages tagged with
Bullish or Bearish sentiment are randomly split into five roughly equal groups (folds). For
each fold, the estimation of the regularized logit is carried over the other four folds (combined
into a training set) and probabilities prediction is executed over this fold; the procedure is
repeated for each fold until a predicted probability is obtained for each observation with
the sentiment tag. Then the probability cutoff is calculated via the YI procedure and the
classification is completed using this cut-off. Each stock is evaluated separately due to the
variation in the industry of the stock and the specifics of the events that happen in life of
each stock.11
Similarly, for the external approach, the tagged messages are collected. The proportion,
in which the Bulls and Bears are mixed, is calculated and if the set is imbalanced, the over-
sampling procedure is performed for the training set. The regularized logit estimation is then
carried over as described above with a small difference of omitting a probability threshold
calculation. Instead the probability cut-off is set to 0.5.
The results of this exercise can be found in the Tables 3 and 4. The comparison of
the diagnostic estimates suggest that over-sampling procedure fares slightly better than
probability cut-off adjustment. The discrepancy is more pronounced when the imbalance is
11The analysis was executed over a whole body of the stocks that are less-covered in the social media
and diagnostics results were compared to a stock-by-stock analysis, only marginal improvements were found.
The results of this exercise are not presented in this study.
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more severe, for instance, for such firms as Exxon Mobile, Starbucks, Microsoft, and General
Electric. The area under the curve grows by roughly 3-4% in such cases and Accuracy and
Recall also increase slightly. This, although marginal, improvement made me follow the
re-sampling technique in my analysis. The classified tweets Bull and Bear mix, as predicted
by the balanced training set by l1-regularized logit model, is depicted in Table 5.
Overall, the algorithm performance is in line with the levels suggested in the shallow
natural language processing machine learning literature (Go et al. (2009)). It is important,
however, to keep in mind that tweets data are non-standardized and usual pre-processing
techniques might not have the same impact on the final result compared to the standard data
sources such as news and financial reporting text. In addition, future research might also
consider deep learning methods, which on average supply much higher accuracy outcomes
(Cambria and White (2014)).
One more potential source of bias in this analysis is stemming from the sentiment tags
distribution across the actors. As it was noted earlier, only a small part of the tweets have
their Bullish or Bearish tag noted. In the ideal case, one would want the tagged messages to
be evenly distributed across the trades to enhance accuracy of the performed classification
of the leftover messages. However, it would be too optimistic to expect data to be so evenly
distributed. On the other hand, extremely high concentration of the messages with sentiment
among few actors would hurt classification accuracy due to the idiosyncratic usage of words
across the actors. To assess the severity of tag concentration in a considered tweets set,
I calculate the portion of actors who never tags for each firm separately; the portion of
messages generated by these actors as well as their followers accounts are also computed
and collected in Table 6. The percentage of those who systematically do not express their
sentiment using Bull or Bear check box is between 26% and 60% (see Table 6) with majority
of the chosen stocks having this percentage way below 50%; high concentrations of non-
taggers are usually found for the stocks that are less covered by the social media stocks with
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a strong presence of heavily followed news re-posting actors or actors who share links to their
proprietary analyses.
1.6.2 News impact
The news headlines have been collected for 22 firms and News Polarity was calculated ac-
cording to the Rinkler (2019) method. Description statistics for the polarity time series is
shown in Table 7. The average news headline has positive sentiment, however, marginally
close to neutral, with the polarity score dispersed on average 0.2 units around the mean. The
selection of firms presents quite varying news coverage, ranging from 96 to 669 release days
within a three-year time window. The volumes of tweets and news polarity show moderately
positive correlation of 0.42 suggesting that news release signal is a relevant ingredient in the
trader’s decision-making.
To better assess the importance of news for the average buy or sell move, I calculate daily
estimated average of actors’ sentiment for each stock on a given day and regress it against the
lagged News Polarity variable.12 A similar exercise was done for the daily average probability
of Bullish sentiment as obtained from the regularized logistic regression; the portion of tweets
with a Bullish or Bearish tag noted by the actor was assumed to have probability equal to
1 in case of Bullish sentiment and 0 in case of Bearish.
In particular, let Y i,t be a value of either average daily sentiment for a day t, stock i,
or average day t probability of being Bullish about the stock s. Then, the effect of News
Polarity is modeled as follows:
Y s,t = β0,s +
10∑
l=1
βlNPt−l,s + ηt,s (1.23)
The News polarity exemplifies stationary series with low autocorrelation levels, which
12News Polarity scores and average sentiment as well as average sentiment probability were tested for
stationarity and according to the ADF test are found to be stationary.
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allow little chance for multicolinearity issue in this set-up. (ACF plots and ADF test statistics
are presented in the Table 33 and Figures 18 and 19 respectively). The coefficients on ten13
lags of the News Polarity are presented in Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11. The results from this
exercise show additional support that, especially for firms well-covered by the news the news
information is relevant to the trader’s decision. The significance of the coefficients vanishes
almost entirely after a week of news release, suggesting a short-term nature of its impact.
This aggregate evidence supports the next step of my analysis, which is to use News
Polarity to filter out the idiosyncratic news component eit,s for each trader. Specifically,
following Equation (11), I calculate the residuals for each trader14; the calculations are
carried out for each stock separately. To better control for possible effect of imprecisely
classified decision to buy or sell, I perform a similar exercise for the continuous measure of
probability, which is obtained from the regularized logit, as presented in the Equation (12).
The histograms of residuals from Equation (11) and (12) are collected and presented as
the aggregates per each stock in the Figures 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. The visible skewness in
the error term distributions corresponds with the imbalance in the sentiment. Figures 9, 10,
and 11 present responsiveness of the actors’ decisions to the freshly released news: from each
regression as specified by the Equation (11) γ̂i,s is collected and plotted against its P-value.
The plot follows inverted V-shape with the P-value approaching 1 as the absolute value of γ̂i,s
converges to zero. The plot is symmetric suggesting the presence of actors with completely
polar trading strategies with respect to the news. However, the number of actors who
systematically uses news fresh after release in their trading decisions (γ̂i,s being significant
at least at the 90%-significance level, which is marked on the plot by the horizontal line) is
quite low. Such a result might reflect some imprecision in the output given the simplistic
13Ten business days were chosen to cover two weeks. In addition, as a robustness check, weekend days
were included, but the number of lags was kept the same since the predicting power of the news dies off over
time closer to the end of the second week.
14The actors with less than 10 tweets are discarded
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nature of the classification and news processing methods. However, as the previous studies
state (Campbell (2006), Drehmann et al. (2005)), the average trader acts with at least some
extent of irrationality, especially if such trader is a retail, non-institutional one. This gives a
reason for further exploration of this irrationality and presence of herding and contrarianism
in the chosen stock markets.
1.6.3 Herding and Contrarianism
The residuals from the Equation (11) are further used in the spatial lag regression for each
stock separately, as described in the Equations (13) and (14). As a robustness check, the
residuals from the Equation (12) are also utilized in the same setup. In addition, I consider
two specifications of the spatial weights matrices: directional and non-directional 15 The
regression is run for each day that encompasses initial tweets and any reply to the tweet
that was ever posted. It is expected that there will be a lag between the initial post and a
reply. However, due to the nature of micro-blogging, this lag on average does not go beyond
one day, as it is shown in Table 10: the response is usually short and quick, which allows for
clearer separation between the posting days.
As noted earlier, three measures of volatility are considered: 1) intraday realized volatility
(calculated using Barndorff-Nielsen (2004) methodology), realized volatility calculated over
10, 14, or 30 days (as provided by the OptionMetrix data base), and implied volatility
surface over the array of delta and days to expiration. Each of measures are examined in the
relationship with the calculated herding ρ, as described by the Equation (18). The exercise
is done over each of 22 considered stocks and the results of it are presented in Tables 14 -
29 and Figures 12 – 17.
Let us start with the analysis of the longer-term volatility. The performance of the four
15The directional spatial matrix is calculated using first two steps as described in Subsection 4.3; the
non-directional matrix includes step 3.
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mentioned specifications (Equation (18) and (19)) varies across the stocks, but on average
the specification with the ρ generated by the non-directional W matrix and log-odds as a
dependent variable in the spatial regression fares slightly better than others. Table 14, 18,
and 22, provide the results of this regression for the volatility calculated over 10, 14, and
30 days respectively. These tables show significant negative impact of lagged herding on
volatility of major tech companies (AAPL, AMZN, NFLX, TWTR, FB), suggesting that for
a longer horizon volatility herding positively impacts price discovery and brings the price
closer to the fundamental value. This is true primarily for firms whose product is hard to
evaluate: in this case, herding is more of a social learning type behavior allowing for rational
decision of following someone else in hope that that decision is better informed than one’s
own belief. Collectively, the ten lagged herding rho variable explain up to 17% of variation
in the volatility for some of the stocks, as noted by the adjusted R squared in the Tables.
However, this number varies substantially across the stocks, being the highest for primarily
tech firms, as noted earlier.
For the intraday volatility, the negative statistically significant coefficients become smaller
in absolute value and insignificant (Table 26). In case of Amazon Inc. or Twitter, some lags
become significant and positive, suggesting that over the short horizon (one day) herding is
marginally responsible for the deviation of the stock price from its fundamental value.
As a robustness check in this exercise, I add a first lag of stock price volatility into the
Equation (18) which yields the Equation (20). Adjusted R squared as well as partial R
squared for the ten lags of herding Rho are presented in Tables 30 and 31.16 For intra-day
volatility, the partial R-squared for the lags of Rho reach up to 17% of unexplained variation,
and in light of the adjusted R squared magnitude this suggests importance of the herding
variable in the volatility modeling task. For the long-term volatility measure, the story is
16Two tables present results in specifications with directional and non-directional spatial matrix across
longer and shorter term volatility calculated from the log-odds specification error.
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not a clear cut: inclusion of the lagged volatility into the Equation (18) for this type of
volatility leads to a drastic increase of adjusted R squared. The added lag absorbs virtually
all (especially in the case of londer term, 30-day volatility) variation and such outcome is to
be expected due to the way these variables are constructed.17
To account for this, similar exercise was performed on differenced longer term volatility
series. The model performance dropped significantly with the adjusted R squared approach-
ing zero; the partial R squared for the lagged herding coefficient, even though small, suggests
that herding should be considered when modeling volatility. The results of this exercise are
presented in the Tables 34 and 35.
For the implied volatility surface, the adjusted R squared values are collected for each
delta and days to maturity combination. The resulting surface is plotted against delta
and days to maturity and presented in Figures 12 and 13 for the eight (four tech and four
non-tech) stocks18. As for the longer term volatility, the ρ, that is obtained from the non-
directional W and log-odds as the dependent model explains more of variation in the stock
volatility. The highest adjusted R squared is noted for the tech-related companies, such as
Netflix, Twitter, Apple, and Amazon. For these firms, the ρ generated by the non-directional
W matrix and log-odds as a dependent variable in the spatial regression explains implied
volatility best if days to expiration and delta are the highest.
Tables 8 – 11 show that the public information is not absorbed instantaneously but it
rather takes roughly a week for the traders to process it. Taking this into account, I perform
another robustness check by replacing one lag of news polarity in the Equation 11 with seven
lags and recalculate herding rhos as well as their impact on volatility. The results of this
robustness check are presented in the Table 3219 and the Figures 24 – 26. In most of the
17For example, for 10-days volatility, the calculation of V olt is carried over 10 past days, variation of 8 of
these days will be included into the calculation of the V olt−1.
18Figures 14 – 17 show the results for the remaining firms
19The calculations were run only for 10 out of 22 companies with the highest volume of tweets.
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cases, predictive power of such herding rhos only increases.
1.7 Conclusion
This study provides analysis of presence of herding and contrarian behavior in the stock
market proxied by the social media micro-blog, using a novel approach of quantifying the
network relationship between the traders. The study uses the simplest tools to quantify
the trader’s tweets with respect to their buy or sell sentiment alongside the strong assump-
tions that such micro-blog messages reflect actual trading behavior. Nevertheless, evidence
of herding and contrarianism is found on the market of predominantly tech goods and ser-
vices. Consistent with the existing literature, herding and contrarianism was found to have
a negative, although marginally small, impact on the price discovery within the short time
horizon, but over longer horizon social learning behavior brings the price closer to its mean,
by decreasing volatility.
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Table 1.1: Firms. Summary
Firm Name Ticker Amihud Illiquidity Market Cap Sector Industry
Apple Inc. AAPL 1.97E-06 957.81 Technology Computer Manufacturing
Amazon.com, Inc. AMZN 7.10E-06 916 Consumer Services Catalog/Specialty Distribu-
tion
Bank of America Corpo-
ration
BAC 8.09E-06 289.46 Finance Major Banks
Baidu, Inc. BIDU 2.59E-05 59.5 Technology Computer Software: Pro-
gramming, Data Processing
Citigroup Inc. C 1.08E-05 164.65 Finance Major Banks
Chipotle Mexican Grill,
Inc.
CMG 3.16E-05 19.08 Consumer Services Restaurants
eBay Inc. EBAY 2.64E-05 32.91 Miscellaneous Business Services
Ford Motor Company F 2.26E-05 37.9 Capital Goods Auto Manufacturing




GE 7.88E-06 79.43 Energy Consumer Electron-
ics/Appliances





GM 2.27E-05 58.05 Capital Goods Auto Manufacturing
Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc.




IBM 1.24E-05 123.79 Technology Computer Manufacturing
J P Morgan Chase & Co JPM 9.00E-06 370.79 Finance Major Banks
Microsoft Corporation MSFT 6.08E-06 934.25 Technology Computer Software:
Prepackaged Software
Netflix, Inc. NFLX 1.34E-05 154.88 Consumer Services Consumer Electronics/Video
Chains
Procter & Gamble Com-
pany
PG 8.87E-06 264.79 Basic Industries Package Goods/Cosmetics
Starbucks Corporation SBUX 2.11E-05 93.42 Consumer Services Restaurants
Tesla, Inc. TSLA 1.63E-05 47.1 Capital Goods Auto Manufacturing




XOM 7.49E-06 344.84 Energy Integrated Oil Companies
The Amihud Illiquidity measure is reported as multiplied by 106; Market Cap is reported in Billions of
dollars. Source: https://www.nasdaq.com/
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Table 1.2: Tweets. Summary








Apple Inc. AAPL 1642500 0.246 0.225
Amazon.com, Inc. AMZN 246339 0.205 0.379
Bank of America Corporation BAC 118208 0.210 0.194
Baidu, Inc. BIDU 45192 0.236 0.224
Citigroup Inc. C 27739 0.173 0.324
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. CMG 78274 0.263 0.584
eBay Inc. EBAY 23028 0.193 0.290
Ford Motor Company F 40220 0.247 0.225
Facebook, Inc. FB 610937 0.244 0.207
General Electric Company GE 139374 0.289 0.133
Gilead Sciences, Inc. GILD 216044 0.235 0.117
General Motors Company GM 23790 0.174 0.264
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. GS 36350 0.166 0.332
International Business Machines Corporation IBM 32340 0.197 0.352
J P Morgan Chase & Co JPM 39813 0.168 0.321
Microsoft Corporation MSFT 79043 0.185 0.175
Netflix, Inc. NFLX 312182 0.264 0.488
Procter & Gamble Company PG 33105 0.137 0.234
Starbucks Corporation SBUX 45061 0.247 0.181
Tesla, Inc. TSLA 413897 0.281 0.308
Twitter, Inc. TWTR 485235 0.282 0.244
Exxon Mobil Corporation XOM 121585 0.343 0.107
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Table 1.3: Classification performance comparison. Area under the curve
Youden Index Approach Balancing
Firm Probability cut-off AUC AUC
Apple Inc. 0.66 0.756 0.773
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.50 0.779 0.779
Bank of America Corporation 0.69 0.745 0.758
Baidu, Inc. 0.50 0.768 0.780
Citigroup Inc. 0.50 0.812 0.812
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 0.50 0.769 0.762
eBay Inc. 0.50 0.766 0.773
Ford Motor Company 0.50 0.789 0.808
Facebook, Inc. 0.68 0.772 0.789
General Electric Company 0.69 0.747 0.789
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 0.76 0.741 0.766
General Motors Company 0.50 0.771 0.785
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 0.50 0.758 0.760
International Business Machines Corporation 0.50 0.782 0.786
J P Morgan Chase & Co 0.50 0.793 0.791
Microsoft Corporation 0.70 0.749 0.768
Netflix, Inc. 0.50 0.782 0.775
Procter & Gamble Company 0.50 0.838 0.850
Starbucks Corporation 0.75 0.740 0.758
Tesla, Inc. 0.59 0.760 0.770
Twitter, Inc. 0.66 0.767 0.781
Exxon Mobil Corporation 0.78 0.766 0.802
Average 0.770 0.782
CHAPTER 1. HERDING IN SOCIAL MEDIA 33
Table 1.4: Classification performance comparison. Accuracy, Precision and Recall
Firm Accuracy Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall
Apple Inc. 0.7205 0.8713 0.7501 0.7372 0.8794 0.7659
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.7240 0.7646 0.7989 0.7182 0.7805 0.7562
Bank of America Corporation 0.7078 0.8904 0.7261 0.7499 0.8886 0.7879
Baidu, Inc. 0.7852 0.8528 0.8741 0.7646 0.8741 0.8139
Citigroup Inc. 0.7502 0.8225 0.8022 0.7623 0.8293 0.8148
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 0.7087 0.6616 0.6131 0.7001 0.6354 0.6540
eBay Inc. 0.7360 0.8149 0.8104 0.7378 0.8280 0.7939
Ford Motor Company 0.7883 0.8618 0.8644 0.7844 0.8851 0.8282
Facebook, Inc. 0.7307 0.8887 0.7546 0.7536 0.8945 0.7810
General Electric Company 0.7554 0.9218 0.7829 0.7936 0.9322 0.8205
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 0.7288 0.9343 0.7449 0.7818 0.9369 0.8070
General Motors Company 0.7461 0.8313 0.8232 0.7598 0.8581 0.8083
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 0.7178 0.7837 0.7967 0.7144 0.7992 0.7636
International Business Machines Corporation 0.7294 0.7940 0.7855 0.7270 0.8031 0.7658
J P Morgan Chase & Co 0.7498 0.8070 0.8289 0.7419 0.8176 0.7966
Microsoft Corporation 0.7115 0.9032 0.7277 0.7733 0.9018 0.8134
Netflix, Inc. 0.7060 0.7123 0.7113 0.7043 0.6976 0.7428
Procter & Gamble Company 0.7965 0.8787 0.8514 0.8171 0.8981 0.8582
Starbucks Corporation 0.6520 0.9074 0.6395 0.7733 0.8956 0.8181
Tesla, Inc. 0.7075 0.8187 0.7393 0.7195 0.8270 0.7500
Twitter, Inc. 0.7068 0.8694 0.7198 0.7431 0.8697 0.7760
Exxon Mobil Corporation 0.7310 0.9458 0.7409 0.8151 0.9474 0.8394
Average 0.7314 0.8426 0.7675 0.7533 0.8491 0.7889
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Table 1.5: Post-classification Bull and Bear sentiment. Whole sample
Firm Bull Bear
Apple Inc. 1107193 513074
Amazon.com, Inc. 151338 88617
Bank of America Corporation 81284 33663
Baidu, Inc. 16813 10219
Citigroup Inc. 28628 10705
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 427308 174100
eBay Inc. 100779 34970
Ford Motor Company 158538 53168
Facebook, Inc. 15821 7502
General Electric Company 21599 13811
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 20084 11516
General Motors Company 25959 13127
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 57527 19395
International Business Machines Corporation 140029 168766
J P Morgan Chase & Co 23839 8484
Microsoft Corporation 31734 12202
Netflix, Inc. 253712 155040
Procter & Gamble Company 87160 31032
Starbucks Corporation 31448 12446
Tesla, Inc. 15972 6430
Twitter, Inc. 35600 40913
Exxon Mobil Corporation 322257 157194
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Apple Inc. 11844 0.264 0.155 1698 402
Amazon.com, Inc. 3708 0.345 0.340 3164 1138
Bank of America Corporation 1690 0.354 0.320 3536 1151
Baidu, Inc. 813 0.360 0.342 5597 1514
Citigroup Inc. 484 0.512 0.503 7556 3334
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 1369 0.343 0.324 4913 1711
eBay Inc. 437 0.492 0.521 7884 2410
Ford Motor Company 679 0.405 0.420 6781 1273
Facebook, Inc. 7300 0.303 0.244 1636 592
General Electric Company 2073 0.318 0.282 3322 526
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 2336 0.275 0.148 3209 750
General Motors Company 435 0.487 0.545 9075 2294
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 628 0.492 0.483 7862 4380
International Business Machines Corporation 624 0.489 0.516 6605 3138
J P Morgan Chase & Co 660 0.473 0.578 6851 3570
Microsoft Corporation 1326 0.428 0.468 5455 2320
Netflix, Inc. 4095 0.297 0.243 2527 763
Procter & Gamble Company 469 0.597 0.717 7932 3714
Starbucks Corporation 865 0.379 0.400 7416 1483
Tesla, Inc. 4920 0.267 0.199 2108 586
Twitter, Inc. 5829 0.263 0.173 2045 510
Exxon Mobil Corporation 1753 0.312 0.214 4336 765
CHAPTER 1. HERDING IN SOCIAL MEDIA 36












Apple Inc. 0.009 0.179 669
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.056 0.206 451
Bank of America Corporation 0.019 0.195 295
Baidu, Inc. 0.043 0.180 115
Citigroup Inc. 0.002 0.194 407
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 0.024 0.255 96
eBay Inc. 0.024 0.200 129
Ford Motor Company 0.020 0.186 409
Facebook, Inc. 0.007 0.206 360
General Electric Company 0.061 0.182 360
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 0.062 0.226 143
General Motors Company 0.002 0.174 526
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 0.018 0.170 541
International Business Machines Corporation 0.050 0.212 228
J P Morgan Chase & Co 0.000 0.199 404
Microsoft Corporation 0.020 0.203 378
Netflix, Inc. 0.027 0.214 191
Procter & Gamble Company 0.052 0.231 117
Starbucks Corporation 0.018 0.221 143
Tesla, Inc. 0.041 0.185 260
Twitter, Inc. 0.002 0.240 187
Exxon Mobil Corporation 0.012 0.188 356
Table 1.8: Relationship between News and Sentiment Class. Weekend Included
Predicted class vs News Polarity lagged by
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days
Apple Inc. 0 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.014 0.007 -0.001 -0.006
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.019 0.016 0.024 0.013 0.028 0.035 -0.018 0.007 0.03 0.043**
Bank of America Corporation 0.014 -0.004 0.083*** 0.009 -0.001 0.001 -0.029 -0.025 -0.028 -0.018
Baidu, Inc. 0.074 -0.094 -0.032 0.071 -0.021 0.047 0.092 0.092 0.053 -0.038
Citigroup Inc. 0.039 0.024 -0.051 -0.069 -0.034 0.005 0.051 0.034 -0.003 0.077
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 0.049 0.07 -0.005 -0.045 0.015 -0.052 0.045 0.029 0.025 -0.016
eBay Inc. -0.066 -0.095 -0.058 0.064 -0.068 -0.023 0.062 -0.025 0.067 -0.069
Ford Motor Company -0.017 0.063 -0.091** -0.06 0.031 -0.017 0.049 0.001 -0.031 0.003
Facebook, Inc. 0.003 0.011 0.036** 0.038*** 0.018 0.012 -0.007 -0.012 0.005 0.011
General Electric Company -0.008 0.033 0.022 0.015 0.051 -0.021 -0.005 -0.044 -0.021 -0.003
Gilead Sciences, Inc. -0.047 -0.005 -0.068** -0.032 -0.006 -0.029 -0.03 0.019 -0.011 0.024
General Motors Company 0.159*** 0.164*** 0.031 0.014 0.091** 0.009 0.031 0.016 0.002 0.014
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 0.004 0.038 -0.066 0.076 -0.086** 0.021 0.048 0.056 -0.027 -0.014
International Business Machines Corporation -0.019 -0.001 -0.01 0.051 0.053 0.011 0.072 0.041 0.045 0.012
J P Morgan Chase & Co -0.002 0.041 0.039 0.037 0.029 -0.077** -0.036 -0.038 -0.043 -0.01
Microsoft Corporation 0.027 0.052** -0.003 0.057** -0.016 0.003 0.045 0.016 -0.043 0.009
Netflix, Inc. 0.013 -0.022 0.005 0.033 0.07*** 0.01 0.005 -0.008 0.009 -0.033
Procter & Gamble Company -0.002 0.009 0.013 0.034 0.07 -0.124** -0.067 -0.088 -0.002 -0.011
Starbucks Corporation -0.051 0.019 0.038 -0.011 0.088 -0.068 0.017 -0.014 0.09 -0.043
Tesla, Inc. 0.034 0.02 0.031 0.02 0.017 -0.018 -0.033 -0.014 0.01 -0.048
Twitter, Inc. 0.025 0.048 0.077*** 0.087*** 0.032 0.05** 0.01 0.009 0.05** 0.005
Exxon Mobil Corporation 0.012 -0.006 0.017 -0.066 -0.042 0.039 0.008 -0.034 -0.002 -0.073**
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Table 1.9: Relationship between News and Sentiment Probability. Weekend included
Predicted probability of being Bull vs News Polarity lagged by
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days
Apple Inc. 0 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.01 0.01 0.007 0.003 -0.004
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.018 0.018 0.01 0.014 0.025 0.024 -0.015 0.001 0.018 0.036***
Bank of America Corporation 0.001 -0.009 0.063*** 0.013 0 0.003 -0.024 -0.01 -0.013 -0.011
Baidu, Inc. 0.038 -0.087 -0.051 0.03 -0.017 0.026 0.067 0.045 0.043 -0.013
Citigroup Inc. 0.026 0.021 -0.036 -0.051 -0.007 0.027 0.04 0.026 0.029 0.055
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 0.052 0.076 0.013 0.006 0.02 -0.033 0.013 0.031 0.025 0.025
eBay Inc. -0.094 -0.055 -0.068 0.029 -0.097 -0.006 0.022 0.005 0.032 -0.05
Ford Motor Company -0.009 0.041 -0.06** -0.034 0.014 -0.02 0.043 0.005 -0.04 -0.012
Facebook, Inc. 0 0.006 0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.002
General Electric Company -0.008 0.023 0.015 0 0.031 -0.005 0.004 -0.041 -0.017 -0.007
Gilead Sciences, Inc. -0.021 0.003 -0.054** -0.042 -0.027 -0.026 -0.03 0.022 -0.028 0.013
General Motors Company 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.017 0.016 0.048 -0.008 0.032 0.02 -0.002 0.001
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 0.033 0.011 -0.037 0.028 -0.014 0.023 0.031 0.046 -0.004 -0.003
International Business Machines Corporation 0.008 -0.018 0.051 0.043 0.053 0.026 0.054 0.046 0.033 -0.018
J P Morgan Chase & Co -0.016 0.022 0.006 0.018 0.013 -0.059** -0.016 -0.039 -0.024 -0.003
Microsoft Corporation 0.021 0.025 0.008 0.031 -0.021 0.004 0.03 0.012 -0.01 0.002
Netflix, Inc. 0.006 -0.019 0.002 0.022 0.027 0 0.004 0.005 0.009 -0.016
Procter & Gamble Company -0.006 -0.008 0.02 0.048 0.019 -0.08 -0.013 -0.06 0.032 0.012
Starbucks Corporation -0.017 0.03 0.026 -0.003 0.026 -0.037 0.005 -0.034 0.056 -0.032
Tesla, Inc. 0.038 0.02 0.018 0.013 0.017 -0.003 -0.027 -0.008 0.008 -0.035
Twitter, Inc. 0.024 0.035 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.031 0.053*** 0.011 0.004 0.034 0.014
Exxon Mobil Corporation 0.01 -0.004 -0.003 -0.041 -0.029 0.039 -0.004 -0.042 -0.032 -0.057**
Table 1.10: Relationship between News and Sentiment Class. Weekend not Included
Predicted class vs News Polarity lagged by
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days
Apple Inc. -0.013 0.006 0.006 0.014 0.012 -0.003 -0.016 -0.008 -0.01 -0.011
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.038** 0.016 0.016 0.054*** -0.002 0.028 0.015 0.034** 0.015 0.034**
Bank of America Corporation 0.011 -0.022 0.014 -0.026 -0.025 -0.023 -0.012 -0.021 0.006 0.028
Baidu, Inc. 0.023 -0.038 0.049 0.038 0.045 0.056 0.011 -0.03 -0.043 0.027
Citigroup Inc. 0.023 0.012 -0.027 0.034 -0.026 0.017 -0.002 0.032 -0.047 0.067
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 0.066 0.068 0.044 -0.027 0.034 0.047 0.034 0.042 -0.011 -0.002
eBay Inc. 0.003 -0.046 -0.024 -0.028 0.041 0.007 0.02 -0.061 0.049 -0.077
Ford Motor Company -0.003 0.056 -0.048 -0.027 -0.014 -0.015 0.003 0.009 -0.019 0.009
Facebook, Inc. 0.009 0.015 0.022 0.011 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.007 0.02 -0.002
General Electric Company -0.003 0.025 0.033 -0.018 -0.01 -0.008 -0.046 0.011 0.029 0.044
Gilead Sciences, Inc. -0.038 -0.021 -0.032 -0.037 -0.022 0.026 -0.012 -0.014 -0.022 -0.018
General Motors Company 0.09*** 0.159*** 0.065** 0.061 0.02 -0.026 -0.015 0.014 -0.045 0.053
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 0.03 0.052 -0.04 -0.017 0.038 0.038 0.03 0.016 -0.043 0.002
International Business Machines Corporation 0.013 -0.013 0.045 0.005 0.092** 0.105** 0.014 -0.066 -0.05 -0.022
J P Morgan Chase & Co 0.021 0.017 0.038 -0.038 -0.026 -0.015 -0.015 -0.053 0.02 0.031
Microsoft Corporation 0.022 0.049** 0.027 0.027 0.024 -0.007 -0.012 -0.01 -0.003 0
Netflix, Inc. 0.004 -0.017 -0.004 0 -0.002 0 0.024 -0.02 -0.002 -0.006
Procter & Gamble Company -0.049 -0.003 0.015 -0.058 -0.075 -0.065 -0.104** -0.039 -0.034 0.001
Starbucks Corporation 0.011 0.039 0.026 -0.007 0.035 -0.03 0.049 -0.019 0.06 0.042
Tesla, Inc. 0.037 0.022 0.016 -0.02 -0.03 -0.029 -0.018 0 0.014 0.013
Twitter, Inc. 0.027 0.043 0.064*** 0.06*** 0.04 0.029 0.032 0.038 0.027 0.045**
Exxon Mobil Corporation 0.005 -0.001 -0.028 -0.015 0.01 -0.024 -0.031 -0.022 -0.044 0.021
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Table 1.11: Relationship between News and Sentiment Probability. Weekend not included
Predicted probability of being Bull vs News Polarity lagged by
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days
Apple Inc. -0.013 0.005 0.005 0.013 0.008 -0.001 -0.011 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.028** 0.018 0.013 0.04*** -0.002 0.015 0.011 0.024 0.013 0.028**
Bank of America Corporation 0.004 -0.018 0.009 -0.016 -0.026 -0.019 -0.003 -0.019 -0.002 0.023
Baidu, Inc. -0.024 -0.038 0.01 0.039 0.028 0.035 -0.001 -0.01 -0.056 0.013
Citigroup Inc. 0.018 0.004 -0.016 0.03 -0.004 0.015 -0.005 0.015 -0.02 0.041
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 0.069** 0.071** 0.021 -0.008 0.01 0.027 0.022 0.03 -0.04 0.001
eBay Inc. -0.027 -0.02 -0.078 -0.035 -0.003 0.011 -0.044 -0.024 -0.031 -0.07
Ford Motor Company -0.004 0.043 -0.019 -0.024 -0.01 -0.005 -0.009 0.002 -0.012 -0.021
Facebook, Inc. 0 0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.004 0
General Electric Company -0.007 0.021 0.016 -0.007 -0.001 -0.026 -0.033 -0.005 0.019 0.033
Gilead Sciences, Inc. -0.035 -0.008 -0.038 -0.032 -0.019 0.02 -0.01 -0.019 -0.023 -0.017
General Motors Company 0.08*** 0.113*** 0.044 0.037 0.007 -0.017 0 -0.004 -0.024 0.049**
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 0.012 0.018 -0.017 0.007 0.026 0.034 0.001 0.022 -0.034 -0.009
International Business Machines Corporation 0.014 -0.016 0.074** 0.044 0.064** 0.086*** 0.026 -0.051 -0.042 0.004
J P Morgan Chase & Co 0.008 0.006 0.016 -0.039 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.038 0.01 0.018
Microsoft Corporation 0.026 0.021 0.013 0.024 0.014 0.003 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.009
Netflix, Inc. 0.004 -0.015 -0.009 0 0 0.012 0.016 -0.019 -0.003 -0.001
Procter & Gamble Company -0.025 -0.016 -0.012 -0.023 -0.012 -0.035 -0.071** -0.007 -0.03 0.001
Starbucks Corporation 0.018 0.035 0.007 -0.002 0.02 -0.026 0.034 0 0.059 0.005
Tesla, Inc. 0.036 0.019 0.009 -0.01 -0.023 -0.024 -0.012 0 0.008 0.008
Twitter, Inc. 0.026 0.038** 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.031 0.018 0.037**
Exxon Mobil Corporation 0.005 -0.001 -0.039 -0.008 0.003 -0.035 -0.03 -0.021 -0.04 0.006
Table 1.12: Reply delay. Days
Firm Mean SD
Apple Inc. 0.08 0.15
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.18 0.48
Bank of America Corporation 0.17 0.68
Baidu, Inc. 0.33 1.10
Citigroup Inc. 0.24 2.30
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 1.51 22.30
eBay Inc. 0.33 0.96
Ford Motor Company 0.21 0.89
Facebook, Inc. 0.17 1.56
General Electric Company 0.26 0.59
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 0.10 0.19
General Motors Company 0.20 0.61
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 0.42 2.97
International Business Machines Corporation 0.37 2.38
J P Morgan Chase & Co 0.27 1.44
Microsoft Corporation 0.19 0.67
Netflix, Inc. 0.15 0.52
Procter & Gamble Company 0.40 2.37
Starbucks Corporation 0.19 0.58
Tesla, Inc. 0.11 0.16
Twitter, Inc. 0.10 0.22
Exxon Mobil Corporation 0.27 1.48
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Table 1.13: Rho. Summary
Firm Mean SD Min Max
Apple Inc. 0.002 0.095 -0.418 0.476
Amazon.com, Inc. -0.009 0.185 -0.841 0.741
Bank of America Corporation -0.022 0.219 -1.652 0.974
Baidu, Inc. -0.004 0.176 -1.507 1.681
Citigroup Inc. 0.001 0.053 -0.428 0.637
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. -0.001 0.133 -0.924 1.500
eBay Inc. 0.000 0.041 -0.437 0.565
Ford Motor Company 0.000 0.161 -1.060 1.239
Facebook, Inc. 0.000 0.163 -0.638 0.843
General Electric Company -0.016 0.188 -1.022 0.850
Gilead Sciences, Inc. -0.012 0.188 -1.220 0.862
General Motors Company -0.002 0.083 -0.910 0.984
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. -0.003 0.084 -0.700 0.733
International Business Machines Corporation -0.002 0.069 -0.619 0.644
J P Morgan Chase & Co -0.005 0.101 -1.942 0.528
Microsoft Corporation -0.003 0.136 -1.365 0.815
Netflix, Inc. -0.012 0.170 -1.622 0.700
Procter & Gamble Company 0.001 0.095 -0.538 0.762
Starbucks Corporation -0.004 0.119 -0.601 0.732
Tesla, Inc. -0.007 0.182 -2.517 0.546
Twitter, Inc. -0.001 0.165 -0.717 0.592
Exxon Mobil Corporation -0.010 0.213 -3.473 1.180
Table 1.14: Realized volatility (10 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Log-
odds)
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.176* -0.176* -0.188* -0.226** -0.237** -0.171* -0.187* -0.159 -0.089 -0.162 0.04
AMZN -0.135** -0.106* -0.043 -0.06 -0.056 -0.05 0.006 0.01 -0.056 -0.065 0.01
BAC -0.052* -0.035 -0.015 -0.008 -0.014 -0.002 0.021 0.025 0.021 0.005 0.00
BIDU -0.014 -0.004 -0.011 0.001 0.002 -0.014 0.003 -0.012 -0.017 -0.021 -0.01
C 0.01 0.003 0 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.021 -0.014 -0.013 0.006 -0.01
CMG -0.003 -0.031 -0.023 -0.023 -0.027 -0.033 -0.032 -0.037 -0.044 -0.031 0.00
EBAY 0 -0.009 -0.014 -0.027 -0.018 -0.01 -0.032 -0.047 -0.042 -0.039 0.01
F 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.014 0.018 0.009 0.008 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01
FB -0.142* -0.124* -0.114 -0.106 -0.134* -0.133* -0.09 -0.125* -0.126* -0.098 0.03
GE -0.012 -0.003 0.013 0 0.006 -0.005 -0.015 -0.018 -0.043** -0.035* 0.00
GILD -0.062 -0.071* -0.061 -0.034 -0.022 -0.011 0.004 0.008 0.033 0.034 0.00
GM 0.017 0.005 -0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.012 0.001 -0.005 -0.023 -0.01
GS 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.042** 0.025 0.029* 0.033* 0.037** 0.04** 0.027 0.11
IBM 0.016 0.004 0.012 0.015 0.019 0.01 -0.003 0.004 0.002 0 -0.01
JPM 0.046** 0.046** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.04** 0.026 0.012 -0.002 -0.015 -0.006 0.04
MSFT -0.019 -0.027 -0.028 -0.038 -0.046** -0.039* -0.041* -0.041* -0.034 -0.027 0.02
NFLX -0.474*** -0.414*** -0.393*** -0.303*** -0.252*** -0.129 -0.102 0.027 0.108 0.131 0.14
PG 0.026* 0.028** 0.026** 0.018 0.023* 0.023* 0.016 0.014 0.027** 0.016 0.05
SBUX 0.016 0.01 0.011 0.015 0.014 0.008 0.004 -0.014 -0.018 -0.011 -0.01
TSLA -0.216*** -0.238*** -0.262*** -0.285*** -0.255*** -0.219*** -0.136 -0.017 -0.028 -0.027 0.07
TWTR -0.351** -0.309** -0.313** -0.353** -0.384*** -0.35** -0.233 -0.014 0.027 0.054 0.04
XOM -0.015 -0.017 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.016 -0.019 -0.012 -0.009 -0.014 0.00
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Table 1.15: Realized volatility (10 days) vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Log-odds
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.055 -0.076 -0.064 -0.12* -0.153** -0.076 -0.074 -0.087 -0.038 -0.082 0.01
AMZN -0.054 -0.036 -0.052 -0.047 -0.04 -0.053 -0.041 -0.04 -0.075* -0.067 0.01
BAC -0.007 0.007 0.021 0.01 0.009 -0.003 0.003 0.009 0.002 -0.017 -0.01
BIDU 0.058* 0.055* 0.013 0.036 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.091*** 0.089*** 0.111*** 0.143*** 0.08
C -0.078 -0.051 -0.033 -0.021 0.031 0.009 -0.047 -0.118 -0.108 -0.037 -0.01
CMG 0.042 0.027 0.027 0.02 0.016 0.015 0.045 0.01 0.017 0.037 -0.01
EBAY 0.063 0.085 0.195 0.153 0.193 0.172 0.094 0.023 0.037 -0.024 0.00
F 0.002 0.005 -0.01 -0.012 -0.007 -0.021 -0.028 -0.042* -0.03 -0.027 0.00
FB -0.143*** -0.129*** -0.117** -0.1** -0.11** -0.095** -0.071 -0.076 -0.054 -0.04 0.06
GE 0.045** 0.05** 0.048** 0.048** 0.043** 0.04** 0.032 0.034* 0.025 0.022 0.08
GILD 0.012 0.007 0.003 -0.019 -0.003 -0.012 0.006 -0.006 0.006 0 -0.01
GM -0.026 -0.034 -0.031 -0.014 -0.017 -0.002 -0.051 -0.066 -0.074* -0.065 0.01
GS 0.023 0.012 0.038 0.043 0.034 0.023 0.001 0.025 0.067 0.064 0.00
IBM 0.087* 0.073 0.067 0.01 0.012 0.012 0.017 0.055 0.067 0.075 0.01
JPM 0.047 0.04 0.012 0.041 0.025 0.024 0.012 0.044 0.033 0.01 0.00
MSFT 0.038 0.041 0.029 0.049 0.047 0.039 0.023 0.01 0.009 -0.012 0.00
NFLX -0.136** -0.128** -0.15** -0.112* -0.079 -0.05 -0.021 0.014 0.023 0.063 0.01
PG 0.023 0.028 0.03 0.026 0.022 0.021 0.032 0.033 0.045* 0.033 0.02
SBUX 0.033 0.014 0.006 0.002 0.013 -0.016 -0.019 -0.016 -0.006 0.012 -0.01
TSLA -0.019 -0.055 -0.084** -0.082* -0.081* -0.08* -0.046 -0.034 -0.032 -0.03 0.01
TWTR -0.02 -0.013 -0.034 -0.05 -0.157* -0.073 -0.03 0.059 0.018 0.041 -0.01
XOM 0.03* 0.04** 0.031* 0.028 0.02 0.027 0.024 0.028 0.025 0.018 0.04
Table 1.16: Realized volatility (10 days) vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Probability
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.104 -0.171** -0.271*** -0.316*** -0.253*** -0.23*** -0.195** -0.132* -0.096 -0.1 0.12
AMZN -0.049 -0.031 -0.04 -0.06 -0.048 -0.041 -0.022 -0.033 -0.028 0.025 0.00
BAC -0.004 0 0.011 -0.005 -0.012 -0.018 -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 -0.015 -0.01
BIDU 0.059 0.059 0.017 0.026 0.046 0.058 0.075* 0.07* 0.082** 0.128*** 0.03
C -0.038 -0.011 -0.021 0 0.077 0.066 0.042 0.001 0.022 0.039 -0.01
CMG 0.008 -0.001 -0.01 -0.001 -0.011 0.008 0.044 0.014 0.008 0.049 -0.01
EBAY 0.035 0.045 0.178 0.131 0.134 0.131 0.044 -0.01 0.011 -0.084 -0.01
F -0.011 -0.021 -0.043* -0.039 -0.049** -0.058** -0.04* -0.045* -0.035 -0.024 0.03
FB -0.237*** -0.241*** -0.234*** -0.233*** -0.205*** -0.17*** -0.128** -0.093 -0.096 -0.12** 0.14
GE 0.023 0.021 0.022 0.032 0.041** 0.041** 0.039* 0.037* 0.034* 0.027 0.03
GILD -0.019 -0.012 -0.016 -0.037 -0.031 -0.019 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.005 -0.01
GM -0.001 -0.013 -0.024 -0.023 -0.039 -0.032 -0.077 -0.079 -0.086* -0.068 0.01
GS 0.044 0.034 0.045 0.043 0.035 0.02 0.006 0.034 0.075* 0.068* 0.01
IBM 0.063 0.066 0.058 0.009 0.004 -0.016 -0.011 0.04 0.044 0.045 0.00
JPM 0.053 0.041 0.024 0.09* 0.065 0.08 0.079 0.135*** 0.121** 0.102** 0.02
MSFT 0.019 0.009 -0.005 0.004 0.012 0.021 0.012 0.022 0.025 0.012 -0.01
NFLX -0.107 -0.066 -0.069 -0.068 -0.044 -0.027 -0.002 0.046 0.036 0.027 -0.01
PG 0.028 0.032 0.024 0.016 0.015 0.002 -0.004 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.00
SBUX 0.005 -0.009 -0.01 -0.008 0.003 -0.009 -0.013 -0.008 -0.011 -0.004 -0.01
TSLA 0.037 0 -0.103* -0.084 -0.099 -0.098 -0.056 -0.037 -0.073 -0.043 0.01
TWTR -0.169 -0.082 -0.115 -0.072 -0.101 -0.053 -0.012 0.13 0.096 0.117 0.00
XOM 0.036* 0.039** 0.045** 0.038* 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.028 0.038* 0.032 0.04
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Table 1.17: Realized volatility (10 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Prob-
ability)
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.216** -0.221** -0.277*** -0.318*** -0.262** -0.238** -0.186* -0.118 -0.053 -0.059 0.06
AMZN -0.111* -0.101* -0.056 -0.075 -0.086 -0.027 0.023 0.015 -0.01 0.024 0.01
BAC -0.04 -0.035 -0.038 -0.041 -0.039 -0.022 0.013 -0.006 0 -0.012 0.00
BIDU 0.006 0.006 -0.007 -0.013 -0.007 -0.025 -0.012 -0.026 -0.04 -0.029 -0.01
C 0.017 0.011 0.011 0.007 -0.005 -0.013 -0.018 -0.021 -0.019 0.015 -0.01
CMG -0.02 -0.045 -0.031 -0.045 -0.02 -0.022 -0.03 -0.012 -0.009 0.006 0.00
EBAY -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.023 -0.02 -0.022 -0.06** -0.057** -0.055** -0.049* 0.03
F -0.01 -0.024 -0.011 -0.011 0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.011 0.005 0.01 -0.01
FB -0.322*** -0.31*** -0.341*** -0.327*** -0.264*** -0.23*** -0.167* -0.109 -0.123 -0.172** 0.13
GE -0.022 -0.017 0 0.006 0.017 0.012 0.006 -0.001 -0.014 -0.019 -0.01
GILD -0.078* -0.066 -0.047 -0.023 -0.024 -0.004 0.014 0.029 0.063 0.032 0.00
GM -0.002 -0.001 -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 -0.017 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.012 0.00
GS 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.048** 0.019 0.022 0.027 0.031* 0.042** 0.024 0.07
IBM 0.015 0.008 0.019 0.014 0.017 0.007 -0.014 -0.001 -0.004 -0.011 -0.01
JPM 0.033* 0.032* 0.038** 0.042** 0.036* 0.025 0.009 0.001 -0.005 -0.003 0.02
MSFT -0.039 -0.035 -0.043* -0.053** -0.044* -0.034 -0.031 -0.023 -0.02 -0.037 0.01
NFLX -0.436*** -0.335*** -0.273*** -0.219** -0.182** -0.125 -0.133 -0.014 0.004 -0.019 0.10
PG 0.019** 0.02** 0.019** 0.015* 0.015* 0.012 -0.001 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.02
SBUX 0.014 0.007 0.009 0.016 0.008 0.007 0.006 -0.008 -0.013 -0.017 -0.01
TSLA -0.153* -0.126 -0.25*** -0.262*** -0.225*** -0.152* -0.141* -0.015 -0.001 -0.007 0.05
TWTR -0.444*** -0.402*** -0.516*** -0.437*** -0.368** -0.331** -0.368** -0.166 -0.155 -0.1 0.08
XOM -0.017 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.01
Table 1.18: Realized volatility (14 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Log-
odds)
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.138 -0.133 -0.155* -0.14 -0.179* -0.226** -0.257*** -0.234** -0.157* -0.177* 0.05
AMZN -0.074 -0.053 -0.023 -0.089 -0.074 -0.071 -0.082 -0.055 -0.05 -0.051 0.02
BAC -0.041 -0.03 -0.011 -0.011 -0.016 -0.009 -0.004 0.003 0.018 0.024 -0.01
BIDU -0.007 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.012 -0.022 -0.012 -0.01
C 0.012 0.006 0 -0.004 -0.001 -0.013 -0.015 -0.013 -0.014 0 -0.01
CMG 0.027 0.006 -0.008 -0.021 -0.041 -0.029 -0.038 -0.052* -0.046 -0.046 0.01
EBAY -0.029 -0.034 -0.029 -0.026 -0.023 -0.008 -0.015 -0.037 -0.034 -0.036 0.02
F -0.001 -0.003 0.007 0.01 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.013 0.012 0.019 -0.01
FB -0.16** -0.153** -0.156** -0.145** -0.142** -0.139* -0.105 -0.146** -0.117 -0.111 0.05
GE -0.018 -0.022 -0.004 -0.01 0.004 0.007 -0.004 -0.012 -0.022 -0.028 0.00
GILD -0.027 -0.047 -0.059 -0.04 -0.03 -0.036 -0.01 -0.003 0.027 0.034 0.00
GM 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.007 -0.006 0 0.004 0.006 0.001 -0.002 -0.01
GS 0.05*** 0.053*** 0.05*** 0.045*** 0.04** 0.038** 0.04** 0.037** 0.038** 0.035** 0.13
IBM 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.012 0.006 -0.004 -0.01
JPM 0.033* 0.034* 0.041** 0.042** 0.034* 0.032* 0.024 0.017 0.006 0.009 0.04
MSFT -0.004 -0.01 -0.023 -0.027 -0.039* -0.041* -0.049** -0.049** -0.032 -0.031 0.02
NFLX -0.384*** -0.393*** -0.357*** -0.297*** -0.27*** -0.202** -0.148* -0.134* -0.028 0.038 0.17
PG 0.019 0.011 0.017 0.023** 0.03*** 0.027** 0.022* 0.018 0.024** 0.015 0.06
SBUX 0.013 0.004 0.005 0.02 0.013 0.003 0.008 0.004 0 -0.008 -0.01
TSLA -0.103 -0.159** -0.148* -0.184** -0.187** -0.237*** -0.252*** -0.171** -0.11 -0.062 0.06
TWTR -0.258* -0.266** -0.296** -0.314** -0.344** -0.359*** -0.317** -0.127 -0.093 0.003 0.05
XOM -0.013 -0.012 -0.017 -0.016 -0.019 -0.016 -0.019 -0.016 -0.015 -0.019 0.00
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Table 1.19: .Realized volatility (14 days) vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Log-odds)
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.037 -0.048 -0.032 -0.05 -0.104* -0.108* -0.125** -0.122** -0.077 -0.098* 0.01
AMZN -0.022 -0.008 -0.022 -0.039 -0.04 -0.053 -0.077* -0.05 -0.062 -0.069* 0.01
BAC -0.003 0 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.01
BIDU 0.027 0.021 0.014 0.046 0.069** 0.074** 0.095*** 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.106*** 0.08
C -0.089 -0.079 -0.082 -0.064 -0.008 -0.034 -0.028 -0.031 -0.025 0.01 -0.01
CMG 0.021 0.009 0.022 0.024 0.036 0.04 0.048 0.029 0.026 0.035 -0.01
EBAY 0.013 0.03 0.102 0.101 0.111 0.101 0.102 0.104 0.083 -0.005 0.00
F -0.014 -0.009 -0.009 -0.016 -0.011 -0.015 -0.023 -0.029 -0.022 -0.032 0.00
FB -0.143*** -0.135*** -0.137*** -0.128*** -0.108** -0.103** -0.085* -0.111** -0.073 -0.056 0.06
GE 0.042** 0.035* 0.04** 0.042** 0.049** 0.049*** 0.044** 0.039** 0.032* 0.029 0.08
GILD 0.007 0 0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.02 0.002 0.006 0.015 0 -0.01
GM -0.038 -0.024 -0.03 -0.026 -0.026 -0.019 -0.026 -0.043 -0.055 -0.049 0.01
GS 0.007 0.003 0.022 0.027 0.043 0.033 0.023 0.03 0.045 0.05 0.00
IBM 0.069 0.072* 0.06 0.036 0.034 0.023 0.027 0.048 0.076* 0.06 0.01
JPM 0.039 0.024 0.028 0.049 0.023 0.024 0.03 0.032 0.018 0.024 0.00
MSFT 0.027 0.031 0.019 0.037 0.028 0.041 0.041 0.045 0.035 0.012 0.00
NFLX -0.098* -0.099* -0.112* -0.108* -0.096 -0.082 -0.047 -0.037 -0.014 0.035 0.01
PG 0.015 0.014 0.025 0.03 0.021 0.022 0.031 0.021 0.031 0.032 0.02
SBUX 0.006 0.005 0.004 -0.006 -0.009 -0.004 0.012 0.013 0.014 -0.007 -0.01
TSLA -0.021 -0.046 -0.036 -0.047 -0.065* -0.065* -0.067* -0.062 -0.057 -0.048 0.01
TWTR -0.056 -0.043 -0.038 -0.034 -0.066 -0.042 -0.073 0.009 -0.01 -0.008 -0.01
XOM 0.021 0.026* 0.031** 0.04** 0.033** 0.036** 0.035** 0.021 0.02 0.02 0.04
Table 1.20: Realized volatility (14 days) vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Probability
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.075 -0.1 -0.147** -0.179** -0.227*** -0.248*** -0.239*** -0.215*** -0.171** -0.163** 0.12
AMZN -0.018 -0.015 -0.049 -0.059 -0.05 -0.043 -0.058 -0.044 -0.025 -0.002 0.00
BAC -0.01 0.001 0.016 0 -0.014 -0.013 -0.017 -0.019 -0.013 -0.011 -0.01
BIDU 0.028 0.026 0.022 0.046 0.037 0.046 0.068* 0.056 0.062* 0.09** 0.02
C -0.038 -0.025 -0.041 -0.01 0.051 0.021 0.036 0.044 0.056 0.09 -0.01
CMG 0.017 0 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 0.017 0.038 0.02 0.02 0.023 -0.01
EBAY 0.018 0.035 0.127 0.102 0.085 0.068 0.053 0.057 0.063 -0.023 -0.01
F -0.018 -0.024 -0.034 -0.04* -0.04* -0.048** -0.04* -0.041* -0.037* -0.039* 0.04
FB -0.198*** -0.18*** -0.187*** -0.198*** -0.208*** -0.212*** -0.208*** -0.175*** -0.151*** -0.147*** 0.16
GE 0.027 0.014 0.022 0.032 0.034* 0.032 0.039* 0.035* 0.033 0.032 0.03
GILD -0.036 -0.032 -0.027 -0.033 -0.036 -0.03 0 0.016 0.024 0.025 -0.01
GM -0.037 -0.024 -0.025 -0.028 -0.033 -0.028 -0.036 -0.044 -0.064 -0.057 0.00
GS 0.022 0.02 0.028 0.031 0.043 0.034 0.023 0.037 0.056 0.056 0.01
IBM 0.043 0.057 0.048 0.025 0.018 -0.007 -0.008 0.029 0.058 0.04 0.00
JPM 0.056 0.026 0.038 0.083* 0.058 0.077 0.105** 0.108** 0.09* 0.096** 0.02
MSFT 0.013 0.016 0.005 0.014 0.013 0.026 0.012 0.03 0.022 0.01 -0.01
NFLX -0.044 -0.024 -0.042 -0.067 -0.058 -0.046 -0.027 0.019 0.013 0.02 -0.01
PG 0.021 0.016 0.016 0.023 0.017 0.013 0.012 0.004 0 0.002 0.00
SBUX -0.002 -0.008 -0.005 -0.013 -0.01 -0.009 0 0.001 0 -0.008 -0.01
TSLA -0.026 -0.034 -0.018 -0.009 -0.065 -0.071 -0.092* -0.067 -0.067 -0.061 0.00
TWTR -0.152 -0.066 -0.081 -0.062 -0.108 -0.105 -0.115 0.046 0.052 0.11 0.00
XOM 0.03* 0.029 0.035* 0.038** 0.032* 0.034* 0.037** 0.025 0.031* 0.033* 0.05
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Table 1.21: Realized volatility (14 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Prob-
ability)
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.212** -0.188** -0.202** -0.194** -0.234** -0.263*** -0.236** -0.18* -0.125 -0.13 0.07
AMZN -0.021 -0.001 -0.034 -0.092 -0.068 -0.054 -0.061 -0.057 -0.027 0.007 0.00
BAC -0.028 -0.023 -0.015 -0.029 -0.044 -0.036 -0.028 -0.03 -0.009 0.007 0.00
BIDU -0.011 -0.015 -0.002 -0.006 0 -0.011 -0.009 -0.024 -0.034 -0.029 -0.01
C 0.018 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.014 -0.017 0.008 -0.01
CMG 0.017 -0.006 -0.023 -0.043 -0.03 -0.028 -0.027 -0.028 -0.021 -0.015 0.00
EBAY -0.038 -0.042 -0.036 -0.033 -0.026 -0.017 -0.026 -0.033 -0.037 -0.051* 0.04
F -0.01 -0.013 -0.01 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.009 -0.01
FB -0.266*** -0.24*** -0.248*** -0.261*** -0.275*** -0.282*** -0.271*** -0.224*** -0.199** -0.211** 0.15
GE -0.025 -0.028 -0.012 -0.008 0.008 0.003 0.006 0 0.003 -0.005 -0.01
GILD -0.073** -0.064* -0.06* -0.022 -0.024 -0.011 0.006 0.006 0.037 0.059* 0.01
GM -0.008 0 -0.008 -0.01 -0.02 -0.022 -0.01 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 0.00
GS 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.039** 0.034* 0.035** 0.03* 0.036** 0.032* 0.08
IBM 0.018 0.018 0.015 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.001 -0.009 -0.01
JPM 0.022 0.019 0.028 0.032* 0.03* 0.029* 0.023 0.017 0.009 0.003 0.02
MSFT -0.02 -0.018 -0.029 -0.036 -0.038* -0.04* -0.047** -0.048** -0.037 -0.04* 0.02
NFLX -0.353*** -0.33*** -0.236*** -0.236*** -0.193** -0.207** -0.192** -0.12 -0.073 -0.053 0.12
PG 0.014* 0.011 0.012 0.013* 0.014* 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.007 0.03
SBUX 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.014 0.005 0.001 0.008 0.006 -0.001 -0.012 -0.01
TSLA -0.124* -0.101 -0.104 -0.129* -0.164** -0.182** -0.232*** -0.146** -0.088 -0.057 0.05
TWTR -0.408*** -0.358*** -0.411*** -0.389*** -0.376*** -0.367*** -0.474*** -0.315** -0.246* -0.103 0.10
XOM -0.009 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.01
Table 1.22: Realized volatility (30 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Log-
odds)
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.114 -0.11 -0.114 -0.107 -0.116 -0.099 -0.136* -0.15** -0.129* -0.147** 0.04
AMZN -0.017 -0.026 -0.028 -0.024 -0.018 -0.038 -0.047 -0.032 -0.065 -0.095** 0.01
BAC -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.009 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.01
BIDU 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.007 0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.009 -0.01
C 0 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.01
CMG 0.029 0.02 0.017 0.019 0.01 0.013 0.011 0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.01
EBAY -0.032 -0.037* -0.038* -0.045** -0.045** -0.039* -0.042** -0.043** -0.038* -0.033* 0.08
F -0.012 -0.013 -0.009 -0.005 -0.003 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.007 -0.01
FB -0.135** -0.145** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.162*** -0.141** -0.161*** -0.145** -0.148** 0.09
GE -0.014 -0.015 -0.008 -0.013 -0.009 -0.012 -0.015 -0.015 -0.019 -0.021 0.01
GILD -0.002 -0.009 -0.017 -0.015 -0.003 -0.015 -0.008 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.01
GM 0.009 0.009 0.01 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.01
GS 0.02 0.02 0.022 0.024* 0.019 0.022 0.028** 0.03** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.06
IBM 0.018 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.01 0.013 0.008 0.01 0.003 -0.003 0.00
JPM 0.02 0.02 0.022 0.02 0.019 0.022 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.021 0.02
MSFT 0.013 0.009 0.011 0.004 -0.009 -0.005 -0.016 -0.019 -0.013 -0.013 -0.01
NFLX -0.222*** -0.245*** -0.202*** -0.169*** -0.156** -0.147** -0.156** -0.194*** -0.16** -0.146** 0.16
PG 0.02** 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.019** 0.018** 0.018** 0.017* 0.022** 0.019** 0.08
SBUX 0.012 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.01
TSLA -0.048 -0.052 -0.059 -0.061 -0.054 -0.062 -0.071 -0.065 -0.061 -0.073 0.00
TWTR -0.054 -0.052 -0.053 -0.096 -0.115 -0.108 -0.191* -0.123 -0.122 -0.125 0.00
XOM -0.016 -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.015 -0.013 -0.017 -0.015 -0.016 -0.018 0.01
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Table 1.23: Realized volatility (30 days) vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Log-odds)
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.041 -0.043 -0.032 -0.039 -0.045 -0.027 -0.05 -0.055 -0.052 -0.07 0.00
AMZN -0.017 -0.018 -0.027 -0.029 -0.02 -0.032 -0.041 -0.036 -0.033 -0.043 0.00
BAC -0.017 -0.017 -0.014 -0.017 -0.014 -0.014 -0.011 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.00
BIDU -0.084 -0.084 -0.077 -0.074 -0.057 -0.068 -0.069 -0.077 -0.082 -0.046 0.00
C -0.021 -0.021 -0.024 -0.029* -0.022 -0.026* -0.035** -0.032** -0.027* -0.028* 0.04
CMG -0.076* -0.082** -0.098** -0.101*** -0.094** -0.099** -0.094** -0.104*** -0.09** -0.096** 0.09
EBAY 0.041*** 0.036** 0.039** 0.038** 0.039** 0.037** 0.036** 0.035** 0.033** 0.037** 0.11
F -0.001 0.004 0.011 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0 -0.001 0.001 -0.009 -0.01
FB -0.038 -0.028 -0.028 -0.039 -0.044* -0.038 -0.041 -0.041 -0.046* -0.04 0.04
GE -0.005 -0.01 -0.002 0.005 0.015 0.006 0.013 0.018 0.032 0.029 -0.01
GILD 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.008 0.012 0.02 0.03 0.054 0.051 0.053 0.00
GM 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.032 0.041 0.04 0.034 0.01
GS 0.021 0.017 0.02 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.029 0.03 0.016 0.011 0.00
IBM -0.115** -0.139*** -0.136*** -0.11** -0.093** -0.092** -0.078* -0.057 -0.033 -0.002 0.04
JPM 0.017 0.011 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.024 0.02 0.024 0.028* 0.01
MSFT 0.017 0.011 0.009 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.01
NFLX -0.003 -0.01 -0.011 -0.018 -0.022 -0.023 -0.019 -0.024 -0.023 -0.033 -0.01
PG 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.021 0.02 0.026* 0.026* 0.026* 0.03** 0.026* 0.04
SBUX 0.029 0.024 0.021 0.035 0.056** 0.057** 0.058** 0.058** 0.059** 0.065*** 0.05
TSLA -0.016 -0.021 0.014 0.018 0.033 0.023 0.011 0.013 0.009 -0.022 -0.01
TWTR 0.087*** 0.076** 0.062** 0.056* 0.052* 0.057* 0.049 0.041 0.022 0.023 0.04
XOM 0.028 0.001 -0.009 -0.033 -0.041 -0.031 -0.027 0.007 -0.019 -0.011 -0.01
Table 1.24: Realized volatility (30 days) vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Probability)
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.039 -0.032 -0.059 -0.081 -0.091 -0.098 -0.098 -0.102* -0.104* -0.107* 0.03
AMZN -0.026 -0.018 -0.021 -0.028 -0.018 -0.012 -0.015 -0.007 0.01 0.006 -0.01
BAC -0.021 -0.019 -0.012 -0.018 -0.018 -0.015 -0.01 -0.013 -0.01 -0.008 0.00
BIDU 0.028 0.022 0.02 0.026 0.036 0.036 0.042 0.045 0.047 0.062** 0.01
C -0.045 -0.039 -0.037 -0.035 -0.01 -0.026 -0.019 -0.02 -0.018 0.017 -0.01
CMG 0.064** 0.053* 0.03 0.033 0.021 0.034 0.036 0.024 0.019 0.024 0.01
EBAY -0.001 0.002 0.043 0.044 0.049 0.046 0.045 0.044 0.05 0 -0.01
F -0.021 -0.026 -0.034** -0.04** -0.036** -0.04** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.038** -0.036** 0.07
FB -0.145*** -0.141*** -0.149*** -0.159*** -0.15*** -0.157*** -0.155*** -0.148*** -0.159*** -0.173*** 0.15
GE 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.032* 0.034** 0.034** 0.035** 0.033** 0.032* 0.034** 0.05
GILD -0.04 -0.036 -0.028 -0.037 -0.032 -0.027 -0.035 -0.03 -0.023 -0.022 0.01
GM -0.022 -0.007 -0.015 -0.026 -0.032 -0.03 -0.035 -0.042 -0.056* -0.047 0.01
GS 0.021 0.014 0.011 0.01 0.024 0.015 0.015 0.02 0.036 0.034 0.00
IBM -0.002 -0.01 -0.009 -0.014 -0.011 -0.006 0.008 0.035 0.044 0.044 -0.01
JPM 0.03 0.031 0.032 0.039 0.044 0.059 0.062 0.079** 0.081** 0.075* 0.01
MSFT 0.01 0.008 0.011 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.014 0.019 0.009 0.007 -0.01
NFLX -0.009 -0.026 -0.053 -0.043 -0.027 -0.03 -0.041 0.002 0.004 0.025 -0.01
PG 0.027* 0.023* 0.017 0.02 0.019 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.02
SBUX 0.006 0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.01
TSLA 0.013 0.005 -0.019 -0.016 -0.021 -0.044 -0.04 -0.024 -0.026 -0.037 -0.01
TWTR -0.023 -0.047 -0.071 -0.076 -0.078 -0.083 -0.076 -0.071 -0.054 -0.014 -0.01
XOM 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.02 0.024 0.026* 0.027* 0.033** 0.032** 0.04
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Table 1.25: Realized volatility (30 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Prob-
ability)
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.127* -0.109 -0.113 -0.125* -0.133* -0.115 -0.116 -0.113 -0.091 -0.105 0.03
AMZN -0.048 -0.032 -0.027 -0.035 -0.03 -0.012 -0.014 0 -0.006 -0.024 -0.01
BAC 0.006 0.002 0.003 -0.01 -0.014 -0.009 -0.006 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.01
BIDU 0.014 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.01 -0.017 -0.021 -0.01
C 0.005 0.006 0.003 0 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.009 0.003 -0.01
CMG 0.019 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.016 0.012 0.014 0.019 0.017 -0.01
EBAY -0.025 -0.035* -0.04** -0.047** -0.045** -0.045** -0.053*** -0.05** -0.049** -0.047** 0.12
F -0.011 -0.014 -0.008 -0.005 0 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.01
FB -0.151** -0.172** -0.18** -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.199*** -0.202*** -0.192*** -0.214*** -0.234*** 0.12
GE -0.02 -0.022 -0.019 -0.017 -0.011 -0.014 -0.013 -0.018 -0.017 -0.016 0.01
GILD -0.028 -0.033 -0.035 -0.024 -0.012 -0.023 -0.019 -0.021 -0.012 -0.005 0.01
GM 0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.01
GS 0.02 0.022 0.021 0.02 0.018 0.019 0.024 0.024 0.027* 0.029** 0.03
IBM 0.024** 0.02 0.02 0.014 0.012 0.015 0.008 0.012 0.007 -0.001 0.02
JPM 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.013 0.01 0.014 0.009 0.012 0.01 0.011 0.00
MSFT 0.005 0.01 0.012 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.012 -0.01
NFLX -0.2*** -0.179*** -0.136** -0.107 -0.125* -0.107 -0.158** -0.135** -0.131* -0.145** 0.09
PG 0.01 0.01 0.009 0.01 0.01 0.009 0.01* 0.01 0.011* 0.009 0.03
SBUX 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.01
TSLA -0.014 -0.015 -0.039 -0.064 -0.075 -0.065 -0.073 -0.068 -0.048 -0.078 0.00
TWTR -0.167 -0.186* -0.182* -0.208* -0.165 -0.163 -0.193* -0.276** -0.23** -0.24** 0.05
XOM -0.028* -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.00
Table 1.26: Intraday realized volatility vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Log-
odds)
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.0001 0.00019 -0.00018 -0.00017 0.00007 -0.00014 0.00023 -0.00019 0.00007 0.00008 -0.03
AMZN -0.00023 -0.00011 0.00047** 0.00007 0.00003 -0.00026 -0.0001 -0.00016 -0.00016 -0.00008 0.00
BAC -0.00013 0.00017 -0.00007 -0.00014 -0.00017 0.00025 0.00011 0.00016 -0.00004 -0.00007 -0.03
BIDU -0.00009 -0.00012 -0.00006 -0.00011 -0.00001 0.0001 -0.00013 -0.00009 -0.00019* -0.00017 0.01
C 0.00012 0.00008 -0.00006 -0.00001 -0.00011 -0.00015 -0.0001 0.00036*** 0.00003 0.00016 0.05
CMG 0.00004 -0.00004 0.00002 0 0.00003 -0.00003 0.00003 -0.00007 -0.00006 0.00012 -0.02
EBAY -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00005 -0.00002 -6e-05* -6e-05** -0.00005 0 0.01
F 0.00086 0.00471*** 0.00137 -0.00171 -0.00171 0.00386** 0.00441** -0.0002 -0.00045 0.00138 0.04
FB -0.00065* -0.00071** -0.00032 0.00012 -0.00002 -0.00021 -0.00069* 0.00006 -0.00024 -0.00028 0.03
GE 0.00002 0.00003 0.00011** -0.00001 8e-05* -0.00003 0 -0.00005 -0.00006 -0.00007 0.02
GILD -0.00005 0.00023 -0.00004 -0.00029 0.00001 0.00008 0.00004 -0.00033 -0.00015 0.00003 -0.03
GM -0.00009 -0.00006 -0.00016* -0.00016* 0.00007 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00014 -0.00015 0 0.01
GS 0.00004 0 0.00003 0.00003 0 0.00005 8e-05** 0.00006 0.00006 0.00006 0.04
IBM -5.539 -3.82306 -3.92373 -5.76143 -4.45101 -5.20455 2.72137 -4.5295 -4.86907 7.03323 -0.03
JPM 5e-05* 5e-05* 0.00003 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 0 -0.00002 0.00001 0.00002 -0.01
MSFT 0.00001 0.00001 -0.00001 0 0 0.00001 0.00003 0.00002 -0.00001 0.00001 -0.03
NFLX -0.00074** -0.00043 -0.00034 0.00011 0.00019 0.00015 -0.00054* -0.00038 -0.00002 0.00019 0.02
PG 0.00001 0.00001 0 0 0 -0.00001 -0.00002 0 5e-05*** -0.00001 0.00
SBUX 0 0.00002 0 -0.00002 0 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00003 -6e-05** -6e-05** 0.04
TSLA -0.00245* -0.00173 -0.00045 -0.00136 -0.00104 -0.0007 -0.00003 -0.00031 0.00026 -0.00123 -0.01
TWTR 0 -0.00021 0.00004 -0.00033 -0.00022 -0.00052 -0.00029 -0.00004 0.00063* 0.0003 -0.01
XOM -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 0 0 0 0.00002 0.00002 -0.02
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Table 1.27: Intraday realized volatility vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Log-odds)
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.00015 0.00013 -0.00018 -0.00006 0.00014 -0.00012 0.00041** -0.00015 0.00016 0.0002 0.01
AMZN -0.00014 0.00004 -0.00022 0.00006 -0.00019 -0.00025 -0.00014 -0.00024 -0.00026 -0.00001 0.01
BAC 0.00014 0.00039*** 0.00001 -0.00007 -0.00007 0.00006 0.00005 -0.00006 -0.00007 0.00001 0.02
BIDU 0.00031** 0.00003 0.00006 0.00006 0.00021* 0.00022* 0.00009 -0.00006 0.00005 0.00011 0.03
C 0.00121*** -0.00004 0.00012 0.00019 0.0002 -0.00029 0.00009 -0.00005 0.0003 0.00205*** 0.24
CMG 0.00018 0.00012 0.00021 0.00016 0.00053*** 0.00018 0.00025* 0.00013 0.00044*** 0.00017 0.07
EBAY 0.00023* -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 0.00018 0.00012 0.00023* 0.00006 0.00003 0.00011 0.00
F -0.00103 -0.00051 -0.00108 -0.00052 -0.00029 -0.00076 0.01142*** -0.00062 -0.00027 -0.00035 0.13
FB -0.00037 -0.00041* -0.00012 -0.0001 -0.00034 -0.00012 -0.00049** -0.00013 -0.00029 -0.00024 0.06
GE -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00002 0.00006 0.00002 0.00002 0.00004 8e-05* 0.00002 0.00
GILD 0.00008 0.00012 0 -0.00031 0.00008 0.00011 0.00011 -0.00017 0.00012 -0.00029 -0.03
GM -0.00013 -0.00007 -0.00014 -0.00028* 0.00047*** -0.00017 -0.00006 -0.00014 -0.00015 0.00038** 0.04
GS 0.00003 0.00002 0.00008 0 -0.00001 -0.00003 0.00006 -0.00003 0.00002 -0.00007 -0.03
IBM -5.01 -4.39732 -4.94575 -4.86817 -3.22349 -3.24844 -4.83103 -4.9468 -4.25885 -5.06123 -0.04
JPM -0.00004 0.00004 -0.00007 -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00003 -0.00001 -0.00008 -0.03
MSFT 0.00005 0.00001 0.00005 -0.00001 0 0 0.00005 0.00006 0.00002 0.00003 -0.02
NFLX -0.0002 0.00003 -0.00002 0.00005 0.00014 0.00004 -0.00036 -0.00008 -0.00006 0.00016 -0.03
PG -0.00001 -0.00003 -0.00002 0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 0 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.03
SBUX 0.00002 -0.00001 0.00003 -0.00004 0.00001 -0.00005 0.00003 -0.00007 -0.00003 -0.00007 -0.02
TSLA -0.00099 0.00014 -0.00009 0.00009 -0.00041 -0.00075 0.00076 0.00003 -0.00021 -0.00117 -0.03
TWTR 0.00028 -0.00008 0.00066*** 0.00012 -0.00008 -0.00023 -6e-04** -0.00016 -0.00018 -0.00022 0.03
XOM -0.00002 -0.00001 0.00005 0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 0 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00001 -0.04
Table 1.28: Intraday realized volatility vs Herding Rho (Directional W matrix, Probability)
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.00041* -0.00008 -0.00011 -0.00028 0 -0.00003 0.00011 -0.00013 -0.00001 0.00021 -0.01
AMZN -0.00003 -0.00008 -0.00012 0.00015 0.00003 -0.00008 -0.00033* -0.00018 0.00007 0.00008 -0.02
BAC 0.00013 0.00025* 0.00025* -0.00019 -0.00015 0.00001 0.00001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.00004 0.00
BIDU 0.00032** 0.00007 0.0001 -0.00001 0.00014 0.00014 0.00006 -0.00012 0.00004 0.00016 0.01
C 0.00085*** -0.00003 -0.00002 0.00016 0.00033 -0.00081*** 0.00027 -0.00013 0.00058** 0.00271*** 0.33
CMG 0.00012 0.00007 0.00015 0.0001 0.00034** 0.0002 0.00015 0.00015 0.00012 0.00012 0.01
EBAY 0.00033*** -0.00007 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.00003 -0.01
F -0.00049 -0.0006 -0.00084 -0.00067 -0.00065 -0.00075 0.00336* -0.00076 -0.00065 -0.00061 -0.02
FB -0.00068** -0.0004 -0.00056* 0.00015 -0.0002 -0.00009 -0.00001 -0.00041 -0.00006 -0.00002 0.02
GE -0.00002 0.00003 0 0 9e-05** 7e-05* 9e-05** 7e-05* 0.00012*** 7e-05* 0.10
GILD -0.00016 0.00024 0.00013 -0.00038 0.00011 0.00046 0.00031 0.00004 -0.00001 -0.00014 -0.03
GM -0.00014 -0.00016 -0.00005 -0.00021 0.00053*** -0.00012 -0.00012 -0.0002 -0.00013 0.00042** 0.04
GS 0.00003 0.00002 0.00011 0.00009 0.00001 -0.00005 0.00006 -0.00004 0.00002 -0.00008 -0.03
IBM -3.82237 -3.77967 -4.0146 -3.92736 -2.68711 -2.67443 -3.62707 -3.74001 -3.40904 -3.46427 -0.04
JPM 0.00017 0.00042** 0.00036** 0 0.00008 0.0001 0.00012 0.00019 0.00009 -0.00003 0.02
MSFT 0.00008 -0.00003 0.00003 0.00007 0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00002 0.00006 -0.00004 0.00003 -0.01
NFLX -0.00012 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 0.00015 0.00015 -0.00022 0.00029 -0.00026 -0.00017 -0.02
PG -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00002 0 -0.00003 -0.02
SBUX -0.00001 0 0 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00002 0.00001 -0.00001 -0.03
TSLA -0.00071 -0.00004 -0.0007 0.00091 -0.00019 0.00199* 0.0016 0.00128 0.00095 0.00076 -0.01
TWTR 0.00045 0.00026 0.00057* -0.00004 0.00009 -0.00028 0.00016 0.00028 0.00009 0.00038 0.00
XOM 0 0 0.00002 0 0 0 0 0 -0.00001 0.00001 -0.04
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Table 1.29: Realized volatility (30 days) vs Herding Rho (Non-directional W matrix, Prob-
ability)
Lags
Firm 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days 9 days 10 days Rsq
AAPL -0.00047 -0.00026 -0.00005 -0.00018 -0.00008 -0.00023 0.00002 -0.00004 -0.00021 0.00037 -0.01
AMZN -0.00018 -0.00015 0.00042* 0.00014 0.00003 0.00012 -0.00027 0 0.00024 -0.00002 -0.01
BAC 0.00002 0.00025 0.0002 -0.00035* -0.00033* 0.00023 -0.00002 -0.00012 -0.0001 -0.00022 0.01
BIDU 0.00004 0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00007 0.00006 0.00009 0.00008 -0.00007 -0.00006 -0.0001 -0.02
C 0.00006 0.00004 -0.00009 -0.00006 -0.00007 -0.00011 -0.00007 0.00011 0.00009 0.00029*** 0.02
CMG -0.00002 -0.00006 0.00001 -0.00005 0.00006 0.00002 0.00008 -0.00007 -0.00002 0.00025*** 0.02
EBAY -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00003 -6e-05** -0.00004 -6e-05* 0.00001 0.01
F 0.00144 0.00342** -0.0001 -0.00101 -0.00175 0.00224 -0.00035 -0.00033 -0.00125 -0.00142 0.00
FB -0.00115*** -0.00068 -0.00061 -0.00025 -0.00039 -0.00028 -0.00005 -0.00034 -0.00062 -0.00001 0.05
GE 0.00001 0.00004 0 -0.00001 0.00004 0.00001 0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00001 -0.00005 -0.03
GILD -0.00013 -0.00001 -0.00009 -0.00025 0.00003 0.0001 0.00016 -0.00011 -0.00004 -0.00011 -0.04
GM -0.00009 0.00002 -0.00005 -0.00015* 0.00003 -0.00007 -0.00005 -0.00013 -0.00015* -0.00003 0.01
GS 0.00003 0.00003 7e-05* 0.00006 0.00006 0.00006 9e-05** 0.00005 0.00011*** 7e-05* 0.11
IBM -6.07103 -3.76977 -3.9592 -4.40501 -4.29187 -6.26722 14.33849 -6.13744 -4.22169 -4.35017 -0.03
JPM 0.00002 0.00002 0 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00001 0 -0.00001 0 0 -0.02
MSFT 0 0.00004 0.00002 0.00002 0.00003 0.00004 0.00002 0.00003 0.00003 -0.00001 -0.01
NFLX -0.0005 -0.00028 -0.00006 -0.00005 0.00002 0.00049 0.00015 0.0001 -0.00034 -0.00021 -0.01
PG 0.00001 0.00001 0 0.00001 0.00001 0 -0.00001 0 0.00001 -0.00001 -0.01
SBUX 0.00001 0 -0.00001 -0.00003 0 -0.00001 -0.00001 -4e-05* -4e-05* -4e-05** 0.04
TSLA -0.00225 0.00038 -0.00052 0.00018 -0.00181 0.00204 0.00107 0 0.00172 -0.00126 -0.01
TWTR -0.00031 0.00029 -0.00009 -0.00059 -0.00009 -0.0005 -0.00029 -0.00005 0.00022 0.00012 -0.02
XOM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00001 0 -0.03
Table 1.30: R-squared and partial R-squared in the regression on lagged Volatility and
Herding Rho (directional W matrix)
Intraday Vol 10-day Vol 14-day Vol 30-day Vol
Firms Adjusted R2 Partial R2 Adjusted R2 Partial R2 Adjusted R2 Partial R2 Adjusted R2 Partial R2
Apple Inc. 0.0396 0.0556 0.8007 0.0231 0.8698 0.0290 0.9402 0.0177
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.1740 0.0385 0.7625 0.0078 0.8546 0.0123 0.9228 0.0124
Bank of America Corporation 0.0223 0.0583 0.8473 0.0192 0.9078 0.0090 0.9623 0.0084
Baidu, Inc. 0.3124 0.0530 0.7720 0.0499 0.8471 0.0423 0.9429 0.0429
Citigroup Inc. 0.2325 0.2652 0.8496 0.0361 0.9086 0.0284 0.9652 0.0353
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 0.1395 0.0584 0.7534 0.0088 0.8241 0.0056 0.9189 0.0084
eBay Inc. 0.0783 0.0394 0.7427 0.0145 0.8196 0.0094 0.9123 0.0073
Ford Motor Company 0.1316 0.1678 0.7661 0.0110 0.8204 0.0129 0.9272 0.0221
Facebook, Inc. 0.2292 0.0573 0.8302 0.0206 0.8869 0.0176 0.9566 0.0171
General Electric Company 0.1194 0.0338 0.8337 0.0135 0.8839 0.0112 0.9516 0.0085
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 0.0230 0.0160 0.7690 0.0070 0.8203 0.0108 0.9151 0.0132
General Motors Company 0.0826 0.0925 0.7534 0.0188 0.8185 0.0060 0.9261 0.0189
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 0.2322 0.0613 0.8389 0.0110 0.9039 0.0098 0.9672 0.0206
International Business Machines -0.0423 0.0013 0.8027 0.0145 0.8610 0.0110 0.9349 0.0195
J P Morgan Chase & Co 0.4477 0.0512 0.8261 0.0256 0.8995 0.0227 0.9596 0.0179
Microsoft Corporation 0.2948 0.0277 0.7809 0.0154 0.8516 0.0268 0.9305 0.0131
Netflix, Inc. 0.3376 0.0510 0.7518 0.0173 0.8124 0.0164 0.9033 0.0248
Procter & Gamble Company 0.1057 0.0182 0.8004 0.0081 0.8682 0.0134 0.9508 0.0246
Starbucks Corporation 0.2341 0.0656 0.8136 0.0280 0.8808 0.0217 0.9562 0.0388
Tesla, Inc. -0.0038 0.0363 0.7798 0.0985 0.8382 0.1186 0.9369 0.0897
Twitter, Inc. 0.2758 0.1556 0.7673 0.0320 0.8162 0.0150 0.9083 0.0106
Exxon Mobil Corporation 0.6131 0.0291 0.8658 0.0162 0.9075 0.0205 0.9730 0.0205
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Table 1.31: R-squared and partial R-squared in the regression on lagged Volatility and
Herding Rho (non-directional W matrix)
Intraday Vol 10-day Vol 14-day Vol 30-day Vol
Firms Adjusted R2 Partial R2 Adjusted R2 Partial R2 Adjusted R2 Partial R2 Adjusted R2 Partial R2
Apple Inc. 0.0009 0.0175 0.7988 0.0139 0.8698 0.0287 0.9402 0.0178
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.1755 0.0403 0.7637 0.0131 0.8552 0.0162 0.9228 0.0128
Bank of America Corporation -0.0188 0.0187 0.8468 0.0159 0.9084 0.0148 0.9624 0.0111
Baidu, Inc. 0.3044 0.0420 0.7637 0.0155 0.8426 0.0140 0.9414 0.0191
Citigroup Inc. 0.0501 0.0906 0.8483 0.0280 0.9090 0.0325 0.9652 0.0367
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. 0.1109 0.0270 0.7542 0.0120 0.8267 0.0203 0.9187 0.0059
eBay Inc. 0.0884 0.0499 0.7425 0.0139 0.8202 0.0129 0.9123 0.0075
Ford Motor Company 0.0426 0.0826 0.7654 0.0082 0.8205 0.0134 0.9263 0.0098
Facebook, Inc. 0.2211 0.0474 0.8304 0.0220 0.8860 0.0095 0.9563 0.0117
General Electric Company 0.1533 0.0709 0.8345 0.0178 0.8856 0.0260 0.9518 0.0131
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 0.0199 0.0128 0.7685 0.0050 0.8205 0.0119 0.9149 0.0109
General Motors Company 0.0342 0.0446 0.7550 0.0251 0.8191 0.0092 0.9258 0.0150
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 0.2510 0.0843 0.8388 0.0106 0.9044 0.0151 0.9673 0.0232
International Business Machines -0.0319 0.0112 0.8031 0.0169 0.8613 0.0134 0.9350 0.0211
J P Morgan Chase & Co 0.4480 0.0518 0.8274 0.0326 0.8994 0.0222 0.9595 0.0164
Microsoft Corporation 0.2915 0.0230 0.7805 0.0134 0.8502 0.0177 0.9311 0.0214
Netflix, Inc. 0.3451 0.0617 0.7547 0.0289 0.8166 0.0381 0.9036 0.0277
Procter & Gamble Company 0.1096 0.0224 0.8015 0.0137 0.8699 0.0265 0.9508 0.0247
Starbucks Corporation 0.2362 0.0681 0.8132 0.0261 0.8820 0.0315 0.9562 0.0404
Tesla, Inc. 0.0070 0.0467 0.7825 0.1094 0.8413 0.1356 0.9368 0.0888
Twitter, Inc. 0.2234 0.0944 0.7661 0.0271 0.8177 0.0229 0.9091 0.0186
Exxon Mobil Corporation 0.6073 0.0147 0.8655 0.0144 0.9064 0.0092 0.9732 0.0288
Table 1.32: R-squared and partial R-squared in the regression on lagged Volatility and
Herding Rho
Directional W matrix, errors from regression on multiple News Polarity lags
Intraday Vol 10-day Vol 14-day Vol 30-day Vol
Firms Adjusted R Partial R Adjusted R Partial R Adjusted R Partial R Adjusted R Partial R
Apple Inc. 0.0065 0.0278 0.8003 0.0217 0.8703 0.0199 0.9404 0.0224
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.1408 0.0794 0.7636 0.0497 0.8584 0.0626 0.9262 0.0715
Bank of America Corporation -0.0169 0.0256 0.8464 0.0139 0.9084 0.0166 0.9624 0.0111
Facebook, Inc. 0.2164 0.0474 0.8310 0.0255 0.8862 0.0152 0.9562 0.0140
General Electric Company 0.1317 0.1559 0.8333 0.0140 0.8844 0.0168 0.9520 0.0153
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 0.0710 0.0708 0.7703 0.0153 0.8213 0.0182 0.9166 0.0311
Netflix, Inc. 0.4018 0.1485 0.7651 0.0834 0.8231 0.0823 0.9100 0.0986
Tesla, Inc. -0.0092 0.0363 0.7723 0.1182 0.8289 0.1261 0.9353 0.0939
Twitter, Inc. 0.2389 0.0835 0.7686 0.0300 0.8174 0.0147 0.9079 0.0277
Exxon Mobil Corporation 0.6199 0.0526 0.8682 0.0350 0.9071 0.0183 0.9734 0.0381
Non-directional W matrix , errors from regression on multiple News Polarity lags)
Intraday Vol 10-day Vol 14-day Vol 30-day Vol
Firms Adjusted R Partial R Adjusted R Partial R Adjusted R Partial R Adjusted R Partial R
Apple Inc. -0.0095 0.0121 0.8006 0.0235 0.8695 0.0143 0.9399 0.0148
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.1533 0.0928 0.7648 0.0546 0.8585 0.0630 0.9264 0.0740
Bank of America Corporation 0.0146 0.0558 0.8457 0.0094 0.9085 0.0178 0.9630 0.0275
Facebook, Inc. 0.2284 0.0619 0.8311 0.0264 0.8865 0.0179 0.9562 0.0134
General Electric Company 0.1850 0.2077 0.8347 0.0225 0.8853 0.0246 0.9520 0.0173
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 0.0889 0.0887 0.7726 0.0252 0.8227 0.0263 0.9152 0.0148
Netflix, Inc. 0.3688 0.1015 0.7604 0.0650 0.8201 0.0666 0.9077 0.0747
Tesla, Inc. 0.0165 0.0608 0.7765 0.1343 0.8317 0.1408 0.9363 0.1077
Twitter, Inc. 0.3039 0.1618 0.7669 0.0230 0.8169 0.0124 0.9068 0.0158
Exxon Mobil Corporation 0.6225 0.0593 0.8654 0.0141 0.9068 0.0151 0.9731 0.0267
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Table 1.33: ADF test statistics. News Polarity and Rho
Firm News Polarity (n lags = 10) Rho (n lags = 9)
Apple Inc. -9.99 -7.718
Amazon.com, Inc. -10.62 -8.543
Bank of America Corporation -10.00 -8.761
Baidu, Inc. -9.84 -8.706
Citigroup Inc. -9.45 -9.951
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. -9.40 -9.487
eBay Inc. -9.44 -8.588
Ford Motor Company -9.64 -9.120
Facebook, Inc. -9.94 -7.185
General Electric Company -8.84 -7.824
Gilead Sciences, Inc. -9.36 -8.378
General Motors Company -10.10 -9.608
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. -9.18 -8.674
International Business Machines Corporation -10.01 -8.746
J P Morgan Chase & Co -9.79 -9.244
Microsoft Corporation -9.50 -8.424
Netflix, Inc. -10.64 -8.903
Procter & Gamble Company -10.74 -9.145
Starbucks Corporation -10.29 -8.832
Tesla, Inc. -10.05 -9.000
Twitter, Inc. -8.37 -9.325
Exxon Mobil Corporation -9.23 -8.847
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Table 1.34: R-squared and partial R-squared in the regression of differenced volatility on
lagged differenced volatility and Herding Rho (non-directional W matrix)
10-day Vol 14-day Vol 30-day Vol
Firms Adjusted R Partial R Adjusted R Partial R Adjusted R Partial R
Apple Inc. -0.0066 0.0114 -0.0026 0.0287 0.0047 0.0195
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.0087 0.0119 0.0024 0.0169 0.0027 0.0157
Bank of America Corporation 0.0061 0.0095 0.0202 0.0378 0.0078 0.0235
Baidu, Inc. -0.0058 0.0168 -0.0073 0.0108 -0.0017 0.0210
Citigroup Inc. 0.0059 0.0268 0.0207 0.0533 0.0070 0.0465
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. -0.0037 0.0103 0.0046 0.0197 -0.0007 0.0080
eBay Inc. -0.0058 0.0117 -0.0020 0.0144 -0.0096 0.0071
Ford Motor Company -0.0066 0.0110 -0.0084 0.0133 -0.0064 0.0078
Facebook, Inc. -0.0092 0.0218 -0.0058 0.0127 -0.0062 0.0114
General Electric Company 0.0199 0.0253 0.0270 0.0422 0.0074 0.0212
Gilead Sciences, Inc. -0.0098 0.0069 -0.0023 0.0164 -0.0055 0.0125
General Motors Company 0.0058 0.0244 -0.0044 0.0077 -0.0048 0.0139
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. -0.0021 0.0093 -0.0004 0.0162 -0.0008 0.0177
International Business Machines 0.0007 0.0175 0.0046 0.0220 0.0129 0.0319
J P Morgan Chase & Co 0.0154 0.0185 0.0177 0.0408 0.0062 0.0298
Microsoft Corporation -0.0049 0.0157 -0.0022 0.0199 0.0079 0.0265
Netflix, Inc. 0.0116 0.0318 0.0224 0.0408 0.0076 0.0255
Procter & Gamble Company 0.0041 0.0173 0.0156 0.0326 0.0103 0.0377
Starbucks Corporation 0.0002 0.0229 0.0121 0.0372 0.0100 0.0430
Tesla, Inc. 0.0094 0.1058 0.0153 0.1350 -0.0103 0.0864
Twitter, Inc. 0.0011 0.0312 0.0038 0.0266 0.0040 0.0201
Exxon Mobil Corporation -0.0053 0.0142 -0.0043 0.0130 0.0080 0.0280
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Table 1.35: R-squared and partial R-squared in the regression of differenced volatility on
lagged differenced volatility and Herding Rho (directional W matrix)
10-day Vol 14-day Vol 30-day Vol
Firms Adjusted R Partial R Adjusted R Partial R Adjusted R Partial R
Apple Inc. 0.0057 0.0234 0.0001 0.0313 0.0063 0.0212
Amazon.com, Inc. 0.0001 0.0033 -0.0027 0.0119 -0.0008 0.0122
Bank of America Corporation 0.0084 0.0119 0.0134 0.0311 0.0030 0.0188
Baidu, Inc. 0.0161 0.0381 0.0094 0.0272 0.0158 0.0381
Citigroup Inc. 0.0141 0.0348 0.0182 0.0509 0.0068 0.0463
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. -0.0070 0.0070 -0.0080 0.0073 0.0014 0.0101
eBay Inc. -0.0038 0.0137 -0.0053 0.0112 -0.0083 0.0085
Ford Motor Company -0.0051 0.0125 -0.0095 0.0122 0.0046 0.0187
Facebook, Inc. -0.0090 0.0220 0.0055 0.0237 -0.0011 0.0164
General Electric Company 0.0028 0.0083 0.0083 0.0238 0.0000 0.0139
Gilead Sciences, Inc. -0.0072 0.0094 -0.0042 0.0146 -0.0025 0.0155
General Motors Company -0.0014 0.0173 -0.0085 0.0036 -0.0012 0.0175
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 0.0042 0.0156 -0.0011 0.0155 0.0066 0.0249
International Business Machines -0.0014 0.0154 0.0056 0.0230 0.0007 0.0200
J P Morgan Chase & Co 0.0071 0.0102 0.0190 0.0420 0.0096 0.0330
Microsoft Corporation -0.0013 0.0192 0.0084 0.0302 0.0058 0.0245
Netflix, Inc. -0.0014 0.0190 -0.0022 0.0167 0.0086 0.0264
Procter & Gamble Company -0.0072 0.0062 0.0012 0.0185 0.0005 0.0281
Starbucks Corporation 0.0030 0.0255 0.0009 0.0263 0.0082 0.0412
Tesla, Inc. -0.0031 0.0945 -0.0084 0.1142 -0.0091 0.0875
Twitter, Inc. 0.0077 0.0376 -0.0040 0.0190 -0.0011 0.0152
Exxon Mobil Corporation -0.0032 0.0162 0.0080 0.0250 0.0024 0.0225
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(a) Distribuion of log of Amihud illiquidity (b) Number of tweets vs Amihud measure in
the left cut-off
Figure 1.1: Stocks’ Amihud measure of illiquidity and social media coverage
Panel (a) presents the distribution of log of Amuhud measure calculated according to Amihud (2002) and
averaged over the three years; red line represents cut-off for the most liquid 100 stocks traded on NYSE,
NASDAQ, or AMEX.(Most liquid stocks have smallest Amihud number, and are located in the left tail of
distribution). Panel (b) presents relationship between the log of number of tweets posted during January
2014 (first month in the time window considered in the study) for these 100 stocks and their Amihud
illiquidity. measure.
CHAPTER 1. HERDING IN SOCIAL MEDIA 53
Figure 1.2: Stocks with sufficient continuous tweet data and their log-Amihud illiquidity
The 22 stocks are chosen with the log-Amihud measure evenly covering the left cut-off of the distribution
as presented on Figure 1(a).
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Figure 1.3: Histograms of disturbances as defined by Equation (8)
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Figure 1.4: Histograms of disturbances as defined by Equation (8). Continued
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Figure 1.5: Histograms of disturbances as defined by Equation (8). Continued
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Figure 1.6: Histograms of disturbances as defined by Equation (13)
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Figure 1.7: Histograms of disturbances as defined by Equation (13). Continued
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Figure 1.8: Histograms of disturbances as defined by Equation (13). Continued
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(a) AAPL (b) TWTR
(c) AMZN (d) TSLA
(e) GILD (f) XOM
(g) BAC (h) IBM
Figure 1.9: Value of Gamma against its P-value. Gammas as specified in Equation (8)
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(a) NFLX (b) FB
(c) C (d) F
(e) GE (f) GM
(g) GS (h) JPM
Figure 1.10: Value of Gamma against its P-value. Gammas as specified in Equation (8).
Continued
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(a) MSFT (b) PG
(c) SBUX (d) BIDU
(e) EBAY (f) CMG
Figure 1.11: Value of Gamma against its P-value. Gammas as specified in Equation (8).
Continued





Figure 1.12: Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to maturity
and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from non-directional W’s,
right panels represent directional W’s





Figure 1.13: Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to maturity
and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from non-directional W’s,
right panels represent directional W’s. Continued





Figure 1.14: Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to maturity
and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from non-directional W’s,
right panels represent directional W’s. Continued





Figure 1.15: Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to maturity
and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from non-directional W’s,
right panels represent directional W’s. Continued





Figure 1.16: Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to maturity
and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from non-directional W’s,
right panels represent directional W’s. Continued
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(a) TWTR
(b) XOM
Figure 1.17: Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to maturity
and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from non-directional W’s,
right panels represent directional W’s. Continued
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(a) GM (b) IBM (c) MSFT
(d) TSLA (e) GS (f) SBUX
(g) PG (h) JPM (i) XOM
(j) TWTR (k) NFLX (l) GILD
Figure 1.18: ACF plots for the News Polarity for each stock.
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(a) AAPL (b) AMZN (c) BAC
(d) C (e) F (f) FB
(g) GE (h) BIDU (i) EBAY
(j) CMG
Figure 1.19: ACF plots for the News Polarity for each stock. Continued
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(a) GM (b) IBM (c) MSFT
(d) TSLA (e) GS (f) SBUX
(g) PG (h) JPM (i) XOM
(j) TWTR (k) NFLX (l) GILD
Figure 1.20: ACF plots for the herding rho for each stock.
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(a) AAPL (b) AMZN (c) BAC
(d) C (e) F (f) FB
(g) GE (h) BIDU (i) EBAY
(j) CMG
Figure 1.21: ACF plots for the herding rho for each stock. Continued
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(a) GM (b) IBM (c) MSFT
(d) TSLA (e) GS (f) SBUX
(g) PG (h) JPM (i) XOM
(j) TWTR (k) NFLX (l) GILD
Figure 1.22: Plots of herding rho over time for each stock.
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(a) AAPL (b) AMZN (c) BAC
(d) C (e) F (f) FB
(g) GE (h) BIDU (i) EBAY
(j) CMG
Figure 1.23: Plots of herding rho over time for each stock. Continued





Figure 1.24: Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to maturity
and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from non-directional W’s,
right panels represent directional W’s. Decisions filtered through seven lags of news.





Figure 1.25: Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to maturity
and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from non-directional
W’s, right panels represent directional W’s. Decisions filtered through seven lags of news.
Continued
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(a) TWTR
(b) XOM
Figure 1.26: Portion of variation in the implied volatility (for a given pair of days to maturity
and delta) explained by lags of ρ. Left panels represent ρ obtained from non-directional
W’s, right panels represent directional W’s. Decisions filtered through seven lags of news.
Continued
Chapter 2
Banks under the Volcker Rule: Elastic
Net Approach
2.1 Introduction
As a response to the financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform was signed into
law on July 21, 2010. A part of it was a special provision that prohibits banks from the
proprietary trading and investing in hedge funds and private equity – the so-called Volcker
Rule.
Prop trading, as defined by the regulation, is ”engaging as a principal [or main party to
a transaction acting for his own account and risk] for trading account of the banking entity
in any transaction to purchase or sell security, derivative, or any other financial instrument”.
Without restriction on such activity, large banking entities could allow themselves to take
on increased risk in trading while still relying on commercial banks access to the Fed Banks
Discount Window: availability of cheap fed funds makes elevated risk levels more tolerable,
but at the expense of the US taxpayer (Chatterjee (2011)).
The rule that once was envisioned as a simple clear ban on prop trading, gained com-
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plexity while being worked on by five regulatory agencies. It is argued by some that it could
deliver benefit of financial stability if implemented properly (Baily et al. (2017)); however,
the cost of implementation would be high. For instance, JPMorgan’s estimate of only early
compliance cost was 400-600 million annually.
In addition to direct cost of implementation, one would expect to observe an indirect
cost of forgone profits due to the ban of certain trading activities. Yet, for most banks that
made changes in order to comply with Volcker, earnings reports did not show much difference
compared to pre-Volcker times. The percentage of total revenue these banks generated from
trading also remained quite stable over time. There were two possible explanations for
such observations floating in the literature. The first pointed out multiple methodological
flaws of the Rule (Chatterjee (2011)): a return to Glass-Steagalls restrictions is problematic
after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act – once allowed by the latter, the financial combinations
of commercial and investment banks became a well-tied structure that is vital to todays
financial markets. Thus, the Volcker Rule, focuses not on structure but rather on transaction
— it bans prop trading for deposit-taking banks, but exempts market-making and hedging
activities. In particular, the distinction between speculative trade and hedge oftentimes is
hard to make.
Secondly, banned from one type of trading, banks are trying to make up their revenue by
engaging more in the type of trading that is still allowed, as some speculate (Chung et al.
(2019)). Because of increased engagement in such seemingly safer transactions, an aggregate
level of risk would not decrease (and potentially could even get higher), defeating the whole
purpose of the Volcker Rule.
In this study, I test such spillover effect. I find no impact of the Rule on measures of
profitability (RoE), which is consistent with the previous studies. A potential explanation
here is that the variable possesses an exogeneity characteristic: it is rather a measure that
banks aim to attain and relocate their resources in such an order so that the bar is met.
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I speculate, however, that, following the enactment of the Volcker Rule, there is a change
in the banking practices. To test this conjecture, I consider banks’ non-interest revenue
generated by the activities similar to those banned under the Volcker Rule. In addition, I
propose a new way of identification: I collect banks’ feedback about the Rule’s potential
and current impact on their operations and financial results from the annual 10-K reports.
This approach allows for more accuracy in separation between those banks that are subject
to the law, and the banks in the controlling group – a feature much needed in this policy
evaluation question. I use a synthetic control method in the form of an elastic net approach,
which allows me to relax some assumptions posed by the traditional approach and to tailor
the method to the peculiarities of the banking business.
I find that the notional values of derivatives held for hedging increase in response to the
Rule for most of the banks with the result being statistically significant for the majority of
the affected banks. The percentage of the revenues brought by investment banking advi-
sory, brokerage, and underwriting also shows a small increase, although, the result is not
statistically significant; similarly, trading assets and riskiness of banking activity (as proxied
by z-score) decrease in post-Final Rule era, and the result is significant for for the few last
observed months in the testing window. Per recent developments in the regulation, available
for sale securities were also considered. No statistically significant change was captured.
2.2 Background
In 1933, the Congress passed the Glass-Steagal Act in order to restore the confidence in the
banking system. In a prelude to the Act, banks were allowed to underwrite and deal in
securities and the decade of 1920s was extremely prosperous up until 1929 when the ”boom”
turned into a ”bust”, with worried depositors rushing to the banks in hope to withdraw
their funds. Such bank runs have resulted in the Emergency Banking Act, also named
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Glass-Steagal Act, separating commercial banks from the investment banks.
Along with the separation of banking activities, the Act specified the creation of the
FDIC, which started insuring bank deposits with a pool of money gathered from the banks.
The deposit insurance had in its key function to promote confidence in the banking system
and prevent it from the aforementioned ”bank runs.” Such guarantees, however, potentially
invited excessive risk-taking – a so-called moral hazard effect: lacking control by the depos-
itors that are ready to withdraw their funds in case of bank being unsafe, the bank is more
prone to get involved in a risky action. The risk, in turn, was transferred to the public.
In 1999 the Glass-Steagal Act was repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act with the purpose
to modernize financial system. The Act allowed for the creation of financial behemoths
that housed the deposit banks and often risky investment business under a single roof. It
was passed with an enormous fanfare; however, as Macey (2000) notes, at the time of its
passage Glass-Steagal Act was already a dead letter: ”the investment banks had conspired
with compliant regulators to punch giant holes in the statutory restrictions on combining
commercial banking and investment banking.”
By that time, the FDIC insurance limit grew up to $100,000. In 2008, Congress approved
a temporary increase in the limit to $250,000 but the Dodd-Frank Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 made this number permanent. The moral hazard question was raised
once again with the suggestion of possible solution to the problem. During his testimony
before the Senate Banking Committee, Paul Volcker mentioned:
The basic point is that there has been, and remains, a strong public interest in
providing a safety net – in particular, deposit insurance and the provision of
liquidity in emergencies – for commercial banks carrying out essential services.
There is not, however, a similar rationale for public funds — taxpayer funds —
protecting and supporting essentially proprietary and speculative activities. Hedge
funds, private equity funds, and trading activities unrelated to customer needs and
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continuing banking relationships should stand on their own, without the subsidies
implied by public support for depository institutions.
The Volcker proposal to limit banks proprietary trading and fund activity was signed
into law in June 2010 as Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The text of it, however,
required extensive agency definition and rule-making. In particular, the first part of it pro-
hibits banking entities from engaging as principal in proprietary trading for the purpose of
selling financial instruments in the near term or otherwise with the intent to resell in order
to profit from short-term price movements. The prohibition is subject to numerous exemp-
tions, including trading in U.S. government, agency and municipal obligations, underwriting
and market making-related activities, risk-mitigating hedging activities, trading on behalf
of customers, trading for the general account of insurance companies, and foreign trading
by non-U.S. banking entities. Oftentimes, such activities as market making, hedging, and
underwriting evidence quite similar characteristics to the prop trading making it difficult to
draw a distinct line between them. For instance, accumulation of the inventory in anticipa-
tion of the customer demand might resemble prop-trading; banks also might engage in prop
trading through incomplete or inconsistent hedging strategies, as noted in the FSOC study
(FSOC (2011)). Broadly determined restrictions may have a deterring effect on the permit-
ted activities; however, the loose definition of prohibited area might invite an opportunity
for the camouflaged prop trading.
The second part of the Volcker Rule bans the bank holding companies from investing
in or sponsoring private equity or hedge funds (so-called covered funds), again subject to
a list of exemptions. Funds that are not regarded as covered include foreign public funds,
wholly owned subsidiaries, joint ventures, acquisition vehicles, securitization-related vehicles,
mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, etc. In addition, the banks are permitted to take part
is so-called ”de-minimis investment” in which the bank might provide up to 100% of the
seed capital or make investment in a fund as long as the amount of it is no more than 3%
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of the total ownership interest within a year from transaction. Such investment must also
be immaterial to the bank and should constitute no more than 3% of Tier 1 Capital of the
banking entity.
With regard to the latter portion of the Rule, the federal regulators and others expressed
worries about the potential market disruptions caused by banks dumping the covered funds
into the marketplace, as well as about the burdens the banks would experience in case of
liquidation of already held investments. As a result, the Volcker Rule implementation was
prolonged by the extensions given to banks on their way to compliance with the legislation.
To this day, Volcker Rule remains to be a hotly debated topic in the literature. A number
of studies point out its potential unintended negative impact on the bond market liquidity
(Duffie (2012); Bao et al. (2016); Whitehead (2011); Chow and Surti (2011)); some suggest
its complete ineffectiveness in today’s financial markets structure (Chatterjee (2011); Chung
et al. (2019)); some empirical studies find conflicting evidence on the market liquidity post
crisis and during the Volcker Rule enactment (Trebbi and Xiao (2015); Bessembinder et al.
(2018); Dick-Nielsen and Rossi (2016)). Bao et al. (2016) notes that such inconsistencies in
results might stem from the differences in periods examined in the studies – some authors
focus on pre-Volcker events and discuss their results in light of anticipation of new regulation
rather than assessing implementation of the Rule and its impact on market conditions. The
latter would require the extension of the time window to, preferably, today’s date.
Few studies bring their analysis to a firm (bank) level, looking into the impact of Volcker
on banks default likelihood and profits. Chung et al. (2019) find that the impact on default
probability could be unfavorable; profitability, however, is expected to decrease, based on
their simulation results. In their empirical exercise, the authors find no evidence of such
decrease in profits, and explain this inconsistency by their sample limitation: their sample
consists of banks with higher banking profitability than their trading activity. Moreover, the
Rule decreases the trading book and raises the illiquid banking book portfolio, which yields
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even higher earnings at the expense of higher risk.
Other studies suggest that the Volcker Rule could reduce banks’ risk management capa-
bilities and the services that they offer (Thakor and E. (2012)). Madura and Premti (2014)
find a negative valuation effect for money center banks following the Rule’s announcement.
They also note a risk reduction as a response to a first event signaling development of Vol-
cker and attribute such change to the perception of the banking industry: the Rule boosts
confidence of the investor in the risk-taking behavior of a bank. In contrast to these results,
Keppo and Korte (2016) find no decrease in default probabilities for affected banks in post-
Volcker times: the volatility of trading returns remained unchanged and volatility of banking
activities decreased, suggesting that risk-taking has not moved to the banking book.
2.3 Model and inference
The standard approach in the policy evaluation literature follows Mill’s Method of Difference
(Mill (2011)), which specifies:
If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an in-
stance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common,
that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two
instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the
phenomenon.
In essence, the focus is on the comparison of outcomes between the units affected by
the event of interest and those that remained unaffected, with a requirement for unaffected
units to reproduce a counterfactual case, which would have happened, had there been no
event or intervention occurring. Execution of such a strategy requires a careful choice of the
comparison, or unaffected, unit in order to reduce bias and erroneous conclusions (Card and
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Krueger (1994)) and since a suitable single comparison unit often does not exists, one would
want to explore combinations of unaffected units to better reproduce characteristics of the
affected (treated) unit.
The method that allows for such comparison unit selection constructs this unit as a
weighted average of all potential comparison units with weights chosen in such a fashion that
the difference in the characteristics between the synthesized unit (hence, the name of the
method – the synthetic control) and the affected unit in the pre-intervention era is minimal
(Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)). In brief, the method specifies that the unobserved control





i denotes 2 through N (untreated) units and scalar wi represents weight of i
th untreated unit
in the synthesized unit. To calculate the vector of weights W = {w2...wN}, the weighted
least squares approach is used, so in the matrix form1:
Ŵ = argmin
w
||X1 −X0W ||v (2.1)
subject to a number of constraints. Here X1 represents the vector of pre-intervention charac-
teristics for the treated unit which include the outcome variable Y1 and a vector of observed
covariates not affected by the intervention Z1.
2
The traditional version of the synthetic control method sis a constrained optimization
problem, including such constraints as non-negative weights, no-intercept assumption, and
restriction for weights to sum to one.3
1As per Abadie et al. (2007), ||X1 −X0W ||v =
√
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W )
2Abadie et al. (2007), suggests a variety of specifications of the vector X1. In particular, if the outcome
variable in pre-intervention is observed over T0 periods, let K = (K1,K2, ...KT0)
′ be a (T0 × 1) vector of





where i = 1 represents the treated unit and i ∈ [2;N ] represents the control units. Consider M of such






); Xi where i ∈ [2;N ] representing control
units, would be calculated in a similar way
3Non-negativity constraint specifies that wi ≥ 0∀i ∈ (2 : N) and adding-up constraint specifies that∑
(wi) = 1
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I follow the Doudchenko and Imbens (2016) method and relax some assumptions initially
imposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2007). First, I add an
intercept µ to allow for possibility that the outcome for the treated unit is systematically
larger by a constant amount; the need for this assumption is based on previous research
that shows significant gap between trading book ratios and return volatility for treated and
control group. Secondly, I do not restrict the weights to be nonnegative: banks profit is
a result of its strategy that could be positively or negatively related to strategies of other
banks that belong to a control group. The resulting model is an application of the elastic
net regression as proposed by Zou and Hastie (2005).
The method takes a semi-parametric approach to pre-treatment outcomes by assigning
an optimal weight to each control observation. A vector of weights, w, is obtained in a
minimization problem:
(µ̂(λ, α), ŵ(λ, α)) = argmin
µ,w
Q((µ,w)|Xobst,pre, Xobsc,pre; (λ, α)), (2.2)
Q((µ,w)|Xobst,pre, Xobsc,pre) = ||Xobst,pre − µ− w′Xobsc,pre||22 + λ(
1− α
2
||w||22 + α||w||1), (2.3)
where Xobst,pre, X
obs
c,pre are pre-intervention values
4 for treated and control. I select tuning pa-
rameters (λ, α) using the cross-validation method suggested by Breiman et al. (1984) to
overcome over-fitting.

















4in this case, Xi = (Z
′
i, Yi)
CHAPTER 2. BANKS UNDER THE VOLCKER RULE 87
(where control index, i ∈ [2 : N ]) to ensure unbiasednes of the estimator.
Since large sample asymptotic inference is not possible for the synthetic control, the use
of permutation methods is suggested (Abadie et al. (2015)). This requires estimation of a
placebo treatment effect for each unit in a donor pool using synthetic control method, and




i,τ − Ŷ obsi,τ ,∀τ ∈ [1 : T ] (2.6)
as the estimated gap due to the enactment of the Rule. Here, T is the last available month









∀i ∈ [1 : N ] (2.7)
The P-value is then calculated as
p =
∑N
i=2 I(RMSPEi >= RMSPE1)
N
, (2.8)
where I is an indicator function given the condition in the parentheses.
2.4 Identification
The Volcker Rule’s explicit aim is to reduce risk-taking by banks by limiting their prop
trading and investment in hedge funds and private equity. The limitation to hold ”covered
funds” allows for a few exemptions, as discussed earlier, one of which stipulates that such
investment must be ”immaterial” to the bank and should constitute no more than 3% of Tier
1 Capital of the banking entity. The identification of affected banks based on this indicator
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was used in Keppo and Korte (2016) and Chung et al. (2019). Both studies, however, note
that a 3% is rather arbitrary number for two reasons. Firstly, the Volcker Rule is still not
fully implemented and is not yet fully binding for banks — some of them may have responded
to a new regulation and made a public announcement about it, some are still in the process
of compliance.
Secondly, the Rule specifies that the entities that could rely on exception from the defini-
tion of the investment company under the Investment Company Act could also be excluded
from the definition of the covered fund (real estate funds, for example). This could enlarge
the trading book (as defined in the aforementioned studies) without having a bank violate
any of the Volcker stipulations. In this case, the noted ratio would be higher than the spec-
ified 3% yet the bank would not be affected by the law at all. Thus, application of such
strategy would result in leaving a few ”apples” in a basket of ”lemons.”
In addition, the considered identification strategy would not take into account the propri-
etary trading limitation, which forces banks to stop engaging as a principal for the trading
account. It is true that some banks ceased all proprietary activity during or before 2010.
However, some larger banks note in their financial reports that the portion of it remained
after the Volcker enactment date and was expected to be exited by the Final Rules deadline
which was in April, 2014.
To properly capture the legislation’s effect on the banks’ practices, one would need to find
a reliable measure that could identify the line between the treatment (affected) and control
(unaffected) pool. For instance, public announcement about compliance with the Volcker
Rule made by a certain bank would not only indicate bank’s assignment to treatment but
potentially give some information about the start of the treatment. Publicly traded firms
(banks) disclose their information on ongoing basis in compliance with the federal security
laws. Thus, one can use text data from the annual 10K reports to extract firms’ opinion
about the effect of the Volcker Rule on them as well as progress they made towards meeting
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the Rule’s requirements. This draws a distinct line between the banks that are subject to the
Volcker Rule and those who are not. Accordingly, in this study, I follow the latter strategy.
2.5 Data
According to U.S. regulations, the banks that are in a status of a bank holding company
are regulated by the Federal Reserve and required to file quarterly financial reporting on a
consolidated level (FR Y-9C/LP/SP, available from the Chicago Fed). There is a limited
number of banks that have long enough histories of quarterly financial reports. For instance,
such banks as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley switched to be the traditional bank
holding companies only a year or two before the enactment of the Volcker Rule. There is
a trade-off between the length of pre-intervention era chosen for the study and the number
of banks to be included in it; however, both dimensions need to be maximized. A short
pre-intervention period poses the small-training-set problem: the smaller size of training set
increases the part of squared error of the model that is due to the variance term as defined
by Geman et al. (1992); from the other side, a small pool of control units would negatively
affect the fit of the model.
The time window considered in this study extends from 2001 Q1 to 2017Q3 and covers
120 banks. The data are obtained from the Bank Regulatory database of WRDS.
The variables of interest are the banks’ non-interest revenues generated by trading and
investment activities and defined according to the Consolidated Income Statement - Report
of Income for Holding Companies. In particular, these are trading assets, securities available
for sale, revenue from investment banking advisory, brokerage, and underwriting fees and
commissions. The values are calculated as a ratios; see Table 1 for precise descriptions.
In addition, I consider gross notional amounts of derivative contracts held for trading
as well as those held for purposes other than trading to proxy for the trading and hedge
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inventory levels. The changes in these levels could potentially be linked to the changes in
hedging and market making activity with respect to this particular security class.
In the assessment of the riskiness of banks’ activities, I follow previous studies. As a
measure of a bank’s risk, I consider a Z-score, calculated as the sum of Equity/TA and ROA
divided by the standard deviation of ROA, estimated over rolling windows of two years
(King, 2013) The set of covariates includes ratios covering profitability, efficiency, and asset
quality. In particular, the controlling variables are RoE, Cost-to-Income ratio, and Loan
Loss Provision to Gross Loans. The choice of the explanatory variables is limited due to the
methodology requirements: covariates must be not affected by the legislation.
The flow variables in the BHC regulatory filings are reported on a year-to-date basis.
Quarterly flow series are obtained by ”quarterizing” the data: the variable at time (t-1)
for a given year is subtracted from observations in quarter 2, 3, and 4 of the same year. I
use a cubic spline imputation technique for the quarterly accounting data to derive monthly
time series which are then merged with the 10-K reports text data using CIK-PERMCO
links obtained from the WRDS database as well as PERMCO-RSSD links file provided by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The time period is 2001Q3 to 2017Q3 (the latest
available for most banks), allowing for at least 885 observations before the treatment took
place.
I extract annual 10K reports for 2010-2016 fiscal years from EDGAR (SEC) using Master
Index directories. The public announcements with regard to the Volcker Rule compliance
progress and firm’s opinion about the Rule’s impact on it are then located in the reports
using text analysis. I scrape the html version of the 10-K filing for each bank and extract
paragraphs with the Volcker Rule mentioned in them; I then choose only sentences with the
bank’s feedback about the legislation that is contained within this paragraph. The procedure
5Z-score calculation includes estimation of σ of ROA which requires 2 years of past RoA data at each
point; for the rest of variables, the pre-Volcker period constitutes 112 months
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is repeated for 2011-2017 filing years that represent 2010-2016 fiscal years. The output is
manually classified into the treated and not-treated pools. Those BHCs that clearly state
that they are not a subject to the Rule constitute the control group; the BHCs in the
treatment group note in their reports about changes to be done in compliance with the
Volcker Rule and any material effect it might have on the business, financial condition, and
results of operations. The sample size is 120 publicly traded banks out of which 47 noted
to be affected by the Volcker Rule, and the other 73 reported that they neither held any
covered funds, nor they engage in the trading activity prohibited by the Volcker Rule.
The smaller size treated banks are less likely to be involved in the prop trading activity
in the pre-Volcker era. The primary change in the operation of such banks in compliance
with the regulation would be a sell-off of the prohibited covered funds, as they mention in
their 10-K reports. This is consistent with the recent calculations presented by the Federal
Agencies (OCC et al. (2018)), showing that roughly 98 percent of the trading assets and
liabilities in the U.S. banking system are currently held by firms with trading assets and
liabilities of 1 billion or more. Thus, it is reasonable to distinguish between smaller and
larger banks when running aggregate analysis. For that purpose, I construct representative
big and small bank. I define a big bank as one that has over $50 billion in total assets. The
representative big bank is then constructed as the total-asset-weighted average of all treated
banks populating the big banks group; the leftover treated banks are used in the calculation
of the representative small bank.
Figure 1 depicts simple averages for the covariates (RoE, Cost-to-Income ratio, and Loan
Loss Provision to Gross Loans) across banks in the treated and control groups. None of
the variables shows long-lasting differences between the groups. Summaries of the pre- and
post-treatment averages for each of the variables are presented in Table 2 for aggregate small,
big, and control bank: no significant change across the representative banks is noted.
Table 3 summarizes the variables of interest. Trading Assets constitute slightly more than
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1% of Total Assets for the small representative bank which see a marginally small increase in
this accounting item post-Volcker; the representative big bank, on the other hand, allocates
14% of its total assets to the trading activity in the pre-Volcker period. This number drops
by 2.7% in the post-intervention. At the same time, the big bank almost doubles its total
notional amounts of derivatives held for the purpose other then trading, the derivatives held
for trading increase significantly too for both small and big banks, however, in comparison
with the control bank, such change is not dramatic. The increase in the Z-score for big banks
is much more pronounced for the big bank compared to both the small bank and the control
bank, potentially pointing to the negative impact of the Volcker Rule on the riskiness of
those ”too big to fail.”
2.6 Estimation and results
For the estimation purposes all variables are normalized using estimates of means and stan-
dard deviations that are calculated based on the pre-treatment (train) set for each of treat-
ment and control banks. The estimation process includes an automatic choice of tuning
parameters, (α, λ) via the cros-validation procedure; I follow the suggestion of Doudchenko
and Imbens (2016) to consider all positive values of λ on a grid of α ∈ {0.1, ..., 0.9} The
cross-validation procedure is then carried out as following: for each α, such λ is calculated












where k represents the folds6: a vector of treated values, Y obst,pre, is divided into five folds and
for each of these folds the model is fitted using the other four (denoted in the Equation (9)
6the number of folds is traditionally set to 5.
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by superscript (−k) meaning non-kth folds) as a training set. Finally, α is chosen for which
CVα(λ) is minimal. Essentially, the optimal pair of (α, λ) that minimizes CV () on a given
grid of α is chosen.
To obtain a more parsimonious model, I follow Breiman (1984) method that suggests to
choose λ for which
CVλ̂ = min
λ
CV (λ) + s(min
λ
CV (λ)) (2.10)
where s() is a standard error operator (standard error is estimated based on five values of
mean squared error obtained from fitting the model for each fold). In essence, I choose the
simplest model — that yields the smallest CV — which is no more than one standard error
worse than the best model.
Using elastic net regression, I construct at most 47 synthetic treated units7 for each
variable of interest. In addition, in order to summarize the results, I repeat the estimation
of the synthetic control for a representative big and small bank, constructed as noted earlier.
The estimation procedure is carried over sets of controls populated by 18 to 73 banks for
the representative big and small treated units as well as sets of 25 to 47 separate affected
banks. The seminal synthetic control study (Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)) imposes re-
striction of weights summing to one on the optimization process, as an assurance of stability
of the model. The elastic net approach allows to relax this constraint by imposing a com-
bination of LASSO and Ridge regression constraints. However, in this application, the sum
of weights for each considered case does not fall far from 1. The weights are presented in
Tables 8 – 11.
In assessment of the Rule’s impact on banks, I define two post-intervention periods: pre-
Final Rule and post-Final Rule. The Final Rule was adopted in April 2014, coming into effect
7Some of the treated banks do not show any activity with respect to a particular variable, especially
in case when it is a smaller bank (for instance some smaller banks do not trade but do report presence of
covered funds that need to be liquidated); the numbers of observed banks in each category (small, big, or
control) for each variable are presented in Table 3.
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in July 2015, and included a set of revisions. In particular, it reduced the burden on smaller
and less-complex institutions by shrinking their compliance and reporting requirements. In
addition, it permitted banks to retain certain CDOs, and gave an extension in conformance
with the covered funds clause.
Krawiec and Liu (2015) note that the effort to influence the Rule at the agency level began
early in the legislation process. After the enactment in 2010 the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) committee was formed to conduct a study and make recommendations on
effective Volcker Rule implementation. Prior to the study, the FSOC solicited public input,
and roughly 18450 comments were received. The comments addressed all major provisions of
the proposed Rule; however, major attention was paid to the market-making exemption. For
instance, the commenters worried that the Volcker Rule, in its original form (the Proposal),
would limit banks’ ability to engage in market-making, which would negatively affect market
liquidity, price discovery, and capital formation.
The Final Rule took into account the comments and made substantial revisions to treat-
ment of the market making and hedging activities. In particular, under the Final Regulation,
a trading desk may engage in the market-making activity without trade-by-trade analysis
required under the Proposal, but instead a banking entity must monitor its financial expo-
sure (aggregate risks of the financial instruments which the desk trades) and market-making
inventory; the Proposal had a provision which would require market-making to generate
revenues primarily from fees, commissions, bid-ask spread, or any other source except the
appreciation in the value of covered financial position, which by many deemed to be quite
restrictive. This provision was not included into the Final Rule.
While relaxing regulation of market-making, the Final Rule imposed additional compli-
ance obligations on the hedging activity: under the Final regulation, for each position to
qualify as a hedge, some type of analysis should demonstrate that this position can mitigate
specific identifiable risk. In addition, hedging could no longer be used to reduce risks associ-
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ated with the general market movements, broad economic conditions, or other macro-based
risk.
The mentioned changes in the rule-making process required this study to separate be-
tween pre- (June 2010 - March 2014) and post-Final Rule (April 2014 and onward) period.
Consistent with previous studies (Keppo and Korte (2016), Chung et al. (2019)), I find
reduction in trading asset compared to constructed counterfactual for the representative big
bank. Figure 2 (panel (a)) presents the true and counterfactual values for the considered
variable; it shows the widening gap between the two, suggesting a lingering effect of the
legislation on the banks’ assets structure. The result, however, is not statistically significant
with respect to the standard confidence levels; no significant change was captured for the
representative smaller bank (Figure 3).
Tables 14 and 15 show the estimated gaps between synthetic and observed values for each
of treated banks. The biggest banks experience slight although not significant shrinkage
of their trading assets. Few banks (Wells Fargo, U.S. Bancorp), however, experience a
statistically significant increase in this accounting item.
For the treated representative bank whose total assets are bigger than 50 billion, revenue
generated by the IB advisory, brokerage, and underwriting increased slightly although such
change was not statistically significant (Figure 2, panel (b); Table 12). In the bank-by-bank
analysis (Tables 16 and 17), in the post-Final Rule period, nine treated banks show significant
increase in this item, including such banks as Bank of America and Wells Fargo. This finding
suggests that, relative to the other lines of business, for some banks, this revenue-generating
practice potentially gained more importance in the post-Volcker era.
As Figure 2, panel(c) and Table 20 show, some of the biggest banks (Bank of Amer-
ica, JPMorgan) have expanded their derivative hedging activities – the total gross notional
amounts of derivatives held for the purpose other than trading have increased drastically over
the pre-Final Rule period. As noted earlier, prop trading ban has a vast list of permitted
CHAPTER 2. BANKS UNDER THE VOLCKER RULE 96
exceptions, including hedging and market-making, and differentiation between prohibited
and permitted activity often is hard to make. A broken hedging strategy could resemble
proprietary trading. Likewise, such short-term increase in this financial report item could
possibly signify an attempt of presenting banned activity as a legitimate hedging strategy
- the sharp increase only happens in pre-Final Rule period and becomes insignificant after
the final, more stringent (with respect to hedging), regulation is released. Alternatively, a
potential explanation of such increase could be a growing need of managing inventory risk
for bank as a market-maker.
The Volcker Rule aimed for a reduction of riskiness of the banking actions and existing
literature documents it being ineffective with that respect: Chung et al. (2019) find that
the Rule has raised default probability of the affected banks. Figure 2 (panel (e)) shows
small positive gap between true and synthetic Z-score for a representative big bank; how-
ever, statistically speaking, this gap is not different from zero. As in case of trading assets,
the distance between the two widens with time: the drop in riskiness of banking activity
is statistically significant over the last quarter of the post-intervention window at 90% con-
fidence level. In the bank-by-bank analysis, four out of 15 big banks, including Citigroup
and JPM Chase, experience significant increase in the Z-score in the post-Final Rule era.
The effect of the Rule on the small representative bank is virtually zero (Figure 3, panel(e),
Table 23).
In light of recent developments around the Rule, I also consider changes in available-
for-sale securities. In May 2018, the Board issued proposed revisions to the regulation
which should potentially simplify the Rule and reduce compliance costs without negatively
affecting safety and soundness of the banking entities. One of the proposed changes included
revision of the term ”trading account” by replacing short-term intent-based prong with the
accounting-based prong, which in general would cover derivatives, trading securities, and
available-for-sale securities. The proposal was met with negative feedback from the banks,
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as the available-for-sale category of securities is quite broad and includes investment grade
corporate bonds and asset backed securities.
If the accounting-based prong coincides with the previously adopted prong, given that
the Volcker Rule had at least small effect on the banks, some changes in the available-for-
sale securities category should be captured. Figure 2 (segment (f)) shows small increase
(although not lasting) for the representative big bank and decrease for the representative
small bank in both cases with overwhelmingly high p-values, suggesting a need for finer
classification in determining potentially affected accounting items.
2.7 Conclusion
This study analyzes the impact the Volcker Rule had on the U.S. bank holding companies.
A new identification strategy was designed, based on the text portion of the banks’ annual
financial reporting. The assumptions behind this study are built on previous findings (as
well as the finding in this study) that suggested that the Rule had no impact on the banks’
profits; in a sense profitability is an exogenous measure, a level that the bank aims to meet
so its stock performance is not penalized. Consistent with previous studies, I find change in
assets structure in the banks in compliance with the regulation. The notional value of the
derivatives held for the purpose other than trading increases drastically over the pre-Final
Rule period. Such activity coincides with the heated interest from the banks and public
to relax the initial Rule’s constrains on the market-making. The gap between the true and
counterfactual derivatives diminishes significantly in the post-Final rule period. Finally,
previous studies find that the Rule was not effective with respect to its risk-decreasing
aim. My result is consistent with the finding only over the portion of the considered post-
intervention window, suggesting that the regulation did bring some positive changes into the
current financial system.
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Table 2.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Bank regulatory database item
Trading assets BHCK3545/BHCK2170
Investmet banking advisory, brokerage,
and underwriting fees and commissons
(BHCKC386 + BHCKC387 +
BHCKC886 + BHCKC887 +
BHCKC888)/(BHCK4074+BHCK4079)
Total gross notional amount of deriva-
tive contracts held for trading
BHCKA126 + BHCKA127 +
BHCK8723 + BHCK8724
Total gross notional amount of deriva-
tive contracts held for purpose other
than trading
BHCK8725 + BHCK8726 +
BHCK8727 + BHCK8728
Z-score ((BHCK3519/BHCK2170)+RoA)/sRoA
Available for sale securities BHCK1773/BHCK2170
Efficiency (Cost-Income ratio) BHCK4093/(BHCK4107 + BHCK4079)
Profitability (RoE) BHCK4340 / BHCK2170
Table 2.2: Summary statistics. Covariates
Variable Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker Change N of banks
Small Bank
Profitability 0.002 0.002 0.000 32
Efficiency 0.683 0.676 -0.007 32
Asset Quality 0.001 0.000 -0.001 32
Big Bank
Profitability 0.002 0.002 0.000 15
Efficiency 0.643 0.691 0.048 15
Asset Quality 0.001 0.000 -0.001 15
Control Bank
Profitability 0.002 0.002 0.000 73
Efficiency 0.640 0.665 0.025 73
Asset Quality 0.001 0.000 -0.001 73
*Big banks are defined as such that have total assets of 50B and more (based on pre-
intervention); small banks are defined as all other banks populating the treated group. All
values are weighted by the total assets
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Change N of banks
Small Bank
Trading assets (as % of total assets) 0.012 0.013 0.0013 16
Investment banking advisory, broker-
age, and underwriting fees and commis-
sions (as % of interest and noninterest
income)
0.023 0.0308 0.007 30
Total GNA of derivative contracts held
for trading
4261852 8277239 4015387 10
Total GNA of derivative contracts held
for purpose other than trading
3103719 1055982 -2047737 24
Z-score 272 330.7 58.7 30
Available for sale securities (as % of to-
tal assets)
0.192 0.195 0.0032 32
Big Bank
Trading assets (as % of total assets) 0.140 0.113 -0.02695 15
Investment banking advisory, broker-
age, and underwriting fees and commis-
sions (as % of interest and noninterest
income)
0.0761 0.131 0.05473 15
Total GNA of derivative contracts held
for trading
2.40E+10 3.90E+10 1.50E+10 15
Total GNA of derivative contracts held
for purpose other than trading
3.20E+08 5.80E+08 2.60E+08 15
Z-score 183.59 269.92 86.33 15
Available for sale securities (as % of to-
tal assets)
0.130 0.147 0.017 15
Control Bank
Trading assets (as % of total assets) 0.007 0.0053 -0.0021 18
Investment banking advisory, broker-
age, and underwriting fees and commis-
sions (as % of interest and noninterest
income)
0.0621 0.07 0.0079 72
Total GNA of derivative contracts held
for trading
1.10E+07 2.90E+07 1.80E+07 24
Total GNA of derivative contracts held
for purpose other than trading
9.00E+06 1.60E+07 7.20E+06 50
Z-score 298.3 386.07 69.746 69
Available for sale securities (as % of to-
tal assets)
0.182 0.174 -0.0076 73
*Big banks are defined as such that have total assets of 50B and more (based on
pre-intervention); small banks are defined as all other banks populating the treated
group. All values are weighted by the total assets. The dollar amounts are reported
in thousands of dollars
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics. Covariates. Control banks
Profitability Efficiency Asset quality
Banks Pre- Post- Change Pre- Post- Change Pre- Post- Change
1St Source Corporation 0.0019 0.0028 0.0009 0.7085 0.6424 -0.0661 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003
American National Bankshares Inc. 0.0034 0.0027 -0.0008 0.5563 0.6343 0.0780 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001
Associated Banc-Corp 0.0028 0.0017 -0.0010 0.5273 0.7009 0.1736 0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0013
Bancfirst Corporation 0.0030 0.0025 -0.0005 0.6491 0.6544 0.0054 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
Bank Of Hawaii Corporation 0.0038 0.0029 -0.0009 0.5950 0.5928 -0.0022 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0003
Bar Harbor Bankshares 0.0022 0.0024 0.0002 0.6642 0.6020 -0.0622 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000
Bb&T Corporation 0.0032 0.0025 -0.0008 0.5646 0.6338 0.0692 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0004
C&F Financial Corporation 0.0039 0.0030 -0.0009 0.6740 0.6505 -0.0235 0.0010 0.0014 0.0004
Capital City Bank Group, Inc. 0.0024 0.0007 -0.0018 0.7092 0.8710 0.1617 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0003
Center Bancorp, Inc. 0.0016 0.0025 0.0009 0.7290 0.5232 -0.2058 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002
Central Pacific Financial Corp. -0.0007 0.0026 0.0033 0.7623 0.7670 0.0047 0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0023
Century Bancorp, Inc. 0.0015 0.0015 0.0000 0.7170 0.7098 -0.0072 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002
City Holding Company 0.0039 0.0036 -0.0002 0.5270 0.5477 0.0206 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
Columbia Banking System, Inc. 0.0021 0.0026 0.0005 0.6611 0.6803 0.0191 0.0007 0.0000 -0.0007
Commerce Bancshares, Inc. 0.0035 0.0030 -0.0005 0.6078 0.6151 0.0073 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0003
Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc. 0.0035 0.0028 -0.0008 0.6125 0.6480 0.0355 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001
Cvb Financial Corp. 0.0034 0.0033 -0.0001 0.5177 0.5037 -0.0139 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0005
Enterprise Bancorp, Inc. 0.0022 0.0019 -0.0002 0.7102 0.7108 0.0006 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001
Enterprise Financial Services Corp 0.0008 0.0024 0.0017 0.7642 0.5971 -0.1671 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0006
Farmers Capital Bank Corporation 0.0016 0.0017 0.0002 0.7798 0.7684 -0.0115 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0006
Farmers National Banc Corp. 0.0022 0.0022 -0.0001 0.6433 0.7240 0.0807 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0002
Financial Institutions, Inc. 0.0015 0.0023 0.0008 0.6503 0.6243 -0.0260 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0002
First Bancorp 0.0013 0.0002 -0.0011 0.5342 0.7099 0.1757 0.0012 0.0009 -0.0003
First Busey Corporation 0.0001 0.0022 0.0021 0.7279 0.6553 -0.0726 0.0014 0.0002 -0.0012
First Citizens Banc Corp 0.0008 0.0017 0.0009 0.7989 0.7217 -0.0772 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0005
First Citizens Bancshares, Inc. 0.0018 0.0018 0.0000 0.7265 0.7172 -0.0093 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002
First Commonwealth Financial Corporation 0.0018 0.0018 0.0000 0.6573 0.6718 0.0145 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0002
First Community Bancshares, Inc. 0.0024 0.0025 0.0001 0.6827 0.6486 -0.0341 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003
First Financial Corporation 0.0029 0.0030 0.0001 0.5962 0.6248 0.0287 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0002
First Merchants Corporation 0.0018 0.0024 0.0006 0.6519 0.6613 0.0094 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0005
First Mid Ill Bancshares Inc 0.0026 0.0022 -0.0004 0.6455 0.6472 0.0017 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001
First Midwest Bancorp, Inc. 0.0027 0.0014 -0.0013 0.5572 0.6926 0.1354 0.0010 0.0006 -0.0004
Fulton Financial Corporation 0.0029 0.0023 -0.0006 0.5924 0.6433 0.0509 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0002
German American Bancorp, Inc. 0.0024 0.0031 0.0007 0.6870 0.6052 -0.0818 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001
Hanmi Financial Corporation -0.0002 0.0034 0.0037 0.6391 0.6047 -0.0344 0.0017 -0.0006 -0.0023
Heartland Financial Usa, Inc. 0.0018 0.0021 0.0003 0.7091 0.7355 0.0265 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0004
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics. Covariates. Control banks. Continued
Profitability Efficiency Asset quality
Banks Pre- Post- Change Pre- Post- Change Pre- Post- Change
Heritage Commerce Corp 0.0009 0.0017 0.0008 0.7673 0.7276 -0.0397 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0011
Home Bancshares, Inc. 0.0019 0.0037 0.0018 0.6010 0.4655 -0.1354 0.0007 0.0011 0.0004
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated 0.0003 0.0025 0.0022 0.7613 0.6615 -0.0998 0.0019 0.0000 -0.0018
Iberiabank Corporation 0.0028 0.0017 -0.0011 0.6124 0.7472 0.1348 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0002
Independent Bank Corp. 0.0025 0.0024 -0.0001 0.6434 0.6619 0.0184 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002
Independent Bank Corporation 0.0006 0.0024 0.0017 0.7256 0.8129 0.0873 0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0011
International Bancshares Corporation 0.0033 0.0028 -0.0006 0.5536 0.5863 0.0327 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001
Lakeland Bancorp, Inc. 0.0019 0.0021 0.0002 0.6324 0.6066 -0.0258 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0003
Lakeland Financial Corporation 0.0026 0.0031 0.0005 0.5815 0.4915 -0.0900 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0003
Midsouth Bancorp, Inc. 0.0026 0.0014 -0.0011 0.7299 0.7571 0.0272 0.0004 0.0006 0.0002
Midwestone Financial Group, Inc. 0.0017 0.0023 0.0005 0.7047 0.6543 -0.0504 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001
Nara Bancorp, Inc. 0.0028 0.0029 0.0001 0.5515 0.4891 -0.0624 0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0016
Nbt Bancorp Inc. 0.0026 0.0024 -0.0002 0.5894 0.6474 0.0580 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0004
Park National Corporation 0.0035 0.0027 -0.0007 0.5412 0.6055 0.0644 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0004
Peoples Bancorp Inc. 0.0023 0.0019 -0.0004 0.6092 0.7380 0.1288 0.0008 0.0001 -0.0007
Peoples Utah Bancorp 0.0038 0.0028 -0.0010 0.5269 0.6195 0.0926 0.0009 0.0001 -0.0008
Popular, Inc. 0.0004 0.0021 0.0018 0.6497 0.8373 0.1876 0.0016 0.0010 -0.0006
Prosperity Bancshares, Inc. 0.0033 0.0034 0.0000 0.4805 0.4232 -0.0573 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001
Qcr Holdings, Inc. 0.0013 0.0017 0.0004 0.7418 0.7062 -0.0356 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0002
Regions Financial Corporation 0.0010 0.0017 0.0007 0.7595 0.6765 -0.0830 0.0011 0.0002 -0.0009
Renasant Corporation 0.0025 0.0022 -0.0003 0.6718 0.6937 0.0219 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003
Republic Bancorp, Inc. 0.0031 0.0035 0.0004 0.6047 0.6562 0.0515 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0002
Royal Bancshares Of Pennsylvania, Inc. 0.0013 0.0000 -0.0014 0.5557 0.9477 0.3920 0.0010 0.0010 0.0000
S & T Bancorp, Inc. 0.0040 0.0027 -0.0013 0.4673 0.5864 0.1191 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001
S. Y. Bancorp, Inc. 0.0038 0.0034 -0.0004 0.5790 0.5865 0.0076 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001
Sandy Spring Bancorp, Inc. 0.0023 0.0025 0.0002 0.6669 0.6383 -0.0287 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0006
Scbt Financial Corporation 0.0027 0.0021 -0.0006 0.6430 0.6971 0.0541 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0005
Shore Bancshares, Inc. 0.0031 0.0002 -0.0029 0.5732 0.7289 0.1557 0.0004 0.0006 0.0002
Southwest Georgia Financial Corporation 0.0023 0.0018 -0.0005 0.7594 0.8036 0.0442 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002
Summit Financial Group, Inc. 0.0018 0.0016 -0.0003 0.6373 0.6616 0.0243 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0005
Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc. 0.0017 0.0025 0.0008 0.6777 0.5477 -0.1301 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0003
Tompkins Financial Corporation 0.0032 0.0025 -0.0007 0.6118 0.6504 0.0386 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001
Trustmark Corporation 0.0034 0.0025 -0.0008 0.5698 0.6959 0.1261 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002
Union First Market Bankshares Corporation 0.0027 0.0021 -0.0006 0.6766 0.6988 0.0222 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001
United Community Banks, Inc. 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0012 0.6820 0.9306 0.2486 0.0014 0.0000 -0.0014
Valley National Bancorp 0.0033 0.0020 -0.0013 0.5172 0.6648 0.1476 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001
West Bancorporation, Inc. 0.0032 0.0031 -0.0001 0.4207 0.5181 0.0974 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003
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Table 2.6: Summary statistics. Covariates. Small banks
Profitability Efficiency Asset quality
Banks Pre- Post- Change Pre- Post- Change Pre- Post- Change
Auburn National Bancorporation, Inc. 0.0024 0.0022 -0.0002 0.5802 0.6319 0.0518 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0003
Banner Corporation 0.0002 0.0017 0.0015 0.7737 0.7309 -0.0428 0.0008 0.0001 -0.0006
Bok Financial Corporation 0.0028 0.0027 -0.0002 0.6069 0.6573 0.0504 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0007
Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc. 0.0005 0.0020 0.0016 0.8473 0.7506 -0.0967 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0004
Camden National Corporation 0.0031 0.0024 -0.0006 0.5331 0.6149 0.0818 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001
Cathay General Bancorp 0.0030 0.0029 -0.0001 0.4147 0.5082 0.0935 0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0012
Chemung Financial Corp 0.0024 0.0018 -0.0005 0.7049 0.7671 0.0622 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001
Colony Bankcorp, Inc. 0.0012 0.0012 0.0000 0.6402 0.7439 0.1037 0.0011 0.0002 -0.0010
Community Bank System, Inc. 0.0025 0.0029 0.0004 0.6804 0.6703 -0.0101 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001
F.N.B. Corporation 0.0023 0.0023 -0.0001 0.6494 0.6298 -0.0196 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0004
First Financial Bancorp 0.0035 0.0025 -0.0010 0.6734 0.6171 -0.0563 0.0007 0.0002 -0.0005
First Financial Bankshares, Inc. 0.0043 0.0042 -0.0001 0.5422 0.5265 -0.0157 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002
First Horizon National Corporation 0.0020 0.0012 -0.0008 0.7575 0.8428 0.0853 0.0009 0.0000 -0.0009
First United Corporation 0.0017 0.0011 -0.0006 0.6526 0.7842 0.1316 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0002
Heritage Financial Corporation 0.0028 0.0023 -0.0006 0.6098 0.6952 0.0855 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0003
Investors Bancorp, Mhc 0.0006 0.0016 0.0010 0.6432 0.5161 -0.1271 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001
Mainsource Financial Group, Inc. 0.0016 0.0024 0.0008 0.7079 0.7098 0.0019 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0006
Old National Bancorp 0.0020 0.0024 0.0003 0.7237 0.7461 0.0223 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0005
Old Second Bancorp, Inc. 0.0015 0.0010 -0.0005 0.6871 0.8473 0.1602 0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0017
Pacwest Bancorp -0.0017 0.0029 0.0046 0.9023 0.5789 -0.3234 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0011
Rockville Financial, Inc. 0.0010 0.0016 0.0005 0.7003 0.7484 0.0481 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001
Seacoast Banking Corporation Of Florida -0.0006 0.0013 0.0018 0.7667 0.8645 0.0978 0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0017
Southside Bancshares, Incorporated 0.0027 0.0026 -0.0001 0.6637 0.6551 -0.0085 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0001
Sun Bancorp, Inc 0.0005 -0.0018 -0.0023 0.8176 1.0257 0.2081 0.0005 0.0007 0.0002
Svb Financial Group 0.0033 0.0022 -0.0011 0.6834 0.5489 -0.1345 0.0004 0.0005 0.0001
Synovus Financial Corp. 0.0017 0.0018 0.0001 0.7477 0.6812 -0.0665 0.0013 0.0003 -0.0010
Trico Bancshares 0.0029 0.0023 -0.0006 0.6222 0.6701 0.0479 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0004
Umb Financial Corporation 0.0021 0.0020 -0.0001 0.7963 0.7764 -0.0199 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001
United Bankshares, Inc. 0.0033 0.0026 -0.0007 0.5199 0.5405 0.0206 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001
Washington Trust Bancorp, Inc. 0.0024 0.0028 0.0005 0.6483 0.6206 -0.0277 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
Wesbanco, Inc. 0.0023 0.0024 0.0000 0.6333 0.6250 -0.0083 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0003
Wintrust Financial Corporation 0.0018 0.0018 0.0000 0.6591 0.6589 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003
Table 2.7: Summary statistics. Covariates. Big banks
Profitability Efficiency Asset quality
Banks Pre- Post- Change Pre- Post- Change Pre- Post- Change
Bank Of America Corporation 0.0026 0.0010 -0.0016 0.5496 0.8215 0.2719 0.0013 0.0001 -0.0011
Citigroup Inc. 0.0020 0.0016 -0.0004 0.7628 0.6618 -0.1010 0.0019 0.0006 -0.0012
Citizens Financial Group Inc 0.0016 0.0003 -0.0014 0.6124 0.8268 0.2144 0.0007 0.0002 -0.0005
Comerica Incorporated 0.0027 0.0020 -0.0007 0.5866 0.6768 0.0902 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0005
Fifth Third Bancorp 0.0027 0.0031 0.0004 0.5620 0.6085 0.0465 0.0015 0.0001 -0.0014
Jpmorgan Chase & Co. 0.0016 0.0023 0.0007 0.6890 0.6478 -0.0412 0.0014 0.0002 -0.0012
Keycorp 0.0010 0.0024 0.0014 0.6773 0.6841 0.0068 0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0013
M&T Bank Corporation 0.0030 0.0030 0.0000 0.5517 0.5859 0.0341 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0002
Northern Trust Corporation 0.0030 0.0020 -0.0010 0.6649 0.7184 0.0535 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002
Pnc Financial Services Group, Inc., The 0.0034 0.0030 -0.0004 0.6318 0.6291 -0.0027 0.0011 0.0001 -0.0010
State Street Corporation 0.0019 0.0024 0.0005 0.7395 0.7507 0.0112 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001
Suntrust Banks, Inc. 0.0020 0.0021 0.0001 0.6571 0.6953 0.0382 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0006
U.S. Bancorp 0.0043 0.0037 -0.0005 0.4811 0.5378 0.0567 0.0008 0.0003 -0.0005
Wells Fargo & Company 0.0035 0.0033 -0.0002 0.5871 0.5985 0.0115 0.0011 0.0002 -0.0009
Zions Bancorporation 0.0014 0.0014 0.0000 0.6416 0.7249 0.0833 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0009
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1St Source 0.027 0.000 0.000
American National Bankshares 0.008 0.048 0.000 0.100 0.028 0.032
Associated Banc-Corp 0.000 0.000 -0.109 -0.103 -0.036 0.018
Bancfirst 0.051 0.056 0.044 0.000 -0.009
Bank Of Hawaii 0.005 0.032 0.132 0.068 0.000 0.088
Bar Harbor Bankshares 0.020 0.143 0.007 0.078
Bb&T 0.078 0.036 0.057 0.048 -0.026 0.031
C&F Financial 0.137 0.107 0.078 0.000
Capital City Bank Group, 0.000 0.000 -0.048
Center Bancorp, -0.156 0.000 -0.079
Central Pacific Financial Corp. -0.089 0.000 -0.006 0.000
Century Bancorp, -0.029 -0.067 -0.061
City Holding Company 0.024 0.018 0.000 0.000
Columbia Banking System, 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.000
Commerce Bancshares, 0.000 0.015 0.142 0.021 0.008 0.255
Cullen/Frost Bankers, 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.087 0.081 0.100
Cvb Financial Corp. -0.029 -0.079 -0.161 -0.044 -0.057
Enterprise Bancorp, 0.025 -0.036 -0.015 -0.078
Enterprise Financial Services
Corp
0.055 0.000 0.000 0.026
Farmers Capital Bank -0.017 0.028 -0.015
Farmers National Banc Corp. -0.043 -0.087 -0.045
Financial Institutions, -0.094 -0.070 -0.099 -0.052
First Bancorp -0.019 -0.029 -0.043 0.020
First Busey 0.000 0.018 -0.027
First Citizens Banc Corp -0.018 -0.080 0.046
First Citizens Bancshares, 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.000
First Commonwealth Financial 0.013 0.038 0.014 -0.018
First Community Bancshares, 0.053 0.031 0.015 0.000
First Financial 0.077 0.044 0.090 -0.047
First Merchants 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.024
First Mid Ill Bancshares Inc -0.116 -0.106 -0.106
First Midwest Bancorp, 0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.073 0.000
Fulton Financial 0.215 0.182 0.178 0.000
German American Bancorp, -0.071 -0.084 -0.092 -0.009
Hanmi Financial 0.230 0.152 0.176 0.108
Heartland Financial Usa, 0.000 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.154
Heritage Commerce Corp 0.064
Home Bancshares, 0.017 0.016 0.000 -0.043
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0.000 -0.130 0.000 -0.095 -0.060 0.003
Iberiabank -0.030 0.000 -0.007 -0.003
Independent Bank 0.028 0.211 -0.059 0.341 0.299 0.197
Independent Bank Corp. 0.000 0.313 -0.015 0.000 0.000
International Bancshares 0.022 -0.033 0.031 -0.021
Lakeland Bancorp, 0.083 0.074 0.063
Lakeland Financial 0.046 0.000
Midsouth Bancorp, 0.040 0.061 0.147
Midwestone Financial Group, 0.014 -0.077 0.030 -0.020
Nara Bancorp, 0.054 0.010 0.032 0.093
Nbt Bancorp 0.025 -0.031 0.063 -0.087
Park National 0.084 0.146 0.183 0.117 0.006
Peoples Bancorp -0.011 -0.087 -0.042 -0.038
Peoples Utah Bancorp 0.003 0.034 0.000
Popular, 0.200 0.176 0.241 0.171 0.277
Prosperity Bancshares, 0.000 0.066 0.000
Qcr Holdings, 0.000 0.000 0.035
Regions Financial 0.379 0.162 0.197 0.180 0.191 0.182
Renasant -0.136 -0.016 -0.044 -0.165
Republic Bancorp, 0.090 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.054 0.071
Royal Bancshares Of Pennsylva-
nia,
-0.012 0.000 -0.021 -0.025
S & T Bancorp, 0.001 -0.099 -0.015 -0.055 -0.051 -0.203
S. Y. Bancorp, 0.049 0.106 0.041 0.000
Sandy Spring Bancorp, 0.042 0.077 0.003 0.084
Scbt Financial 0.000 0.000 -0.031 -0.047
Shore Bancshares, -0.183 -0.100 -0.021 -0.216
Southwest Georgia Financial 0.000 -0.053 0.000
Summit Financial Group, 0.033 0.001 0.034 0.000
Texas Capital Bancshares, 0.004 0.048 -0.019
Tompkins Financial 0.032 0.076 0.019 0.040 0.020 0.129
Trustmark 0.040 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.011
Union First Market Bankshares 0.055 -0.002 0.085
United Community Banks, 0.000 -0.063 -0.033 -0.079 -0.037
Valley National Bancorp 0.026 0.259 0.010 0.091 0.193
West Ban, 0.000 0.022 -0.076 0.000
Sum of Weights 1.210 1.028 1.046 1.214 1.124 1.046
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1St Source 0 0.000 0.000 -0.031 0.040
American National Bankshares 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.053
Associated Banc-Corp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.026
Bancfirst 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.000
Bank Of Hawaii 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bar Harbor Bankshares 0.000 0.000 -0.074 0.000 0.006
Bb&T 0.071 0.017 0.183 0.000 0.025 0.001
C&F Financial 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.079
Capital City Bank Group, 0.070 0.000 0.000
Center Bancorp, 0.000 -0.030 0.000
Central Pacific Financial Corp. 0.014 -0.054 0.014 0.082
Century Bancorp, 0.034 -0.006 0.000
City Holding Company 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000
Columbia Banking System, 0.013 0.000 0.077 0.038 0.000
Commerce Bancshares, 0.045 0.000 0.075 0.066 0.067 0.079
Cullen/Frost Bankers, 0.000 0.000 0.043 -0.074 0.000 0.011
Cvb Financial Corp. 0.000 0.000 -0.066 0.000 0.014
Enterprise Bancorp, 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.021
Enterprise Financial Services
Corp
0.000 -0.022 0.000 0.000
Farmers Capital Bank 0.000 0.028 0.065
Farmers National Banc Corp. 0.000 -0.031 -0.031
Financial Institutions, 0.049 -0.019 0.000 0.000
First Bancorp 0.200 0.086 0.016 0.001
First Busey 0.000 0.048 0.021
First Citizens Banc Corp 0.000 0.022 0.007
First Citizens Bancshares, 0.000 0.061 0.047 0.039
First Commonwealth Financial 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First Community Bancshares, 0.000 0.023 0.000 -0.022
First Financial 0.030 0.021 0.019 -0.007
First Merchants 0.070 0.000 0.091 0.000
First Mid Ill Bancshares Inc 0.020 0.000 -0.056
First Midwest Bancorp, -0.061 0.043 0.000 0.000 -0.115
Fulton Financial 0.030 0.000 0.142 0.121
German American Bancorp, 0.075 0.000 -0.002 -0.003
Hanmi Financial 0.002 0.154 0.042 0.201
Heartland Financial Usa, 0.122 -0.112 -0.191 0.000 0.010
Heritage Commerce Corp 0.025
Home Bancshares, -0.024 0.000 -0.031 0.000
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0.000 0.072 0.031 -0.049 0.000 -0.027
Iberiabank 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.019
Independent Bank 0.000 0.136 0.406 0.064 0.040
Independent Bank Corp. 0.003 0.000 0.349 0.031 0.015 0.049
International Bancshares 0.058 0.112 0.027 0.008
Lakeland Bancorp, -0.001 0.000 0.000
Lakeland Financial 0.058 0.018
Midsouth Bancorp, 0.000 0.030 0.077
Midwestone Financial Group, 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.054
Nara Bancorp, 0.000 0.062 0.034 0.000
Nbt Bancorp 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000
Park National 0.125 0.051 0.048 0.066 0.004
Peoples Bancorp 0.197 0.204 0.020 0.017
Peoples Utah Bancorp 0.000 0.019 0.048
Popular, 0.151 0.000 0.065 0.101 0.020
Prosperity Bancshares, -0.023 0.000 0.000
Qcr Holdings, 0.000 -0.018 0.000
Regions Financial 0.388 0.001 0.000 0.081 0.046 0.128
Renasant 0.000 -0.043 -0.024 -0.020
Republic Bancorp, 0.005 0.030 -0.022 -0.105 0.000 -0.009
Royal Bancshares Of Pennsylva-
nia,
0.000 0.056 0.000 -0.006
S & T Bancorp, 0.277 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.040 0.050
S. Y. Bancorp, 0.051 0.000 0.034 0.000
Sandy Spring Bancorp, 0.052 -0.020 0.000 0.000
Scbt Financial -0.018 -0.026 -0.025 0.000
Shore Bancshares, 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.038
Southwest Georgia Financial 0.010 0.035 0.056
Summit Financial Group, 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.015
Texas Capital Bancshares, 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tompkins Financial 0.070 0.000 0.062 -0.005 0.000 0.020
Trustmark 0.033 0.016 0.012 0.031 0.000 0.000
Union First Market Bankshares 0.000 0.039 0.000
United Community Banks, 0.000 0.028 0.082 0.006 0.000
Valley National Bancorp 0.000 0.237 0.004 0.066 0.073
West Ban, 0.020 0.170 0.116 0.184
Sum of Weights 1.199 1.301 1.019 1.094 1.397 1.494
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Table 2.12: stimates of gaps for a representative treated unit. Big Banks. Calculated as
observed minus predicted





Profitability Efficiency Asset Quality
Trading Assets -0.0075 -0.0175 -0.0002 -0.0020 0.00021
(0.28) (0.16) (0.44) (0.55) (0.16)
IB advisory, brokerage,
and underwriting
0.024 0.071 0.0005 -0.031 0.0001
(0.53) (0.29) (0.458) (0.25) (0.10)
Total GNA of derivative
contracts held for trading
-4.9E+09 -8.5E+09 0.00024 0.044 0.00022
(0.542) (0.417) (0.79) (0.25) (0.75)
Total GNA of derivative
contracts held for purpose
other than trading
4.8E+08** 2.1E+08 0.00033 -0.0661 0.00024
(0.019) (0.26) (0.38) (0.12) (0.38)
Z-score 80.5 124.8 0.0003 -0.0228 0.0004
(0.47) (0.45) (0.565) (0.377) (0.71)
Available for sale securi-
ties
0.0096 0.0054 0.00044 -0.041 -5.0E-05
(0.84) (0.93) (0.42) (0.21) (0.28)
P-values are in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
Table 2.13: Estimates of gaps for a representative treated unit. Small Banks. Calculated as
observed minus predicted





Profitability Efficiency Asset Quality
Trading Assets 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.001 0.0019 0.0019
(0.78) (0.89) (0.06) (0.33) (0.33)
IB advisory, brokerage,
and underwriting
-5.85E-05 -1.21E-03 -0.0005 0.050 0.00016
(0.764) (0.736) (0.417) (0.736) (0.764)
Total GNA of derivative
contracts held for trading
-621580.7 2499686.2 -0.00082 0.074 0.000
(0.625) (0.375) (0.167) (0.21) (0.66)
Total GNA of derivative
contracts held for purpose
other than trading
-1125711 -1928116 -0.00013 0.06 7.7E-05
(0.7) (0.7) (0.32) (0.64) (0.84)
Z-score 9.3 20.4 -0.0007 0.0573 0.00001
(0.99) (0.86) (0.275) (0.71) (0.579)
Available for sale securi-
ties
-0.004 -0.021 -0.0005 0.0357 6.8E-0.5
(0.99) (0.726) (0.53) (0.93) (0.59)
P-values are in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
CHAPTER 2. BANKS UNDER THE VOLCKER RULE 108
Table 2.14: Estimates of gaps in Trading Assets as the percentage of Total Assets. Big









Bank Of America Corporation -0.0004 0.39 0.0012 0.56
Citigroup Inc. -0.0126 0.50 -0.0256 0.33
Citizens Financial Group Inc 0.0034 0.22 0.0022 0.44
Comerica Incorporated 0.0006 0.50 -0.0016 0.56
Fifth Third Bancorp 0.0049 0.44 0.0088 0.33
Jpmorgan Chase & Co. -0.0399 0.22 -0.0745 0.11
Keycorp -0.0075 0.22 -0.0074 0.33
M&T Bank Corporation -0.0002 0.83 -0.0027 0.22
Northern Trust Corporation -0.0028 0.28 -0.0085 0.33
Pnc Financial Services Group, Inc., The -0.0129 0.22 -0.0181 0.22
State Street Corporation -0.0055 0.28 -0.0132 0.33
Suntrust Banks, Inc. 0.0062 0.56 0.0139 0.33
U.S. Bancorp 0.0013 0.39 0.0036 * 0.06
Wells Fargo & Company 0.0186 * 0.06 0.0266 * 0.06
Zions Bancorporation 0.0001 0.50 0.0063 0.33
Table 2.15: Estimates of gaps in Trading Assets as the percentage of Total Assets. Small









Banner Corporation 0.0077 0.50 0.0062 0.78
Bok Financial Corporation -0.0005 0.89 -0.0013 0.83
Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc. 0.0001 0.39 0.0013 * 0.06
Camden National Corporation 0.0002 0.17 0.0005 *** 0.00
Cathay General Bancorp -0.0014 0.28 -0.0024 0.72
Community Bank System, Inc. 0 0.94 0 0.78
First Financial Bancorp -0.0001 0.94 -0.0001 0.94
First Financial Bankshares, Inc. -0.0045 0.50 -0.0077 0.33
First Horizon National Corporation 0.0083 0.39 0.0048 0.56
First United Corporation -0.0089 0.50 -0.0059 0.83
Seacoast Banking Corporation Of Florida -0.0033 0.72 -0.0026 0.89
Svb Financial Group 0.0007 0.28 0.0018 0.17
Synovus Financial Corp. 0.001 0.39 0.0007 0.72
Umb Financial Corporation -0.0021 0.28 -0.0039 0.22
Wesbanco, Inc. 0.0004 *** 0.00 0.0006 *** 0.00
Wintrust Financial Corporation 0.0006 0.11 0.0019 * 0.06
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Table 2.16: Estimates of gaps in IB advisory, brockerage, and underwriting fees and commis-
sion as a percentage of interest and non-interest income. Big Banks. Calculated as observed









Bank Of America Corporation 0.055 0.17 0.1974 ** 0.04
Citigroup Inc. -0.0469 0.90 0.0062 1.00
Citizens Financial Group Inc 0.0078 0.14 0.0114 0.18
Comerica Incorporated -0.0037 0.68 -0.0022 0.85
Fifth Third Bancorp 0.0024 0.17 0.0066 0.72
Jpmorgan Chase & Co. -0.0044 0.35 0.0026 0.76
Keycorp -0.0424 0.20 0.0117 0.63
M&T Bank Corporation -0.0184 * 0.08 -0.0091 0.48
Northern Trust Corporation -0.0001 0.34 -0.0003 0.25
Pnc Financial Services Group, Inc., The 0.0076 0.96 -0.011 0.97
State Street Corporation -0.014 0.23 -0.001 0.92
Suntrust Banks, Inc. 0.0064 0.63 0.048 * 0.06
U.S. Bancorp -0.0027 0.70 0.0093 0.39
Wells Fargo & Company 0.0606 * 0.07 0.1052 ** 0.04
Zions Bancorporation -0.0029 0.15 -0.0014 0.73
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Table 2.17: Estimates of gaps in IB advisory, brockerage, and underwriting fees and com-
mission as a percentage of interest and non-interest income. Small Banks. Calculated as









Auburn National Bancorporation, Inc. -0.0004 0.24 -0.0006 0.25
Banner Corporation -0.0002 0.14 0.0011 ** 0.03
Bok Financial Corporation 0.0008 0.75 0.0152 0.14
Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc. 0.0622 0.79 0.0287 1.00
Camden National Corporation -0.0101 0.46 -0.0222 0.18
Cathay General Bancorp 0.009 ** 0.04 0.0045 * 0.06
Chemung Financial Corp 0.0035 0.21 0.0099 ** 0.03
Colony Bankcorp, Inc. -0.0004 0.27 -0.0006 0.45
Community Bank System, Inc. -0.0023 0.49 0.0418 *** 0.00
F.N.B. Corporation 0.0073 0.44 -0.0002 0.94
First Financial Bancorp -0.0128 0.99 -0.0146 1.00
First Financial Bankshares, Inc. 0.0002 0.62 0.0018 0.23
First Horizon National Corporation -0.0477 0.17 -0.0167 0.93
First United Corporation -0.013 * 0.10 -0.0547 ** 0.03
Heritage Financial Corporation 6e-04 * 0.07 0.0031 *** 0.00
Mainsource Financial Group, Inc. -0.0041 0.68 -0.0064 0.87
Old National Bancorp -0.0037 0.68 -0.0053 0.94
Old Second Bancorp, Inc. 0.0033 0.13 0.0013 0.72
Rockville Financial, Inc. -0.0035 0.35 -0.0075 0.32
Seacoast Banking Corporation Of Florida -0.0009 0.42 -0.0068 0.45
Southside Bancshares, Incorporated -0.0024 0.25 0.0008 0.35
Sun Bancorp, Inc -0.0006 0.65 -0.0059 0.72
Svb Financial Group -0.0364 0.55 -0.0583 0.41
Synovus Financial Corp. 0.0209 0.69 0.0195 0.94
Trico Bancshares 0.0053 0.44 0.0064 0.56
Umb Financial Corporation 0.0019 0.55 -0.0019 0.55
United Bankshares, Inc. 0.0028 0.55 0.0123 0.15
Washington Trust Bancorp, Inc. -0.0193 0.70 0.0137 0.65
Wesbanco, Inc. 0.0073 0.55 0.0061 0.55
Wintrust Financial Corporation 0.0039 0.20 -0.0437 0.18
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Table 2.18: Estimates of gaps in derivatives held for trading. Big Banks. Calculated as









Bank Of America Corporation -3426424401 0.67 -28201411417 0.33
Citigroup Inc. 14271902067 0.33 20237822883 0.33
Citizens Financial Group Inc -8188296 0.42 16988034 0.33
Comerica Incorporated 2226795 0.54 2535154 0.63
Fifth Third Bancorp -8438739 0.42 6863972 0.63
Jpmorgan Chase & Co. -19801069324 0.54 -45256572509 0.33
Keycorp -31029728 * 0.08 -30491602 0.21
M&T Bank Corporation -16845 0.54 -2357333 0.63
Northern Trust Corporation 73398256 0.50 60217546 0.63
Pnc Financial Services Group, Inc., The -24079144 0.79 18678976 0.92
State Street Corporation 481741486 0.25 714682435 0.25
Suntrust Banks, Inc. -10204762 0.67 -22424581 0.67
U.S. Bancorp -11039624 0.38 83224620 ** 0.04
Wells Fargo & Company -464798393 0.54 2159546004 0.38
Zions Bancorporation -927494 0.38 -743712 0.67
Table 2.19: Estimates of gaps in derivatives held for trading. Small Banks. Calculated as









Bok Financial Corporation 6373137 0.58 12491934 0.58
Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc. -79580 0.42 343498* 0.08
Cathay General Bancorp 123771** 0.04 24477 0.13
First Horizon National Corporation -2726855 0.63 -3199752 0.71
Investors Bancorp, Mhc -59782 * 0.08 -92623 0.21
Sun Bancorp, Inc -971172 0.33 -1485928 0.21
Svb Financial Group 325065 0.42 2162472** 0.04
Synovus Financial Corp. -2641009 * 0.08 -1646348 0.42
Umb Financial Corporation 18772 0.46 18126 0.58
Wintrust Financial Corporation 1945631*** 0.00 5041557*** 0.00
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Table 2.20: Estimates of gaps in derivatives held for the purpose other than trading. Big









Bank Of America Corporation 1561979334*** 0.00 655931303 0.37
Citigroup Inc. -547824150 0.31 -1056591437 0.27
Citizens Financial Group Inc -3997983 0.73 -21910976 0.51
Comerica Incorporated -4505760 0.65 -1464127 0.98
Fifth Third Bancorp 2066138 0.71 -3731452 0.86
Jpmorgan Chase & Co. 623370352** 0.02 485263223 0.29
Keycorp 2301602 0.84 -2111189 0.92
M&T Bank Corporation 266176 0.78 781776 0.71
Northern Trust Corporation 4609215 0.12 1904707 0.71
Pnc Financial Services Group, Inc., The 153453048 0.12 86652714 0.63
State Street Corporation 3394965 0.20 16271787*** 0.00
Suntrust Banks, Inc. 168563 0.98 -8160482 1.00
U.S. Bancorp 1658146 0.86 5575592 0.84
Wells Fargo & Company -156174479 0.86 -174962154 0.86
Zions Bancorporation -2172486 0.27 -9641837 0.29
Table 2.21: Estimates of gaps in derivatives held for the purpose other than trading. Small









Auburn National Bancorporation, Inc. -8165 0.57 -15810 0.55
Banner Corporation 9701 0.98 70234 0.63
Bok Financial Corporation -1328 1.00 818393 0.31
Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc. 42684 0.55 111379 0.51
Camden National Corporation -103712 0.37 98329 0.39
Cathay General Bancorp -155986 * 0.08 200243 0.29
Community Bank System, Inc. -64034 0.35 -173764 0.22
F.N.B. Corporation -283188 0.18 -78698 0.82
First Financial Bancorp 631182 0.12 859981 0.29
First Financial Bankshares, Inc. 18300 0.51 36316 0.39
First Horizon National Corporation -11100739 0.57 -27883061 0.51
Old National Bancorp 422165 0.78 73036 0.92
Old Second Bancorp, Inc. -145970 0.41 -208172 0.53
Rockville Financial, Inc. 74228*** 0.00 820985*** 0.00
Seacoast Banking Corporation Of Florida 24579 0.84 86302 0.57
Southside Bancshares, Incorporated 89076*** 0.00 128151*** 0.00
Sun Bancorp, Inc 455088 0.55 -683275 0.69
Svb Financial Group -361419 0.71 -1365489 0.41
Synovus Financial Corp. -706213 0.84 -1344045 0.78
Umb Financial Corporation 106687** 0.02 564896*** 0.00
United Bankshares, Inc. -460591 0.55 -740773 0.51
Washington Trust Bancorp, Inc. 6243 0.78 100030 0.41
Wesbanco, Inc. -25839 0.61 242892** 0.04
Wintrust Financial Corporation -149326 0.57 -805052 0.57
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Table 2.22: Estimates of gaps in Z-score. Big Banks. Calculated as observed minus predicted.










Bank Of America Corporation -52 0.94 -104 0.86
Citigroup Inc. 69 0.12 160*** 0.00
Citizens Financial Group Inc 62 0.57 -45 0.42
Comerica Incorporated 97 0.13 216** 0.03
Fifth Third Bancorp 67 0.58 -16 0.96
Jpmorgan Chase & Co. 54 0.71 130* 0.10
Keycorp 177 0.30 105 0.39
M&T Bank Corporation -658 0.32 -690 0.38
Northern Trust Corporation 241 0.42 224 0.52
Pnc Financial Services Group, Inc., The -21 1.00 482** 0.01
State Street Corporation -28 0.74 -90 0.62
Suntrust Banks, Inc. 179 0.71 -213 0.81
U.S. Bancorp -714 0.39 -466 0.41
Wells Fargo & Company 77 0.78 120 0.70
Zions Bancorporation 82 0.93 -9 1.00
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Table 2.23: Estimates of gaps in Zscore. Small Banks. Calculated as observed minus pre-










Auburn National Bancorporation, Inc. 400 0.68 451 0.70
Banner Corporation -145 0.86 -194 0.88
Bok Financial Corporation -115 0.81 -555 0.16
Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc. 40 0.74 147 0.86
Camden National Corporation -123 0.55 -392 0.33
Cathay General Bancorp 348** 0.03 262 0.13
Chemung Financial Corp -21 0.99 -117 0.84
Colony Bankcorp, Inc. -208 0.61 -660 0.77
Community Bank System, Inc. 43 0.80 145 0.88
F.N.B. Corporation 456 0.48 703 0.26
First Financial Bancorp 237 0.55 299 0.77
First Financial Bankshares, Inc. -106 0.84 217 0.72
First Horizon National Corporation 25 0.91 -182 0.46
First United Corporation -100 0.49 -73 0.43
Heritage Financial Corporation -382 0.35 -325 0.39
Investors Bancorp, Mhc 254 0.28 340 0.13
Mainsource Financial Group, Inc. -146 0.74 -651 0.22
Old National Bancorp 124** 0.04 177 0.10
Old Second Bancorp, Inc. -195 0.57 -356 0.42
Pacwest Bancorp -59 0.86 -155 0.70
Rockville Financial, Inc. -77 0.30 -258 0.35
Seacoast Banking Corporation Of Florida -267 0.43 -246 0.67
Southside Bancshares, Incorporated -4 0.93 -145 0.39
Sun Bancorp, Inc -241 0.67 -589 0.28
Svb Financial Group 39 0.81 40 0.46
Synovus Financial Corp. -289 0.74 -140 0.71
Umb Financial Corporation -342 0.30 -470 0.33
United Bankshares, Inc. 737 0.39 53 0.87
Washington Trust Bancorp, Inc. 330 0.39 373 0.57
Wesbanco, Inc. 187 0.33 145 0.41
Wintrust Financial Corporation 9 0.93 544 0.19
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Table 2.24: Estimates of gaps in AFS securities as a percentage of Total Assets. Big Banks.









Bank Of America Corporation -0.0216 0.82 -0.0627 0.67
Citigroup Inc. 0.0227 0.74 0.0195 0.81
Citizens Financial Group Inc -0.1443 0.13 -0.2781 ** 0.01
Comerica Incorporated 0.0067 0.92 0.0084 0.89
Fifth Third Bancorp -0.0711 0.71 -0.0639 0.79
Jpmorgan Chase & Co. -0.0242 0.74 -0.0701 0.43
Keycorp 0.0114 0.76 0.1157 * 0.07
M&T Bank Corporation -0.0445 0.29 0.0099 0.89
Northern Trust Corporation -0.0581 0.74 -0.0706 0.79
Pnc Financial Services Group, Inc., The 0.0026 0.97 0.0299 0.81
State Street Corporation -0.0325 0.94 0.1643 0.71
Suntrust Banks, Inc. -0.0829 0.15 -0.1213 * 0.07
U.S. Bancorp -0.0423 0.29 -0.0217 0.74
Wells Fargo & Company 0.0564 0.63 0.0295 0.89
Zions Bancorporation -0.0531 0.29 -0.0253 0.33
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Table 2.25: Estimates of gaps in AFS securities as a percentage of Total Assets. Small









Auburn National Bancorporation, Inc. -0.0875 0.39 -0.0895 0.51
Banner Corporation 0.008 0.60 0.0191 0.89
Bok Financial Corporation -0.0255 0.81 -0.0419 0.79
Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc. -0.0471 0.51 -0.0141 0.82
Camden National Corporation 0.0659 0.51 0.0177 0.81
Cathay General Bancorp -0.1755 0.28 -0.1382 0.51
Chemung Financial Corp -0.1518 0.22 -0.2469 0.11
Colony Bankcorp, Inc. 0.0851 * 0.07 0.1436 ** 0.01
Community Bank System, Inc. 0.0106 0.75 0.24 0.11
F.N.B. Corporation 0.0878 0.51 0.0743 0.71
First Financial Bancorp 0.0416 0.83 -0.0182 0.97
First Financial Bankshares, Inc. -0.0664 0.46 0.2006 0.14
First Horizon National Corporation 0.0102 0.82 0.0323 0.57
First United Corporation -0.0026 0.86 -0.0468 0.74
Heritage Financial Corporation 0.0097 0.58 0.2152 *** 0.00
Investors Bancorp, Mhc -0.0352 0.99 -0.0705 0.90
Mainsource Financial Group, Inc. 0.0182 0.86 -0.0178 0.92
Old National Bancorp -0.0839 0.29 -0.0456 0.74
Old Second Bancorp, Inc. 0.0854 0.28 0.1244 0.24
Pacwest Bancorp 0.0776 0.38 -0.0855 0.43
Rockville Financial, Inc. -0.0461 0.57 0.0478 0.69
Seacoast Banking Corporation Of Florida -0.0379 0.71 0.0317 0.89
Southside Bancshares, Incorporated 0.0946 0.39 -0.0614 0.60
Sun Bancorp, Inc -0.122 0.46 -0.0538 0.79
Svb Financial Group 0.1771 0.29 0.035 0.79
Synovus Financial Corp. 0.0144 0.46 0.0117 0.69
Trico Bancshares -0.0316 0.57 -0.1121 0.38
Umb Financial Corporation -0.0165 0.92 -0.0466 0.86
United Bankshares, Inc. -0.0348 0.65 -0.0269 0.79
Washington Trust Bancorp, Inc. -0.0912 0.43 -0.1532 0.35
Wesbanco, Inc. -0.0367 0.78 -0.0003 0.92
Wintrust Financial Corporation -0.1569 0.22 -0.2276 0.21
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(a) Profitability (b) Efficiency
(c) Asset Quality
Figure 2.1: Covariates. Total Asset weighted average
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(a) Trading Assets (b) IB advisory, brokerage, and underwriting
(c) Total GNA of derivative contracts held for
purpose other than trading
(d) Total GNA of derivative contracts held for
trading
(e) Z-score (f) Available for sale securities
Figure 2.2: Synthetic control vs true values. Representative big bank
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(a) Trading Assets (b) IB advisory, brokerage, and underwriting
(c) Total GNA of derivative contracts held for
purpose other than trading
(d) Total GNA of derivative contracts held for
trading
(e) Z-score (f) Available for sale securities
Figure 2.3: Synthetic control vs true values. Representative small bank
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